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GOLDFARB V. VIRGINIA STATE BAR: THE




"The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide
sanctuary from the Sherman Act ... nor is the public service aspect of
professional practice controlling in determining whether § 1 includes
professions. ... " With these words, the United States Supreme Court
established the applicability of the Sherman Act 2 to the "learned pro-
fessions." The import of the Court's holding has not been lost on the anti-
trust enforcement agencies. They have recently filed suit or announced in-
vestigations of the activities of other professional organizations.3 Some
professionals, on the other hand, have attempted to read the decision
OAsst. Prof. of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.S., United States
Military Academy, 1954; M.S., Purdue University, 1960; J.D., University of Min-
nesota, 1967.
1. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2013 (1975) (citations
omitted).
2. Sherman Act ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
3. On Sept. 22, 1975, the Justice Department filed suit (Civ. No. 75-4640)
in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York against the
American Society of Anesthesiologists, challenging the Society's promulgation of
"relative value guides," which establish monetary values for particular pro-
cedures by anesthesiologists and are used by the Society's members to determine
fees. Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, Sept. 23, 1975, at 5, col. 2. The next day, the
Federal Trade Commission announced that it is investigating restraints on price
advertising by the eyeglass industry. Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, Sept. 24,
1975, at 14, col. 2.
More recently, the Federal Trade Commission has begun an investigation of
the practice of veterinary medicine, CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 10,167 (1976), and
has brought suit against the physician's ethical bans on advertising, American
Medical Assn, CCH TRADE REG. RE. ff 21,068 (1976). For its part, the Justice
Department prevailed at the district court level in its suit challenging the Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers' ethical ban on price competition, United
States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Engrs., 1975-2 TRA.DE CA.s. ff 60,604 (D.D.C. 1975),
and is pursuing an investigation into possible agreements in restraint of trade
among Texas accountants, Texas State Board of Public Accountancy, Dkt. 75-531,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 60,021 (1975).
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even more narrowly than Chief Justice Burger appears to have written
it, in an effort to salvage some practices of professional organizations. 4
Despite, or perhaps because of, the Chief Justice's attempt to limit
the holding to the facts before the Court, the decision raises more ques-
tions than it answers. For example, it is not certain that the decision can
be interpreted restrictively. It dearly applies to other professions, as well
as to attorneys. The actual scope of the Sherman Act's applicability to
other types of professional practices also remains to be delineated in further
litigation. Such practices as "advisory" fee schedules, professional licensing
restrictions, limits on solicitation and advertising, and boycotts of other,
closely related groups will almost certainly be challenged in time, although
the present emphasis appears -to be on mandatory fee arrangements for
professional services. This article will review briefly the holding and
logic of Goldfarb, and consider some of its implications for practices com-
mon to most professions.
It should be recognized at the outset that there may be other bases
on which to challenge particular professional practices, such as infringe-
ment of first amendment rights5 or violation of section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. 6 Such additional theories, however, are beyond the
scope of this article.
II. THE GOLDFARB HOLDING7
In 1971 Lewis and Ruth Goldfarb contracted to buy a house in Vir-
ginia and contacted an attorney to have the title examined. After he
quoted them a fee precisely equal to that suggested in the minimum fee
schedule published by the Fairfax County Bar Association, they tried to
find an attorney who would examine the title for -less. They wrote 36
attorneys, requesting quotations of their fees. Nineteen replied, none in-
dicating that he would charge less than the minimum fee set forth in the
schedule; some said that they knew of no attorney who would charge less.
The Fairfax County Bar Association, a voluntary association, had no
formal power to enforce the schedule. The Virginia State Bar Association,
to which all attorneys practicing in Virginia are required to belong, pro-
vided the enforcement. The State Bar is the administrative agency of the
Virginia Supreme Court for the regulation of the practice of law in Vir-
ginia. 8 "The State Bar had never taken formal disciplinary action to. com-
pel adherence to any fee schedule, but it published reports in 1962 and
4. See, e.g., Jeffers, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: A Narrow Decision, 38
TExAs B. J. 701 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc. v. State Board of
Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3493
(Mar. 18, 1975) (a state statute forbidding advertising prescription drug prices
held to.violate the first amendment).
6. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
7. 'The statement of facts and procedural history are taken from the Su-
preme Court opinion, 95 S. Ct. at 2007-09.
8. VA. CoDE ANN. § 54.49 (Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 41
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1969 condoning fee schedules, and issued two ethical opinions9 which in-
dicated. that fee schedules could not be ignored. The second opinion
stated that habitually charging less than the suggested minimum fee
schedule adopted by a local bar association raised a presumption of pro-
fessional misconduct.
The Goldfarbs had the title examined by the attorney they had first
contacted and then brought a class action against the State and County
Bar Associations, charging that the minimum fee schedule was a contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act.10 The district court, trying the issue of liability, held
that the minimum fee schedule did violate the Sherman Act and enjoined
the use of the schedule, setting the case down for trial to ascertain
damages.3" The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed as to liability.' 2 Although it agreed that the fee schedule and
the enforcement mechanism supporting it substantially restrained com-
petition among attorneys practicing in Fairfax County, it nevertheless
exemt ted the State Bar on the ground that it was immuiie under the doc-
trine of "'state action" set forth in Parker v. Brown.'3 The court held the
County Bar immune because it found that the practice of law was not
"trade or commerce," a prerequisite to the application of the Sherman
Act.'The majority opinion also recognized a limited exclusion of "learned
professions" from the antitrust laws, based upon the special regulation
the states impose on the professions, and the fact that some normal com-
petitive practices might be inconsistent with such regulation. The ap-
pellate court concluded that the fee schedule was one area in which
the needs of professional regulation conflicted with the requirements of
the antitrust laws, and held the practice of law exempt from the Sherman
Act. 'Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit found that the activities of the
State and County Bar did not have sufficient impact on interstate com-
merce to support jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.1 4
The Court said that the issue was "whether the Sherman Act ap-
plies 'to services performed by attorneys in examining titles in connection
with financing the purchase of real estate."' 5 The Court pursued a four-
step analysis: (1) Did the challenged activities amount to price fixing?;
(2) If so, were these activities in interstate commerce, or did they affect
9. Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 98 (June 1,
1960); Virginia State Bar Committee on Legal Ethics, Opinion No. 170 (May 28,
1971).
10. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ...
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
11. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973).
12. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974).
13. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
14. 419 U.S. 963 (1974).
15. 95 S. Ct. at 2009.
1976]. :
3
Tyler: Tyler: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
interstate commerce?; (3) If so, were these activities exempt from the Sher-
man Act because they involved a "learned profession"?; (4) If not, were the
activities exempt as "state action" within the meaning of Parker v. Brown?l0
Writing for a unanimous Court,17 Chief Justice Burger answered the first
two questions affirmatively, the second two negatively, and held that the
minimum fee schedule violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Price-Fixing
In addressing the price-fixing issue,1 8 the Court stated that an ad-
visory fee schedule or a mere exchange of price information, without a
showing of a restraint of trade, would present a different question. In
this case, the district court found there was a "fixed, rigid price floor,"
because every lawyer who responded to the Goldfarbs' inquiry10 ad-
hered to the fee schedule, and none sought additional information in
order to customize his fee. The Court noted that the fee schedule was
enforced through the threat of professional discipline, and that the
attorneys' natural desire to observe accepted professional norms was
reinforced by each attorney's knowledge that others would not compete
on the basis of price. There was no need to infer an agreement from
an exchange of price information-this was an overt agreement with a
plain effect on price. The Court emphasized that these activities were
particularly damaging to consumers, who could not avoid the system
because lenders required title insurance. This dictated a title opinion,
which could only be rendered by an attorney licensed to practice in
Virginia. All such attorneys-whether or not they were members of
the County Bar Association-were subject to the fee schedule. Thus,
the challenged activities constituted a "classic illustration of price fix-
ing."2
0
The Court's analysis did not add anything new to antitrust law, but
it did not really need to mine new veins. Price-fixing is, after all, the
most blatant type of case, a per se violation.21 This aspect of the decision
followed United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards,22
in which the Court held that a voluntary fee schedule adopted by realtors
16. Id.
17. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
18. 95 S. Ct. at 2010-11.
19. Only 19 lawyers responded. In 1971, there were approximately 382 at-
torneys admitted to practice in Virginia located in Fairfax County (not including
those in the independent cities of Arlington and Alexandria). 4 MARTINDALE-Hun-
BELL LAW DIR EroRY 661-765 (1971). Thus, fewer than five percent of the mem-
bers of the Bar responded to the Goldfarbs' survey and supplied the basis for
this conclusion.
20. 95 S. Ct. at 2011.
21. See notes 126-131 and accompanying text infra.
22. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
[Vol. 41
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violated Section 3 of the Sherman Act.23 Reflecting, perhaps, a realistic
appraisal of the implications of National Association of Real Estate Boards
(as well as Justice Department pressure), approximately 19 state bar associ-
ations had abandoned or suspended fee schedules by late 1974; only three
indicated then that they still published fee schedules. 24 However, many
local bar associations retained such schedules, even though the state
organization had abandoned them. Even the Fairfax County Bar As-
sociation kept its schedule in force until confronted with the possibility
of defeat in the Supreme Court.
The Court's emphasis on the fee schedule's harm to consumers may
be significant. Professor, now Solicitor General, Bork has advanced the
thesis that "Congress intended the courts to implement . . . only that
value we would today call consumer welfare . .. "25 Several earlier
Supreme Court opinions had also emphasized that the purpose of the
Sherman Act was to prevent harm to consumers.2 The services in Gold-
farb were indispensable to the particular transaction, and the purchasers
could not turn to alternative sources, so that consumer choice was arti-
ficially restricted. One of the fundamental tenets of our economic system
is that consumer welfare is maximized when basic economic decisions
are determined by forces of the marketplace, rather than by a centralized
decision-maker-regardless of whether that decision-maker is a govern-
ment official or a monopolist.2 7 Therefore, the consumer welfare test
suggested by Professor Bork has considerable appeal. If that is the touch-
stone, however, the Court's attempt to restrict its ruling to the pre-
cise facts before it is almost certainly doomed to failure, because many
other restrictions imposed by professional organizations affect consumer
welfare just as adversely as attorneys' fee schedules. 28
Similarly, the Court's attempt to distinguish a purely advisory fee
schedule seems unlikely to endure. To be sure, in 1958, the American
Bar Foundation suggested that a purely voluntary, informational fee
schedule might pass muster.29 The authors noted factors which would
23. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970). Section 3 is substantially identical to Section 1, ex-
cept that Section 3 applies to the District of Columbia and the federal territories.
Thus, interstate commerce need not be involved, but the other issues remain the
same.
24. Comment, Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules and the Antitrust
Laws, 1974 Dum E L.J. 1164, 1166-67.
25. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAw &
EcoN. 7 (1967). This argument is based upon the legislative debates preceding
enactment of the Sherman Act. Another author traces the inspiration for the
Sherman Act to widespread dissatisfaction with the proliferation of commodity
trusts during the latter part of the nineteenth century. H. TIORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTnTRusT POLICY 54-163 (1955).
26. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
27. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCrURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
1 (1970); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962).
28. See notes 125-189 and accompanying text infra.
29. J. LEARY & M. DotriY, MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULES AND THE ANTrrRUST Lws
2 (American Bar Foundation Research Memorandum Series, No. 12, 1958).
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help insulate such a plan, including: that no enforcement be involved; that
the.schedule be made available to the public as well as the profession;
and. that it be presented as a compilation of fees charged in the past,
as opposed to'a tabulation of fees to expect and charge in the future.8 0
Some cases involving trade associations have sustained price-reporting
schemes with these attributes.8" However, it is by no means certain that
even such sanitized plans would be sustained. Although the plan is "volun-
tary," if it results in placing a floor under fees, a violation should still
be found,3 2 because the harm to consumers would be exactly the same
as in Goldfarb. Thus, those state bar associations having "non-mandatory"
fee schedules should take little comfort from the "narrow" holding in
Goldfarb.3 3 Although it would require a more thorough analysis of
effect to establish a violation, one could still be found. Moreover, if most of
the attorneys in the state adhered to an "advisory" fee schedule, it
would be easy to infer an agreement to adhere to the schedule, as was
done in United States v. Container Corporation.3 4
The absence of an enforcement mechanism did not save the fee
schedule in National Association of Real Estate Boards, nor was there
any effective enforcement in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Go.,35
which: announced the per se rule for price-fixing. The need for finding
an enforcement mechanism in the threat of professional discipline is
also weakened by the Court's statement in Goldfarb:
Even without that threat [of professional discipline] the [ethi-
call opinions would have constituted substantial reason to adhere
to the schedules because attorneys could be expected to comply
- in order to assure that they did not discredit themselves by de-
parting from professional norms, and perhaps betraying their
professional oaths.3 6
Although the question of betraying professional oaths might not be
raised , legitimately under a voluntary fee schedule,3 7 there is, as the
Court noted, a natural human desire to observe accepted norms of be-
havior. Even if an advisory fee schedule or a report of past charges did not
reflect "professional norms," the effect of either probably would be to
create a rigid floor under prices. It is possible that the Court would
require a sampling of more than five percent of the practitioners88
30. Id.
.31. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
Tag Mfrs. Inst. v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949). See also Stocking, The Rule
of Reason, Workable Competition, and the Legality of Trade Association Activities,
21 U.Cm. L. REv. 527 (1954).
32. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
33. But see Jeffers, supra note 4.
34. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
35, 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
36. 95 S. Ct. at 2015.
37. It would be more difficult to predicate a breach of professional ethics on
consistent failure to observe a "voluntary" fee schedule.
38. See note 19 supra.
[Vol. 41
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/6
ANTITRUST AND THE PROFESSIONS
in the area to establish the existence of such a rigid floor, or t6 infer
an unlawful agreement, but that relates to the quantum of proof re-
quired, not the underlying principle. I
In sum, it seems unlikely that any fee schedule, whether mandatory
or not, will survive if it has the effect of fixing price; price-fixing is too
serious an offense to be avoided so easily. A fortiori, Goldfarb is a warning
to other professions to discard their fee programs.3 9
B. Interstate Commerce
The Supreme Court accepted the district court's findings that a
significant portion of mortgage funds came from outside Virginia, and
that a substantial amount of loans on Virginia real estate were guar-
anteed by federal agencies headquartered in the District of Columbia.40
Therefore, the very transactions which created the need for the particular
legal services involved were frequently interstate transactions, and the
necessary connection with interstate commerce was present. It was not
necessary to show that potential home buyers had been discouraged by
the fee schedules, because once a direct effect is shown, no specific magni-
tude need be proven.4 1 Nor was it necessary to show that fees were raised;
it sufficed that they were fixed.42
The Goldfarb Court appears to have applied a "flow of commerce"
theory in resolving this jurisdictional problem.43 The Court did interpret
this theory broadly on the facts before it. The facts that much of the
mortgage money came from lending institutions in other states and that
many mortgages were guaranteed by agencies headquartered outside the
state do not seem to compel a finding that the attorneys' services were an
integral part of an interstate transaction. This is especially true when
it is recalled that the attorneys' services "were carried on wholly within
the State of Virginia."44 This approach, of course, may merely be a reflec-
tion of the seriousness of the offense.
39. See note 3 supra. In recent years, the Justice Department has secured
consent decrees against various professional associations. See, e.g., United States
v. Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1972 TRADE CAs. f 74,007
(D.D.C.) (accountants); United States v. Am. Inst. of Architects, 1972 TRADE CAs.
ff 73,981 (D.D.C.) (architects); United States v. Am. Inst. of Civil Engineers, 1972
TRADE CAs. f 73,950 (S.D. N.Y.) (civil engineers). Shortly before his resignation,
former Attorney General Saxbe indicated that the Department's scrutiny of lawyers
and realtors was to be extended to doctors, dentists, pharmacists, accountants, en-
gineers, funeral directors, and veterinarians. He stated that professional groups
acting under state sanction should not be immune, especially in the present eco-
nomic climate when "personal services represent one of the most rapidly-rising cost
areas for consumers." BUREAU oF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ANTITRUST s& TRADE REGULA-
TION REPORTER, No. 692, p. A-5 (Dec. 10, 1974).
40. 95 S. Ct. at 2011-12.
41. Id. at 2012.
42. Id. See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
43. See authorities cited note 47 infra.
44. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 16 (4th Cir. 1974).
1976]
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The use of the restrictive "flow of commerce" theory in Goldfarb
reflects the Court's reluctance to rule more broadly than the particular
facts required. The Court noted, however, that there might be legal
services which affect commerce in other ways, just as there might be
services having no nexus with interstate commerce. 45 This language
suggests that the Court might, in a proper case, apply the broader "af-
fecting commerce" theory to determine whether a challenged activity
falls within the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act. The "affect-
ing commerce" theory says that an activity is within the scope of the
Commerce Clause4 6 if it has a direct and substantial effect on inter-
state commerce, even though the activity itself is not a part of inter-
state commerce.47 This doctrine has been interpreted broadly in Wickard
v. Filburn,48 Burke v. Ford,49 and Perez v. United States.5 0 In Perez, for
example, the petitioner was convicted of using extortionate means to col-
lect or attempt to collect extensions of credit in violation of Title II of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act 51-i.e., loan-sharking. He challenged
Congress' power to enact this legislation. The Supreme Court, in an 8-1
decision, 2 affirmed the conviction, saying: "extortionate credit transac-
tions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect
interstate commerce. . . .,53 It has generally been held that, in enacting
the Sherman Act, Congress meant to "go to the utmost extent of its
Constitutional power. . . ,,54 Given that scope, it is difficult to imagine
what professional services may not affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to be within congressional jurisdiction.
In a footnote,5 5 the Goldfarb Court discussed United States v. Yellow
Cab Company.56 In that case the Court held that taxi trips between
45. 95 S. Ct. at 2012.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
47. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948). See generally W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 160-234 (3d ed. 1970); VON KAUNOWSKI, 16 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTI-
TRUST ch. 5 (1975). With regard to the interstate commerce element in antitrust
cases, see Stem, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.B.A.J. 823
(1955); Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FrD.
B. J. 282 (1965); Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DUKE L. J.
236; Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 W. REs. L. REv. 66 (1963); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules as Price-
Fixing: A Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act, 22 Ahm-. U. L. Rnv. 439 (1973).
48. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
49. 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
50. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
51. Consumer Credit Protection Act, tit. II, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1970).
52. 402 U.S. at 157-58. Justice Stewart dissented on the &round that Congress
lacked authority to define as a crime and order the prosecution of such a wholly
local activity.
53. Id. at 154.
54. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558
(1944); Atlantic Cleaners 9: Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932);
United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724, 749 (C.C. Ill. 1894).
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2011 n.13.
56. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
[Vol. 41
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railroad stations used by passengers to change trains during interstate
journeys were part of the stream of interstate commerce, but that taxi
trips from the travelers' homes or offices to the railroad station, or vice
versa, were "too unrelated to interstate commerce to constitute a part
thereof within the meaning of the Sherman Act.'" 57 The Goldfarb Court
analogized the legal services at issue to the trips between stations in Yellow
Cab. This analogy, coupled with the dictum that "there may be legal
services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act,"5 8 might suggest that the Court was taking
the position that only those aspects of a fee schedule dealing with legal
services that affect interstate commerce are subject to the Sherman Act,
whereas those aspects of a fee schedule that do not affect interstate com-
merce would be immune from antitrust scrutiny. This interpretation of
Goldfarb would not be justified. First, it is not necessary to show that
each particular activity involved in a challenged transaction affects
interstate commerce, but only that the class of activities affects interstate
commerce. 59 As noted above, attorney's services, as a class, would clearly
have this requisite effect.60 Moreover, the Court noted in another part of
the opinion that the general activities of attorneys undeniably play an
important role in commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive ac-
tivities of attorneys may exert a restraint on commerce.6 1 Although this
language may be somewhat out of context here, it is equally relevant to
the question of jurisdiction. In short, it is nonsensical to sever the ele-
ments of a fee schedule, striking down those elements regarding activities
that affect interstate commerce, and upholding those that do not.
In sum, there is a constitutional requirement that activities affect
interstate commerce to be within the scope of the Sherman Act. If
Wickard and Perez are the standards, however, it is difficult to argue that
any professional services (with the possible exception of services rendered
by ministers) are beyond the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act. In
the case of the medical profession, for example, medical insurance and
payments from Medicare and Medicaid cross state lines, and are similar
to the interstate contacts found in Goldfarb. Furthermore, physicians and
hospitals purchase supplies in interstate commerce. 62 Similar considera-
tions pertain to dentists. 63 Although Goldfarb does not speak to the issue,
57. Id. at 230.
58. 95 S. Ct. at 2012.
59. Katzenbach v. McClung, 879 U.S. 294, 301 (1964); accord, Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971).
60. See notes 45-54 and accompanying text supra.
61. 95 S. Ct. at 2014.
62. See Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973) (finding
sufficient effect on interstate commerce from a Philadelphia hospital's purchase of
supplies from out-of-state sources).
63. But see United States Dental Institute v. Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists,
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it would seem that there is little left of those lower court cases, such as
Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere,64 which held
that the practice of medicine had insufficient effect on interstate com-
merce for Sherman Act purposes.
C. The "Learned Profession" Exemption
The most important result of Goldfarb may be its putting to rest the
canard that the professions, as such, are somehow above the antitrust
laws. The language quoted at the outset of this article is essentially a
reaffirmation of the egalitarian ideas embodied in our fundamental doc-
uments.6 5 The Court did, however, recognize that there may be special
problems associated with regulation of the professions. 66 It remains to
be seen how those "special problems" will be reconciled with the public
policy favoring free competition.
The language, "Whatever else it may be, the examination of a land
title is a service; the exchange of such a service for money is 'commerce'
in the most common usage of that term,"0 7 applies, of course, to everything
professionals do for their clients. It is certainly not novel to apply the
Sherman Act to the rendition of services.68 The Court was also correct in
noting that there is no support in the legislative history for an exemption
for "learned professions." 69 And the Court properly dismissed the language
64. 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
65. See also United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers, 43
U.S.L.W. 2269 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1974), where the court said: "It would be a very
dangerous form of elitism, indeed, to dole out exemptions to our antitrust laws
merely on the basis of the educational level needed to practice a given pro-
fession .. "
66. See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
67. 95 S. Ct. at 2013.
68. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United
States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955); United States v. National Ass'n of Real
Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950); American Medical Assn v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943).
69. The legislative debates are, at best, inconclusive. There is but one
reference to the professions, in a brief dialogue between Senators Edmunds and
Hoar, two of the chief draftsmen of the bill which finally became the Sherman
Act. One can only conclude that (1) the Senate was aware of some earlier attempts
by local bar associations to set minimum fees, and (2) these Senators expressed
no feeling that the professions should be treated any differently from other occu-
pations. See 21 CONG. Rxc. 2726 (1890). There is also some intimation that the
draftsmen believed that the bill, as originally drawn by the Senate Finance
Committee, might include the activities of the Women's Christian Temperance
Union. Id. at 2658-60 (speech by Senator Wilson). Senator Sherman apparently
thought that the WCTU might be affected, and did not oppose an amendment
introduced by Wilson to exempt explicitly organizations promoting enforcement
of the state police power. Id. The bill was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary, from whence it emerged with its present wording, absent the Wilson
amendment but still containing the language which some had thought might
encompass the WCTU. H. THoRELLI, TiE F=uRAL AN~rusT Poucy 197-202
(1955); 1 H. TOULMIN, Tim ANTI-TRUST LAWs OF Tim UNrxmn STATis 21-23 (1949).
THORELL, at 163-210, contains probably the most complete, accurate, and
concise summary of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. See also Coleman.
The Learned Professions, 33 ANTrrusr L.J. 48 (1967).
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in the cases relied on by the County Bar as "passing references in cases
concerned with other issues,"7 0 noting that the Court had twice previously
reserved the question of the applicability of the Sherman Act to the prac-
tice of a learned profession. 7' Thus, after Goldfarb, the members of the
professions are subject to the strictures of the Sherman Act and must
depend on judicial consideration for any limitations on the extent to
which the principles embodied in that Act should apply to their particular
practices.
The Court's emphasis on the commercial impact of lawyers' activ-
ities72 may offer some solace to the practitioners of other professions.
Physicians and dentists do not have as direct an impact on commercial
transactions, but this probably will not exempt them from the Sherman
Act. The opinion's concern with harm to consumers73 applies equally to
those professions. In the modern world, health is big business in the
aggregate,7 4 and anti-competitive conduct by health professionals dearly
has pronounced potential commercial impact.
In footnote seventeen, the Court said:
The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be
viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be
treated differently. . .. 5
The Court did not elaborate on this dictum, but it may suggest that most
activities of professional groups should be analyzed according to the
"rule of reason," even though the conduct complained of might be a
per se violation in another context. This requires a balancing of the
public interest in professional regulation against the public interest in
competition. Considering the strong commitment to competition-rather
than combination-as the market regulator, the burden should be on the
profession to establish clearly the need for the particular conduct. The
profession should be in the best position to establish that fact. Of course,
in such a case, the court would have to determine whether the public
need for professional regulation could be met by less restrictive means.
Where competition is either impossible or undesirable, the usual alternative
is some form of regulation by a public body,76 a solution not calculated
70. 95 S. Ct. at 2012 n.15.
71. Id. See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339
U.S. 485, 492 (1950); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528(1943).
72. 95 S. Ct. at 2014.
73. Id. at 2010.
74. Health care expenditures reached an estimated $94.1 billion in fiscal
year 1973, or 7.7 percent of the gross national product. AwmUCAN MEDcAL Asso-
CIATION, SOCIOECONOMIC IssuEs OF HEALTH 145 (1974).
75. 95 S. Ct. at 2018 n.17.
76. See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNEE, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-18 (1959); Pogue,
The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, ABA SECTION OF ANTrRusT LAW-
PROCEE NGS 313 (1961).
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to appeal to most professionalsY7 But if there is a need to reconcile the
public service aspect of the professions with the public policy favoring
competition embodied in the Sherman Act, such reconciliation should
probably be done by the Congress, rather than the courts. As the Goldfarb
Court recognized, there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemp-
tions.78 It seems that there should be at least an equally heavy presump-
tion against applying differing standards to different occupational groups.
Thus, the decision should put to rest the notion that certain occu-
pations enjoy protected status from the Sherman Act. However, the em-
phasis on commercial impact and the dictum of footnote seventeen will
require clarification from future cases. Such clarification may not be
long in coming.7 9
D. State Action
Parker v. Brown held that an anticompetitive agricultural marketing
program created by state statute did not violate the Sherman Act, because
that Act was intended to regulate private practices and not to prohibit
a state from imposing a restraint as an act of government. In the Goldfarb
context, Virginia, by statute,8 0 authorized the state's highest court to
regulate the practice of law, and established the Virginia State Bar s '
as an administrative agency of the court for the purpose of investigating
and reporting violations of the rules adopted by the court. The Virginia
court adopted ethical codes which dealt in part with fees, but which did
not authorize binding price-fixing. Rather, these codes directed lawyers
"not to be controlled" by fee schedules. The Supreme Court rejected the
claim of state action immunity,8 2 stating that the "threshold inquiry" is
whether the allegedly anticompetitive activity was required by the state
acting as sovereign. That ended the matter, because there was no basis
for saying that the state, either by statute or through the Virginia Supreme
Court Rules, compelled the adoption of the fee schedules. And, although
the State Bar was authorized to issue ethical opinions, there was no
showing that the Virginia court approved those opinions. Furthermore,
77. Current manpower legislation being proposed to the Congress in-
dudes not only a large bureaucracy but also elaborate systems of loans,
fee incentives and disincentives, and a very expensive tax packet to
enforce these goals .... The federal record in the last 30 years of medical
manipulation doesn't encourage further expansion of the [federal] bureau-
cracy in this direction.
Dr. Francis D. Moore, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Manpower for the
Study on Surgical Services for the United States, speaking to the annual meeting of
the American College of Surgeons in San Francisco on October 13, 1975, quoted in
The Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, Oct. 14, 1975, at 12, col. 1,
78. 95 S. Ct. at 2013, citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963), and California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
79. See note 3 supra.
80. VA. CoDE ANN. § 54.48 (Supp. 1974).
81. Id. at § 54.49.
82. 95 S. Ct. at 2014-16.
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the State Bar, by indicating that deviation from County Bar minimum fees
could lead to disciplinary action, voluntarily joined in private anticom-
petitive activity, and thus was unable to claim insulation from the Sher-
man Act.
Again, the Supreme Court did not have to carry its reasoning very
far on the facts of Goldfarb. It found that the state had not acted, and
thus there was no basis for the state action defense.83 If the anticompetitive
activity were compelled by the state in its sovereign capacity, further ex-
ploration of the state action defense would be required.8 4 The holding
is consistent with those cases which have held that the states have no
authority to permit private conduct which violates the antitrust laws,8 5
and that the immunity of Parker v. Brown does not extend to private
activities permitted, but not required, by law.8 6
The Court also noted:
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited
purposes does not create an anti-trust shield that allows it to foster
anti-competitive practices for the benefit of its members.8 7
As its authority the Court cited Gibson v. Berryhill,88 which enjoined
the Alabama Board of Optometry from hearing charges against salaried
optometrists on the ground that the .Board members stood to benefit
financially by excluding optometrists employed by corporations. This
may indicate a receptivity to the procedural due process analysis suggested
by Professor Verkuil and others.8 9 It also appears to call for strict scrutiny
of the professions, traditionally self-regulating, because of the regulators'
unavoidable pecuniary conflict of interest. In Parker v. Brown the state
83. "[I]t cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme
Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent." 95 S. Ct.
at 2015.
84. Several recent articles have examined the ramifications of the state
action defense. See, e.g., Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflec-
tions on Parker v. Brown, 75 CoLum. L. Rlv. 328 (1975); First, Private Interest
and Public Control: Government Action, the First Amendment, and the Sherman
Act, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 9; Comment, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis,
84 YA . L.J. 1164 (1975); Comment, Federal Antitrust Policy v. State Anticom-
petitive Regulation: A Means Scrutiny Limit for Parker v. Brown, 1975 UTAH L.
Rxv. 179.
The Court's holding on this point may call for a narrow reading of cases
like Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th
Cir. 1971), which said that the mere existence of a regulatory body created by
statute which could have authorized or directed the challenged conduct will
sustain the defense, even absent a showing that the regulatory body had actually
considered the conduct.
85. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
86. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962).
87. 95 S. Ct. at 2015.
88. 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973).
89. See Verkuil, supra note 84, at 344-48, 350; Comment, Federal Antitrust
Policy v. State Anticompetitive Regulation: A Means Scrutiny Limit for Parker
v. Brown, 1975 UTAH L. Rlv. 179; note 108 and accompanying text infra.
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regulatory agency included public officials as well as members of the reg-
ulated industry. The significance of the public representation is unclear
in the Parker opinion, but the fact that the State Bar and the Virginia
Supreme Court are composed solely of representatives of the profession
should lead the courts to scrutinize the claim of state action more closely.00
The same, of course, should apply to any regulatory body which is dom-
inated by persons subject to the regulation. Parker v. Brown does not
exempt private action masquerading as state action.0 1 The real question
is whether the actual decision-makers are public officials or the members
of the profession.92 Courts will often have to look beyond the state statute
or regulation to determine how the "regulatory" program actually op-
erates.9 3
Goldfarb leaves open the question of the effect of a fee schedule
established by the legislature,9 4 or set by the state's highest court either
pursuant to legislative authorization or to the court's inherent power to
regulate the bar. Similar questions are raised by statutes limiting entry
into the professions.95 Such situations will require the courts to weigh the
policies inherent in the state regulation against the federal policy set forth
90. The dominance of the regulatory body by the persons regulated is not
unique to the professions. A former Director of Policy Planning for the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of justice noted in 1970 that 75 percent of the
states' occupational licensing boards were composed exclusively of licensed
practitioners. Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regu-
lation, 39 ANrrmusTr L.J. 950, 955 (1970). Donnem suggested that the danger
that the licensing boards' pecuniary interests might lead them to inhibit com-
petition could be reduced by having at least some persons not in the occupation
serve on such boards.
If a state did create a public commission to regulate the professions along the
lines of public utility commissions, with jurisdiction to police rates and services
and control entry and exit, perhaps there would be no need for antitrust scrutiny.
See Verkuil, supra note 84, at 339 & n.64. But see id. at 340 ff. The danger, of
course, is that such a commission might come to be dominated by the profession,
much as lay members of a hospital's board of trustees tend to abdicate effective
control to the members of the medical profession. See Rayack, Restrictive Practices
of Organized Medicine, 13 ANrrrusr BULL. 659, 708-09 (1968) (hereinafter cited
as Rayack).
91. Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 263
F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
92. Cf. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Bldrs., Inc., 424 F.2d
25, 33 n.8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
93. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer-
ica, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
94. See, e.g., § 473.153(3), RSMo 1969 (setting minimum attorneys fees,
based on a percentage of the value of the estate's personal property, for services
rendered the estate at the instance of the executor or administrator). Section
473.153(5), RSMo 1969, provides that no executor or administrator, except one
who is himself an attorney, can appear in court except by an attorney; thus,
the consumer (estate) has no alternative, just as the Goldfarbs had no alternative
but to hire a Virginia attorney. Of course, the statute gives the probate court
discretion to allow a fee larger than that prescribed by the statute.
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in the Sherman Act.9 6 It frequently may not be possible to achieve a
wholly satisfactory reconciliation, in view of the lack of congressional
guidance about which of several possible goals is most important in a
particular situation. But the Sherman Act embodies a fundamental
policy in favor of free competition, 97 and the Congress "exercised all the
power it possessed" under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the
Sherman Act.98 On balance, the federal policy in favor of free competi-
tion should prevail over conflicting state schemes under the Supremacy
Clause.99
Thus, despite the attempt in Goldfarb to rule narrowly, it seems
likely that even acts directed by the state would fall if they were found
to be anticompetitive. The result might turn on whether the violation
charged is a per se violation, or requires a "rule of reason" analysis. In
the former case, the purpose the conduct was intended to serve would
be irrelevant.100 Under the latter approach, the countervailing policies
could be weighed, and the state's regulatory system sustained if it were
not found to be too anticompetitive. However, the challenged activity
would have to be scrutinized closely to ensure that the members of the
profession had not succeeded in advancing their personal economic in-
terests under the guise of state regulatory action. Perhaps the burden of
proof should be placed on the profession if it seeks to sustain the regula-
tion. As in many other areas, the result may turn on the nature of the
relief sought. A court might be more prone to find a violation in a suit
to enjoin enforcement of an offensive regulation than it would be if
the action were a criminal prosecution or a private action for treble
damages.
E. Dicta
The Goldfarb opinion concluded with a series of dicta' 01 in which
the Court recognized the states' "compelling interest" in the practice of
the professions. Under the states' police powers, they may establish
standards for licensing practitioners and regulate their practice. Such
standards might include restrictions on some forms of conduct which,
although commonplace in the business world, could be demoralizing to
a profession.10 2 Also, the states have a special interest in regulating
96. See authorities cited note 84 supra, for several suggested modes of
analysis.
97. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
98. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945).
99. U.S. CONST., art. VI, c. 2.
100. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
101. 95 S. Ct. at 2016.
102. The Court cited United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S.
326 (1952), which involved an alleged concerted refusal of the members of the
Society to deal with a private health association, and Semler v. Oregon State Board
of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), which sustained an Oregon statute
authorizing revocation of a dentist's license for engaging in untruthful or mis-
leading advertising. In Medical Society the Court said:
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attorneys because of their essential role in the administration of justice.10 3
The Supreme Court said that its holding in Goldfarb was not intended
to lessen the states' authority to regulate the professions.
These statements present the most troublesome aspects of the case.
Unfortunately, a great deal of litigation will probably be required to
clarify just what was meant or implied. They may only reflect the Court's
wrestling with the concept of federalism and the notion that the states
should be free to make their own economic decisions, regardless of whether
those decisions coincide with the economic principles held by the federal
judiciary. 04 Also, the dicta may indicate the Court's belief that economic
forces alone cannot provide sufficient regulation of the professions.105
The latter belief is, of course, one of the usual justifications for imposing
public regulation1o6 One could define the professions as "public call-
ings," and subject them to detailed state regulation.' 07 But, for the reasons
already alluded to-the federal policy favoring competition and the Su-
premacy Clause-even public utility type regulation should not provide
an absolute shield against Sherman Act inquiry, where regulation is in
fact anticompetitive.
Professor Verkuil has suggested a mode of analysis which a federal
court should follow in considering a challenge to such state regulation.108
First, the court must decide whether the state agency operated. under
procedures which granted due process to all interested parties. If due
process requirements were not met, the court could pursue the antitrust
inquiry, confident that no serious state interest was being infringed. How-
ever, if the state agency's procedures fulfilled due process requirements,
then the court would have to take up a second question: Does the state
have a pervasive regulatory scheme which requires the agency to examine
antitrust considerations and to enjoin conduct which is not satisfactory
in that light? If the state has such a pervasive scheme, the federal court
should abstain until the plaintiff had sought relief from the state agency,
unless the action were solely for injunctive relief.' 09 If the state, agency
ruled against the plaintiff, the court could intervene, but only after
We might observe in passing, however, that there are ethical consid-
erations where* the historic direct relationship between patient and physi-
cian is involved which are quite different than the usual considerations
prevailing in ordinary commercial matters. This Court has recognized that'
forms of competition usual in the business world may be demoralizing
to the ethical standards of a profession.
343 U.S. at 336 (citing Sdenler).
103. Attorneys have historically been regarded as officers of the court. See
note 114 infra.
104. See Verkuil, supra note 84, at 334.
105. Id. at 336.
106. Cf. C. KAYsEN & D. TuRNER, supra note 76, at 189-90.
107. Professor Verkuil suggests, this as one test to determine whether the
"state action" defense should be sustained. Verkuil, supra note 84, at 337.
108. Id. at 349-50. 1, 1 ,'
109. No abstention would be necessary where the action is only for injunctive
relief, because no serious damage is done ,while the matter is on appeal.: ,
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considering whether the jurisdiction of the state agency was exclusive-
i.e., is the challenged conduct necessary to make the state regulation
work? Although this approach contains substantial potential for delay, it
does leave room for state experimentation and still preserves a role for the
federal judiciary. The point is that even the most elaborate system of state
regulation should be open to antitrust scrutiny by federal courts.
The dicta seem to require a balancing of the state's interests in pro-
tecting the public health, safety, and other valid objectives by regulating
the professions against the policies of the antitrust laws. Such balancing
is very difficult for a court. It is basically a legislative task to consider
competing policies and select one to be paramount in a particular case.
As noted elsewhere, "[T]he federal judiciary has neither guidance from
Congress nor any particular expertise to determine which of the several
goals [of antitrust policy] is most important in a particular situation."1 10
The judiciary is even less equipped to make the determinations which
the Goldfarb dicta seem to require.
Unfortunately, the opinion does not elaborate on the nature of the
states' "compelling interest" in the practice of the professions, beyond
establishing standards for licensing and "regulating the practice." The
Court "recognized" that a state might limit a profession's use of the
forms of competition usual in the business world, citing United States
v. Oregon State Medical Society"' and Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of
Dental Examiners.112 The citation to Medical Society is of little help,
because it is to a dictum; the decision t.urned on a failure of proof.
Semler, dealing with prohibitions against advertising, is more directly in
point, although it was not decided on antitrust grounds, but rather on
due process and equal protection grounds. Also, it is a pre-1936 case, de-
cided during an era which-and by justices who-held a restricted view
of the Sherman Act. It is by no means certain that the case would be de-
cided in precisely the same way today.
The difficulty with this line of argument is that every scheme of
regulation is rationalized on the ground of the need to protect the pub-
lic from the incompetent or fraudulent practitioner. All occupational
licensing schemes, for example, are justified-at least in part-in this
fashion.113 In fact, such regulation protects the pecuniary interests of
those already in the occupation from competition from newcomers-e.g.,
by virtue of "grandfather" clauses which exempt those already in the
occupation from licensing requirements, and shields them from some of
the practices of their more aggressive competitors-e.g., advertising.
110. Comment, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE L.J. 1164,
1171 (1975).
111. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
112. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
113. "The intent of the tree expert law was primarily to protect the public
against tree quacks, shysters and inexperienced persons." Nels J. Johnson, Chair-
man of the Illinois State Tree Expert Examining Board, testifying before the Illinois
legislature, quoted in Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAW Sc EcoN. 93 (1961).
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Except for those occupations traditionally regarded as "public call-
ings"-innkeepers, hackmen, wharfmen, etc.-regulation is a relatively
recent phenomenon. The modern form of regulation of the legal" 4 and
medical" 5 professions dates from the latter part of the nineteenth cen-
tury; most other occupations came under regulation even later.118 This
may reflect growing public awareness of incompetence and deceit, but
it more likely represents the triumph of the professions' instincts for self-
aggrandizement and the growing effectiveness of their political lobbying
power." 7 In general, most aspects of regulation are left entirely to the
members of the professions;" 8 the states as such do not actually regulate
them.
If the states do have a strong interest in regulating professional
activities, then regulation should be provided by a politically responsible
state organ, having procedures that comport with due process and au-
thority to regulate rates and services and to control entry and exit.119
Such regulation, comparable to that presently imposed on public utilities,
would no doubt be anathema to members of the professions. The pro-
cedures to be followed should provide for full public, as well as pro-
114. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMS 218.49(1953) (hereinafter cited as POUND); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation,
2 BELL j. EcoN. & MGT. Sco. 3, 15, table 3 (1971). Perhaps the earliest attempt
in Anglo-American law to regulate admission to the bar occurred in 1292, when
a royal writ directed the Common Bench to designate a number of better-qualified
attorneys and apprentices who alone should appear before the court. 1 Rot.
Parl. 84 (1292), cited in T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAW
217-18 (5th ed. 1956). Plucknett does not disclose what prompted the issuance
of that royal writ; one cannot help but wonder whether the practitioners then
"riding circuit" asked the King to issue it.
115. In America the earliest regulation of the practice of medicine appears
to date from about 1760 in New York City, and from 1767 in New York State.
See People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Soc'y of Erie County, 24 Barb. 570 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1857). Regulation of the medical profession on a broad scale, however,
dates from the latter half of the nineteenth century. See Comment, The American
Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and Politics zn Organized Medicine, 63 YALE
L.J. 938 (1954); Stigler, supra note 114; Moore, supra note 113, at 103, table 3;
E. FREIDsON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 3-23 (1970) (hereinafter cited as FREIDsON).
116. Stigler, supra note 114; Moore, supra note 113, at 103, table 3. See also
FRamsON, supra note 115.
117. FREaISON, supra note 115; Stigler, supra note 114; Moore, supra note 113.
See also M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 139-40 (1962) (hereinafter cited
as FREMmAN).
118. The efficacy with which the professions regulate themselves has been
challenged. For example, a study of the bar of Metropolitan New York estimated
that fewer than 2 percent of the violators of the Canons of Ethics were even in-
vestigated by the disciplinary agency, and only 0.2 percent were officially sanc-
tioned. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHIcs 170 (1966). An earlier study of the Chicago
bar, displayed similar results. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962). Carlin
notes that there may be differences in the bars of smaller metropolitan areas,
because of the different structure of legal work, less stratification of the profession,
etc., all making for a more homogeneous, closer professional community. Id. at
23. However, no definitive studies are available to substantiate or refute this.
With respect to the medical profession, see FREIDSON, supra note 115, at 185-99.
119. C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, supra note 76, at 11-18 (1959); Verkuil, supra
note 84, at 339, 350 (semble).
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fessional, input into the decision-making process. 120 Indeed, the regula-
tory body should be established to insure that policy decisions emanate
from public representatives, rather than representatives of the profession.
If state regulation does not provide at least this much, and demonstrably
satisfy at least one of the goals of antitrust policy,' 2 ' however, then "state
action" should not be a bar.12 2
The usual justification for professional self-regulation is that the
specialized skills required and special problems presented can only be
assessed by persons trained for and working in the professions. 123 This is
a fiction. Laymen, in the role of jurors, are asked to evaluate professional
practice in malpractice cases, with the aid of expert testimony. There is
no reason to believe that a public commission, advised by representatives
of the profession, could not do an adequate job. Such a commission might
be better able than members of the affected profession to balance the
public interest in competence and integrity with the public need for
ready availability of the services at reasonable costs. Such a body could
determine qualifications for entry and practice and pass on questions of
unethical or improper behavior with greater objectivity than members
of the profession, whose self-interest may cloud their view. The danger,
of course, is that lay members might abdicate their responsibilities, ef-
fectively leaving the regulation to the professional "advisers." An analogy
might be found in the lay bodies which nominally control hospitals.
In practice, the lay governing bodies tend to delegate control over "medi-
cal standards" to the physicians already admitted to the staff.' 2 4 If this
120. Professor Verkuil expresses the hope that public interest law firms and
group legal services "may consciously represent the interests of consumers of legal
services and thus serve as the equivalent of public representatives and intervenors."
Verkuil, supra note 84, at 355 (citations omitted). It is submitted that such rep-
resentation is unlikely to be adequate, even though the legal profession is not
monolithic. See Carlin's studies, supra note 118. This is because those working
in such firms are still members of the profession and conditioned by law teachers
to respond much the same as other members of the profession. Of course, the
other professions have no such internal subgroup comparable to the public in-
terest law firms to provide public input; presumably, opportunity would have
to be provided for input from the public at large. Should the legal profession
be treated any differently?
121. At least three goals have been ascribed to federal antitrust policies: (1)
preservation of competition, in order to maintain allocative efficiency; (2) pres-
ervation of competition to protect consumers by insuring adequate quality at a
fair price; (3) preserving small competitors, for noneconomic reasons as well as
to approximate the "perfect market." Comment, Parker v. Brown: A Preemption
Analysis, 84 YA.E L.J. 1164, 1170 (1975). See generally Bork, Bowman, Blake &-
Jones, Goals of Antitrust-A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 363 (1965).
122. Verkuil, supra note 84, at 337, 339.
123. MacIver, The Social Significance of Professional Ethics, 297 ANNALS,
Am. Acrn. POL. 9- SOC. ScL 118 (1955), quoted in M. PnrsG, PROFESSIONAL REsPON-
smrLTYr 47-53 (2d ed. 1970); Desmond, Integrate the New York Bar, 13 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 201, 202 (1961); POUND, supra note 114, at 10-11.
124. Rayack, supra note 90, at 708-09; AMER. COLL. OF SURGEONS & AMER.
SURGICAL AS'N, SURGERY IN THE UNITED STATES: A SUiMARY REPORT OF THE
STUDY ON SURGICAL SERVICES FOR THE UNITED STATFS 187 (1975) (semble) (herein-
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were found to occur in a commission established to regulate a profession,
then the existence of the commission should not insulate the scheme from
antitrust scrutiny.
Many (and perhaps most) observers will welcome the Court's attempt
to rule narrowly on each case according to its facts. This is, after all,
the evolutionary method by which our Anglo-American legal system has
developed. To be sure, it is cumbersome and slow, but it may well yield
better results than broad judicial pronouncements which must later be
retracted or modified. Still, it seems doubtful that the Court's endeavor
in Goldfarb to preserve a zone within which the states can experiment in
regulating the professions without federal interference can stand for long,
unless the states impose affirmative regulation of the professions similar
to that now imposed on public utilities.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS or GOLDFARB
Read most narrowly, Goldfarb deals only with the legal profession.
However, nothing in the opinion suggests that the Court intended to
limit its rationale to the legal profession. Some of the language of the
opinion strongly implies that other professions are equally subject to the
Sherman Act.12 5 Thus, it is important to assess the potential impact of
Goldfarb on some practices common to most professions.
In order to make such an assessment, one should recall some general
principles of antitrust law. In 1911 the Supreme Court announced that
the Sherman Act did not condemn all restraints of trade, but only those
which were unreasonable. 12 6 The "rule of reason" doctrine requires a
plaintiff or prosecutor to demonstrate not only that the alleged act was
perpetrated, but also that the act was unreasonable or contrar to the
public interest. This requires the court to make an extended inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding the performance of the act, its pur-
poses, and its effect on competition. Frequently, a court must undertake
an extensive foray into economic theory to determine whether particular
acts or conditions are "reasonable" or in the public interest.
Some practices, however, have been declared to be inherently hostile
to competition. These acts, denominated per se offenses, are considered
to be so anticompetitive as to warrant their condemnation without ex-
tended inquiry into their effects in particular cases or the circumstances
after cited as SOSSUS). See also FREIDSON, supra note 115, at 23-35, detailing the
pervasive influence of the American Medical Association over American medical
practice.
125. See, e.g., note 1 and accompanying text supra, and the opening sentence
of the concluding section of the Goldfarb opinion: "We recognize that the States
have a compelling interest in the practice of the professions. . . ." 95 S. Ct. at
2016. The cases cited in that concluding section were United States v. Oregon
State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), and Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935), further suggesting extension of the principles of
Goldfarb to other professions.
126. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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which gave rise to them. The per se offenses include horizontal price-
fixing, territorial allocations, concerted refusals to deal, and agreements
tying the sale of one product to the purchase of another.127
One must also recall that the law does not condemn all combinations
of competitors. Trade associations, for example, are condoned unless they
indulge in prohibited anticompetitive activities, such as price-fixing. 28
Such associations' activities are viewed in toto, and if no anticompetitive
results or purposes are found, the association is not disturbed. A similar
approach to professional organizations would permit legitimate activities
designed to enhance the caliber of the profession, but would condemn
anticompetitive behavior.
The professions, however one defines them, do differ from ordinary
commercial combinations. All the recognized professions involve special
skills, usually acquired through prolonged training. It is often said that
a professional's work is so specialized that the uninitiated cannot readily
evaluate his performance or determine the desirable qualifications for
membership. Also, the functions performed by professionals are usually
considered very important to society.12 9 For these reasons, and because of
the inherent conflicts of interest present when professionals are allowed
to regulate themselves, all the activities of professional associations should
be subject to searching scrutiny. Some activities, such as "ethical" bans
on price competition, fall within traditional per se categories and should
not require elaborate inquiry. Most professional activities, however, will
require a rule of reason analysis, balancing the special circumstances of
the professions against the policy favoring competition. In making these
analyses, however, it is important to distinguish between the technical
side of the profession's work (as to which the members of the profession
can claim some expertise) and the manner in which this expertise is
made available. Professionals are not necessarily better qualified than
laymen to pass judgment on the latter aspect.' 3 0 The analysis will vary,
depending upon which aspect of the profession is under examination, but
even the technical aspect of professional conduct should not be immune
from antitrust scrutiny, at least in the absence of a congressional declara-
tion to that effect.' 3 '
127. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See
C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, supra note 76, at 142-44, for a discussion of appropriate
criteria for application of per se rules.
128. Compare Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925), with American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
See generally Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition, and the
Legality of Trade Association Activities, 21 U. CHI. L. Rrxv. 527 (1954).
129. Cf. POUND, supra note 114, at 9-10; PIRSlG, supra note 123, at 50; Wade,
Public Responsibilities of the Learned Professions, 21 LA. L. REv. 130 (1960).
130. FirtxmsoN, supra note 115, at 24, 337 ff.
131. Id. at 335-82. In the remainder of this article, it is assumed that the
required effect on interstate commerce can be established to reach the activities
discussed. See notes 40-64 and accompanying text supra.
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A. Admission to Practice
The question of restrictions on admission to professional practice is
probably the most difficult one which may confront the courts. 3 2 Para-
phrasing Professor Friedman, licensure is the key to the professions' con-
trol over their areas of responsibility.13 3 Most jurisdictions restrict ad-
mission to practice the professions, ostensibly to protect the public from
the incompetent and unethical. Most have delegated the task of promul-
gating standards for licensure to the professions themselves. 13 4 Thus, the
professions' power to control the details of their work is political in na-
ture, involving the aid of the state in establishing and maintaining their
preeminence in their respective fields.' 35 Nonetheless, such restrictions
have by now become so ingrained that the Goldfarb Court acknowledged
them in dicta and appeared to condone them. 86 It is submitted that
this apparent acceptance of restrictions is ill-advised. Because of their po-
tential anticompetitive effects, limitations on entry into the professions
should be scrutinized closely.
Such restrictions, of course, constitute barriers to entry and enhance
the return to those already practicing in the field at the expense of the
public. 1 37 If the number of persons admitted to a profession is artificially
restricted to a number less than that which would result from the opera-
tion of ordinary market forces, those already in the profession would be
able to use the forces of supply and demand to garner higher fees than
they would receive in a fully competitive situation. This in turn leads
to a misallocation of resources, because more is expended for the services
rendered than would otherwise be spent. Also, the cost of professional
services may be increased to the point that a significant segment of the
public is "priced out" of the market. This apparently has happened with
the legal profession, particularly regarding middle-income persons who
cannot qualify for free legal assistance under some federal program.' 38
132. Thus far the federal antitrust authorities have not indicated any in-
tentions to challenge professional organizations in that area.
133. F~mFAN, supra note 117, at 150. Professor Friedman was speaking
of the medical profession and referring to control over the number of physicians.
The statement appears equally applicable to other professions. See also R. POSNER,
EcoNomic ANALysis oF LAw 346-48 (1972) (hereinafter cited as POSNER); FREID-
SON, supra note 115, at 23 ff.
184. FREDMuN, supra note 117, at 137-60, esp. 139-40; POSNER, supra note 133,
at 346-48; W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FRE-DOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RrsTRAINTS
106 ff (1956).
135. FREIDSON, supra note 115, at 23 ff. Professor Freidson was speaking only
of the medical profession, but his analysis need not be limited to that profession.
To be sure, the legal profession's power evolved from the lawyers' control over
access to the courts which apparently originated with a royal writ in 1292. See
note 114 supra. See also POUND, supra note 114, at 221-350, discussing the decline
and resurrection of the American bar during the nineteenth century.
136. See notes 101-24 and accompanying text supra.
137. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPlETITION (1956).
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Artificial barriers to entry are viewed with suspicion, if not antipathy,
in other areas of antitrust law,1 39 and they should fare no better simply be-
cause the barriers have been raised by a profession.
An additional problem with restrictions on admission to practice
stems from the definition of what constitutes the "practice" of a given pro-
fession. In most cases-at least in both medicine and law-this has led to
defining as the "practice' a number of services that could be performed
adequately by less highly trained persons, presumably at a lower cost.140
This in turn resulted in the professions' extending their control over re-
lated, subordinate occupations.1 41 Neither result is necessarily in the pub-
lic interest; on the contrary, both tend to enhance the amounts expended
on those activities defined as "professional."
The professions' claim that only one trained for a profession can ade-
quately evaluate the competence needed for admission to its practice has
been disputed.1 42 Logically, even a prolonged period of training and a
rigorous examination does not insure that the would-be practitioner is
either ethical or capable of judging competence. And, although such re-
quirements may insure some minimal level of competence at the date of
admission, they do nothing to insure maintenance of an adequate level
of competence. Finally, as Professor Freidson notes (speaking of the
medical profession), neither the expertise nor the expert has been ex-
amined with sufficient care to allow an intelligent formulation of the
proper role of the expert in a free society. Expertise is increasingly sus-
ceptible to use as a mask for privilege and power, rather than as a mode
of advancing the public interest.1 43
The "unprofessional" solicitation of business and the performance of
unnecessary services are other concerns of those who fear abolition of re-
139. Alcoa's erection of artificial barriers to entry in the domestic aluminum
market was a major factor in Judge Learned Hand's finding that Alcoa had
illegally monopolized the relevant market. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954), in which Judge Wyzanski emphasized the barriers to entry created
by United Shoe's "lease only" policy.
140. FRim^AN, supra note 117, at 150-57; POSNER, supra note 133, at 346-47.
141. FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, at 150; FRIEDSON, supra note 115, at 47-70.
The legal profession is now confronting the problem of the paralegal assistant
and his place in the profession. See Wall Street Journal, Friday, Nov. 14, 1975, p.
38, col. 1. The legal profession has also engaged in running disputes with realtors
and title companies concerning the status of drafting real estate documents as
unauthorized practice of law, State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust
Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961), and with accountants and various other groups
whose activities occasionally intrude on what the lawyers consider to be their
"turf." This is reminiscent of the disputes between doctors (M.D.) and chiroprac-
tors, osteopaths, and others. Cf. FREMDSON, supra note 115, at 29-30; Rayack, supra
note 90, at 716-17.
142. FR=MAN, supra note 117, at 147-48, 150-60; POSNER, supra note 133,
at 347-48; FREiDSON, supra note 115, at 337-40.
143. FarmsoN, supra note 115, at 337.
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strictions on entry into the professions.' 44 Even if there is a danger of un-
ethical behavior which is somehow avoided by restricting entry, such
problems can be better handled through disciplinary actions. The weak-
ness in the "unnecessary services" argument is that the professions, espe-
dally medicine and law, perform essentially consultation functions. Pro-
fessionals do not go into the street, lasso clients, and force services upon
them; instead, they depend on the clients to come to them if they think
they have a problem.145 It may be true that an underworked surgeon,
for example, may decide to operate when other treatment would be pre-
ferable. Nevertheless, some client must bring the problem to him in the
first instance. Although "elective" or "cosmetic" surgery may not be
necessary to maintain life or health, presumably the patient considers it
important enough to undergo it. As long as he does not prevent a sick
person from obtaining treatment or otherwise endanger the patient, there
is no reason why a doctor should deny him help.' 46 As Professor Friedson
points out,147 where the terms of work make diagnosing and treating ill-
ness more profitable, more illness will be found. Similar comments can
be made about other professions. If there are abuses of this type, dis-
ciplinary remedies are or should be made available.
Friedman characterizes licensure as the American Medical Associa-
tion's means of dominating the medical practice and opines that the re-
sults have been progressively less adequate medical treatment for the pub-
lic and a stifling of innovation in the methods of delivering health care.148
144. FRiEOmSAN, supra note 117, at 152, points out that this is objectionable
on both ethical and factual grounds: the argument that the professions must
limit entry so that their members will earn an adequate income and therefore not
have to resort to unethical practice amounts to saying that the professions must
be paid to be ethical. If that is so, Friedman notes, it is doubtful that the price
would have any limit.
A similar argument-that an excessive number of people trained in surgery
leads to unnecessary operations-is advanced by the American College of Surgeons
and the American Surgical Association to justify their proposal for a drastic cut
in surgical residencies. Presently 2500-3000 new surgeons per year are trained.
These organizations have called for a reduction of about one-third in the number
of residencies (to a level sufficient to produce 1600-2000 surgeons per year) and
the restriction of hospital surgical privileges to "board certified" or "board qual-
ified" surgeons (those who have completed an extended residency in surgery and
become, or are ready to become, "diplomates" of an appropriate specialty board).
At present, the grant of surgical privileges is not restriT to board certified or
qualified surgeons, but is available (in the discretion of the particular hospital)
to any licensed M.D. or D.O. SOSSUS, supra note 124, at 81-90.
It is true that Carlin's studies of the metropolitan Chicago and New York
bars indicate that those lawyers at the lowest level of the profession, where
competition is most fierce, are most likely to violate ethical proscriptions. CARLIN,
supra note 118.
145. FPREDSON, supra note 115, at 21-22.
146. Cf. SOSSUS, supra note 124, at 89-90, discussing "unnecessary operations."
147. FPR.DSON, supra note 115, at 359.
148. FRIEmDAN, supra note 117, at 150-60, emphasizing the AMA's opposition
to group health and prepaid health plans. See also Comment, The American Med-
ical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J.
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Although the medical profession has received more hostile publicity,
logic does not require limiting such criticism to that profession. 149 Li-
censure contributes strongly to the structures of the professions, which in-
fluence their work.150 Perhaps some relaxation of the barriers to entry
into the professions, and a resulting whiff of competition, would pro-
foundly revolutionize the methods of providing services to the benefit of
the public.
The courts need not be concerned that the restrictions on entry to
the professions are hallowed by the passage of time. It is true that the
legal profession has exercised considerable control over access to the courts
for centuries, 151 but its influence has not been consistent. 52 In fact, as of
1886, only 50 percent of the states licensed attorneys. 53 Regarding other
professions, 50 percent of the states did not license dentists until 1887,
nor physicians until 1894.1" Thus, no long-established tradition of pro-
fessional autonomy existed at the time the Sherman Act was adopted.
There is scant reference to the professions in the legislative history of
the Act, but one debate between Senators Edmunds and Hoar (two of
the principal draftsmen), does suggest that those gentlemen thought that
associations of professionals would not be treated any differently from
other occupations, at least with respect to price-fixing.155 The relevance
of legislative history may be questioned, because conceptions of the role
of competition do change with time, but the fact remains that Congress
did not exempt professional licensing. In the absence of any such declara-
tion, courts should be loath to find any implied exemption.
Professional licensing is probably the most appealing case for the
"state action" exemption.156 However, this should not automatically ex-
empt licensing from coverage by the Sherman Act. Rather, courts should
feel free to make a detailed examination of the effect of the restriction
and condemn it if it is anticompetitive.
The issues involved in professional licensing do not lend themselves
to per se treatment, notwithstanding the serious anticompetitive effects
938 (1954); Comment, Medical Societies and Medical Service Plans, 22 U. CHI. L.
Rav. 694 (1955).
The legal profession is now meeting the problems of prepaid legal services.
Compare, Justice Department Continues its Contentions that the Houston Amend-
ments Raise Serious Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A.J. 1410 (1974) (remarks of
Asst. Atty. Gen. Thomas E. Kauper and Spec. Asst. to the Asst. Atty. Gen. Joe
Sims), with, Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal Service Plans
Get an Airing before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A.J. 791 (1974).
149. See, e.g., Carlin's studies, cited in note 118 supra.
150. FREmsON, supra note 115; see also Carlin's studies, supra note 118.
151. See note 114 supra.
152. See POUND, supra note 114.
153. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. LAw & ECON. 93, 102 (1961); see
also Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BFLL J. EcoN. & MGT. Sci. 3
(1971).
154. Moore, supra note 153, at 103, table 3.
155. See note 69 supra.
156. See notes 80-100 and accompanying text supra.
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of barriers to entry. In analyzing such a case, the courts should consider,
among other things, the following: the purpose of the licensing require-
ment; the adequacy of the regulation (whether it is comprehensive regu-
lation of conditions of entry and exit, rates, etc., or merely a barrier to
entry to protect the economic interests of members of the profession); the
nature of the regulatory body (whether it includes adequate representa-
tion of the public interest or is solely controlled by members of the pro-
fession); and the effect of the restriction (whether it promotes the public
interest or only that of the profession). This inquiry requires a legislative
determination, rather than a judicial one. Only that branch can adequately
consider the conflicting interests involved and arrive at an acceptable
solution. Congress has chosen to do so in other areas, and should act here
also, if it believes an exemption to be necessary. Unless and until Con-
gress does act, however, the courts should not hesitate to confront the dif-
ficult questions presented. Considering the complexities involved, perhaps
the courts should adopt a presumption against such barriers to entry and
place the burden of justifying an exemption on the professions.
B. Admission to Professional Education
Closely related problems are presented by restrictions on admis-
sion to professional education. If specialized training is a precondition to
licensure, and such training must be conducted in institutions accredited
by the profession, membership in the profession can be effectively re-
stricted by limiting the enrollment of the training institutions. Of course,
the justification again is the need to insure the adequacy of the technical
training of the new entrants to protect the public welfare. Indeed, several
commentators have noted that this, rather than licensure itself, is the
point at which the American Medical Association exercised its influence
to restrict the number of physicians. 151 The legal profession, if it has tried
this method at all, has been markedly less successful, because law schools
presently are turning out about twice the number of graduates as the
157. Rayack, supra note 90, at 671-76; FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, at 150-55;
Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 971-72 (1954). In fairness, it should be
noted that the number of approved medical schools has expanded from 79 schools
with a total enrollment of 26,186 and 6,135 new graduates in 1950-51, to 112
schools with a total enrollment of 47,546 and 10,391 new graduates in 1972-73.
AMacA MEDICAL ASS'N, SOCIOECONOMxIC ISSUES o. HEALTH 186, table 64 (1974).
However, there are many more applicants for medical training than can be ac-
commodated. In 1972-73, 36,135 applied for admission to medical school; 13,352
new entrants were accepted. COORDINATED COUNCIL ON MEDICAL EDUCATION,
PHYSICIAN MANPOWER AND DISTRIBUTION: THE RoLE OF THE FOREIGN MEDICAL
GRADUATE 25, table 6 (1975) (this is a preliminary report, subject to approval
by the five parent bodies of the CCME). At least partly as a result of the limitation
on American medical graduates, 7,419, or 44.5 percent of the 16,689 total licen-
tiates representing additions to the medical profession in 1973 were graduates of
foreign medical schools. Id. at 21, table 2.
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number of legal openings. 158 The American Bar Association apparently
has not attempted to limit the number of accredited law schools. None-
theless, many would-be lawyers are turned away, largely because of funding
limitations imposed on law schools.159
Before one runs to the barricades to demand abolition of restrictions
on professional education, one should consider other factors. For example,
how much of society's resources should be expended in training profes-
sionals? The question is in terms of society's resources, because few if any
professional schools are wholly self-sustaining. In 1972 it cost society from
$16,300 to $26,400 per student per year to train medical students, with-
out considering the costs of internship and residency training.8 0 By com-
parison, legal training is a bargain, costing only about $1,300 per student
per year.161 Other professionals presumably fall somewhere between these
two extremes. Such comparisons are admittedly inexact because of dif-
ferences in the type and amount of training involved, but obviously so-
ciety expends a great deal more in training a physician than an attorney
or others who do not require graduate or professional training. Clearly,
a judgment as to the numbers of each profession society needs, and is
willing to pay for, is required. Again, such a judgment is properly a
legislative responsibility.
Certainly, there is a public interest in maintaining adequate standards
in professional training. The defect in the present system is that the
task of determining and applying the standards is left to members of the
affected professions, whose economic self-interest may influence their per-
formance. That could be remedied by placing the responsibility for ac-
creditation and admission standards for professional training institutions
in an administrative body, constituted so that responsibility for policy
formulation falls on persons not in the profession. Of course, such a body
could draw on the expertise of the profession through an advisory body.
Care would be required to insure that the professionals' role was advisory
only.16Z Ideally, the establishment of such a system should be part of a
158. Although the Department of Labor projects annual requirements of
16,500 law school graduates for the period 1972-1985, U.S. DEPT. Or LABOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL MANPOWER 9: TRAINING NEEDs, Bull. No. 1824,
p. 38 (1974), 43,798 persons took a bar examination in 1974. Of these, 35,396 were
taking a bar examination for the first time. 44 Tm BAR ExAAINER 115, 117 (1975).
The number actually entering practice is unknown, because some persons pursue
a career in business or politics after admission to the bar.
159. See note 144 supra. Many law schools have been forced to limit the size of
entering classes because of constraints on physical plant and numbers of authorized
faculty positions. As a result, the ratio of applicants to admittees seems to run
about 7 or 8 to 1.
160. ASSOCIATION OF AmEmucAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, UNDERGRADUATE MEDICAL
EDUCATION: ELEz~NTs-OBJECTIVES-COSTS (Report of the Committee on Financ-
ing of Medical Education) 13, table 3 (1973).
161. Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, Oct. 29, 1975, p. 21, col. 2 (data
for the University of Wisconsin Law School).
162. Cf. Rayack, supra note 90, at 717-18; FRmIDSON, supra note 115, at 363-68.
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carefully considered, comprehensive, and legislatively formulated national
policy for the professions.
One should bear in mind, however, that any attempt to impose such
regulation on the numbers of persons to be trained for each of the pro-
fessions carries the danger of centralized direction as to career choice and
location for practice. At present, such decisions are left to the individual,
who presumably reaches them on the basis of economic and personal fac-
tors. This arrangement has resulted in a tolerably adequate coverage of
the professions.' 63 If it is determined to limit the number of training spaces
for any of the professions, there is a danger that certain areas of the
country, or certain specialized skills, may lack even minimally adequate
coverage. There would then be strong pressure to alleviate such an im-
balance by some form of governmental action: perhaps initially by per-
suasion-e.g., offering economic inducements such as forgiveness of stu-
dent loans, assistance in establishing a practice, etc., but ultimately by
fiat if necessary. This begins to sound rather Orwellian.
The fact remains that, in the absence of any coherent national policy,
such decisions are in effect being made today by essentially private or-
ganizations-the societies which accredit professional schools and the
school administrations which are forced to limit enrollments due to
budgetary considerations. The situation thus cries for legislative de-
terminations of the extent of public support such training should receive
and of the extent to which the strictures of the Sherman Act should apply
to admission to professional training. In the event that Congress does not
act, a court will be confronted with precisely the same issues as those pre-
sented by professional licensure. Limitations on professional training in
some areas constitute insurmountable barriers to entry. There is less justi-
fication for restrictions at this level than at the level of licensure. There-
fore, any involvement by professionals in imposing such restrictions (as
by unduly stringent accrediting standards, pressure on professional schools
to limit enrollment, etc.) would appear to constitute a combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade. One must concede, however, that it will be
more difficult to establish involvement of the professional associations in
this area than in others.
C. Professional Discipline
Determining when a person, once admitted to a profession, should
be expelled for incompetence or breach of ethical standards is closely re-
lated to the two areas just discussed and is equally problematic. It would
163. See SOSSUS, supra note 124, at 82:
•.. [A] free system of career choice and location for practice has resulted
in a remarkably widespread distribution of surgeons in the United States.
While there are some regional inequities, and one might consider some
of the specialties overpopulated, the overall distribution of surgeons would
be very difficult to improve by forcible constraint, obligatory service, or
penalties for failure to follow legal directions.
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do no 'good, to invalidate the licensing restrictions if the profession could
reconstruct them through the device of bringing disciplinary proceedings
against the nonconformist. Also, the same conflict of interest considerations
are present. Other professionals might initiate disciplinary proceedings
against aggressive competitors, as in Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental
Examiners.164
Today, 'professional discipline seems to be more discussed than af-
fected. The legal profession has been criticized for formally disciplining
very few violators. It has been noted that the public visibility of the of-
fense is the principal factor in determining the severity of the official sanc-
'tiofi imposed. A person operating in the fringe area of the profession is
far more likely to be disciplined, and to be disciplined more severely, than
is the member of a profession's elite group. These observations suggest that
the function of formal controls has been to forestall public criticism of
the profession.'0 5 It has also been said that the medical profession's hy-
pothesized profession-wide sense of responsibility is manifested almost en-
tirely in its standards for training and admission. Everi in well-organized
work settings in which there is ample opportunity for observation and
regulation, there is little effort to exclude an offender from practice. In-
stead, the characteristic mechanism of control is the personal boycott, in
which a physician stops referring his patients to the offender and refrains
from consulting him. This results in a lack of any effective internal regu-
lation.166
The professions are also criticized for an apparent reluctance to initi-
ate or testify in malpractice actions.'0 7 These symptoms may merely re-
flect the "There, but for the grace of God, go I" syndrome, or they may
reflect a natural hesitance to second-guess the judgment of a colleague
who may have made difficult decisions under pressure with less complete
information than hindsight provides. Nevertheless, the public needs pro-
tection from the incompetent and unethical practitioner. Problems arise
when the procedures adopted for that purpose are shrouded in secrecy,
when the standards followed are not clearly articulated, and when the de-
cisions are arrived at through procedures neither comporting with tra-
ditional notions of due process nor guaranteeing even-handed application
to all practitioners. Leaving responsibility for such matters entirely with
the profession means that either the discipline will not .be administered-
as is the case at present-or that it may be administered in accordance with
the prejudices and predilections of the profession: the iconoclast is ex-
pelled, but the pillar of the profession gets a slap on the wrist.
Again, the ideal solution might be to establish a board independent
of the profession, or at least having strong public respresentation. Until
164. See notes 176-178 and accompanying text infra.
165. J. CARLiN, LAwYras' ETHICS 170 (1966).
166. FREADSON, supra note 115, at 161, 190-99.
167. See, e.g., Wade, Public Responsibilities of the Learned Professions, 21
LA. L. R.v. 180 (1960).
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-such a board is created, courts must evaluate each challenge on its par-
.ticular facts, striking down those practices which appear to be motivated
by anticompetitive considerations.
D. Specidlization
Admittedly, specialization can enhance the efficient and productive
use of resources. It can also be anticompetitive, and therefore more costly
to society; to the extent that others are prevented from practicing in the
area of the specialty.'0 8 '
The medical profession has developed specialization to a greater de-
gree than other professions. Certification as a specialist is controlled by
the members of the specialty. Certificates are granted on the basis of com-
pleting a prescribed course of residency at a teaching hospital and pass-
ing an examination administered by the certifying agency. 169 Neither state
licensing lawys nor the ethics of the profession, however, preclude any li-
censed doctor: from holding. himself out as pursuing a particular spe-
.cialty,170 although some hospitals might restrict certain privileges to. per-
sons having board certification.171 Also, one who holds himself out as a
surgeon and who is sued in a malpractice action will be held, by most
courts, to 'the standard of care of board-certified practitioners of that
specialty.17 2 Thus, there are powerful incentives for one to restrict his
activities to fields in which he has been certified.
The legal profession is just coming to grips with the 'question of
recognizing specialties, although a certain amount of de facto specializa-
168. See, e.g., Mindes, Lawyer Specialty Certification: The Monopoly Game,
'61 A.B.A.J. 42 (1975); Rayack, supra note 90, at 703-16.
169. Telephone.conversation with Dr. Jack M. Colwill, Associate Dean of the
Medical School 'at the University of Missouri-Columbia, May 5, 1975; memoran-
dum of call in writer's files.
170. Id. There are presently 94,000 physicians active in surgical work. Of
these, 52,000 are either board certified or board qualified (having completed a
residency and undergone board examination), and 12,000 are residents in surgery.
The remaining 30,000 active in surgery are neither board certified nor qualified.
SOSSUS, supra note 124, at 27, table 4.
171. Indeed, the SOSSUS report, having concluded that a pool of 50,000 to
60,000 board certified surgeons plus about 10,000-12,000 interns and residents
would be sufficient for surgical care in the United States for the next 40-50 years,
SOSSUS, supra note 124, at 22, recommends restricting the grant of hospital sur-
gical privileges to board-certified or board-qualified surgeons, with, of course, a
'grandfather" clause for those "older persons who have demonstrated long service
in their communities as effective surgical specialists." Id. at 83. The grant of
hospital privileges is apparently a local decision, at least initially. FREIDSON, supra
note 115, at 138; Rayack, supra note 90, at 701. However, because the same
committee that accredits medical schools also accredits hospitals, and hospitals
must be accredited in order to get the interns they need for their house staffs,
the profession can exert considerable pressure on the hospitals, and might use
that pressure for anticompetitive purposes. Rayack, supra note 90, at 663-65.
172. See, e.g., Wells v. Nayar, Cal. Super., Alameda County, Docket No.
407215 (1974), briefed in 31 CrrAnION 5 (1975); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757
(Del. Super. 1974); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif,, 13 Cal.3d 177, 118
Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P,2d 553 (1974); Raite v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 22 Md. App.
196, 322 A.2d 548 (1974).
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tion has existed for some time-especially in areas such as tax, securities,
and antitrust. Much of the current furor seems to revolve ariound the de-
gree to which one can advertise his specialty, which is a part of the ad-
vertising problem, to be discussed below. However, many proponents of
legal specialization have couched their arguments in terms that raise the
specter of exdusivity.17 3
If specialization in any profession has the effect' of exclusivity, the
public interest in ready availability of services at reasonable prices will
suffer. Paraphrasing an example given by Professor Friedman,174 it would
be comparable to saying that, if a Cadillac is the best car produced in the
United States, then no other cars should be manufactured; all should be
compelled to buy Cadillacs. There ought to be room for one to employ a
Ford lawyer, if he so chooses. Again, ideally, the standards for specialization
and the limitations imposed on the remainder of the profesgion should be
scrutinized dosely for anticompetitive effect by some group outside the
profession, and any attempt to make the specialities exclusive should be
suspect.
E. Advertising
The professions' ethical restrictions on advertising have been suc-
cessfully challenged on grounds other than their anticompgtitive impact.17 5
Currently, the Justice Department is bringing the first suit challenging
such proscriptions on antitrust grounds.' 7 6 The action is against ihe
American Pharmaceutical Association and the Michigan. State Pharma-
ceutical Association, charging them with conspiring to restrain competition
by adopting codes of ethics barring their members from advertisingretail
prescription, drug prices. The Federal Trade Commission has proposed
regulations which would invalidate state and local laws barring advertis-
ing of prescription drug prices, but these regulations are not expected to
become effective until sometime in 1976.177 The FTC is also investigating
state laws and professional codes. prohibiting price advertising for eye-
glasses and contact lenses.1 78
The stage is thus being set for a reconsideration of the question pre-
sented in Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners,179 which
was cited with approval by the Goldfarb Court. 80 The plaintiff in Semler
had been a licensed dentist for seventeen years and had built up a large
practice by extensive advertising in newspapers and periodicals and with
neon signs and billboards. He displayed teeth and bridgework in his
advertisements. He also employed solicitors; He advertised free examina-
178. See Mindes, supra note 168.
174. FRIEDMAN, supra note 117, at 158.
175. See cases cited note 5 supra.
176. Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, Nov. 25, 1975, p. 2, col. 3.
177. Id.
178. 40 FED. RmE. 24031 (1975).
179. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
180. Note 114 and accompanying text supra.
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tions, quoted prices for, various types of work, and guaranteed his work.
Plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of an Oregon statute, which au-
thorized revocation of a dentist's license for advertising of this sort, on
the basis that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment, and the impairment of contracts clause of
Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution. The Supreme Court sustained
the law on the ground that the states have the power to regulate such
professions in, order to insure competence, to prevent the public from
being misled by deceptive advertising, and to keep the profession -from
being "demoralized" by forcing its members into an "unseemly. rivalry
which would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous."18' .
One must offset against the need for protecting the public from
deceptive advertising and the profession from "demoralization" the public
interest in free and open price competition. In most areas of the economy,
this is believed to be the optimum system of regulation. It is not pre-
cisely clear why: it should not also be optimum in the professional, areas.
Additionally, the public has an interest in being able to learn easily, which
practitioners concentrate in particular fields, and to compare prices for
the same services without the need to telephone or visit several prac-
titioners. Perhaps most persons are more concerned about the qualifi-
cations of the professiohal who takes care of them than they are about
his charges, but' those for whom price is a factor should be able to make
such comparisons without artificial hindrances.
The probleni of deceptive or misleading advertising is by no means
unique to the professions. The Federal Trade Commission is already
active in requiring substantiation of advertising claims in normal com-
mercial matters. There is no reason why the FTC, or some othe, body,
could not assume such responsibilities for the professions as well. Further-
more, the public is probably a good deal more sophisticated today than
it was in 1936. The consumer is no more likely to be taken in by tile out-
landish blandishments of the least scrupulous professional than he is by
those of the television hawker of used cars.
In short, restrictions on advertising are similar to fee schedules in
that they tend to reduce price competition-here by making it more dif-
ficult for the consumer to make comparisons. As such, they should be
equally vulierable to antitrust challenge. It appears that further clarifi-
cation of this problem. will not be long in coming.'8 2
F. Multistate Practice
All occupations requiring a license to practice have limitations on
multistate practice.' 83 A typical statute provides:
181. 294 U.S. at 612.
182. The American Bar Association has recently amended the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility by expanding the scope of permissible advertising. Wall Street
Journal, Wednesday, February 18, 1976, p. 6, col. 3.
183. Brakel, A Look at Multistate Practice Restrictions, 60 A.B.A.J. 1084(1974).
[Vol. 41
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/6
ANTITRUST AND THE PROFESSIONS
It shall be unlawful for any person not now a registered physician
within the meaning of the law to practice medicine or surgery...
in this state. . . The terms "physician" [and] "surgeon"
should be construed to mean physicians and surgeons licensed un-
der this chapter. ... 184
This has the effect of creating a barrier against out-of-state practitioners.
To its credit, the medical profession appears to be quite flexible in this
area. As of September 1, 1974, only the Virgin Islands had no reciprocal
arrangement for "endorsing" certificates granted in other jurisdictions.
Most states have such reciprocal arrangements with virtually all other
states, although in some states such arrangements are subject to the dis-
cretion of the Medical Licensing Board.18 5
The legal profession ameliorates this problem through the device of
admission pro hac vice, admitting a "foreign" attorney for a particular
matter upon the motion of, and often in association with, a local at-
torney. Such admissions are, however, discretionary with the court. There
is no guarantee that I can be defended by an out-of-state lawyer if I should
be charged with murder in Missouri. There may have been a need for
such restrictions in the legal profession in former years, when the states
had differing procedural rules and widely divergent case law in some areas.
However, the growth of uniform laws, the adoption of court rules pat-
terned on the federal rules, and particularly the improvement in research
aids undermine any justification for limitations on multistate practice.
There is no justification for territorial limitations in the other pro-
fessions. Disease does not recognize state boundaries, nor do methods of
treatment, nor do ideas. Thus, those who would sustain such restrictions
in the face of antitrust attack should be compelled to bear a heavy bur-
den of proof.
V. CONCLUSION
The Goldfarb decision is welcome because it finally puts to rest the
notion that the professions are somehow above and beyond the Sherman
Act. Unfortunately, in its understandable attempt to rule narrowly, the
Supreme Court has left a number of ambiguities which future litigation
must clarify. This writer believes these ambiguities should be resolved in
favor of the broadest possible interpretation of the Sherman Act, because
that appears most likely to promote the public interest in the long run.
Thus, the Commerce Clause should be read expansively to permit the
Sherman Act to reach any professional activities having any effect on
interstate commerce. Parker v. Brown, on the other hand, should be read
narrowly. Restrictions on professionals should be condoned as "state
action" only where the state regulation is pervasive, and only then if the
regulatory body is controlled by public representatives, not the profession.
184. §§ 334.010, .021, RSMo 1969.
185. COUNCIL ON MEDICAL EDUCATION OF TnE AMEICAN MEDICAL ASS'N,
MEDICAL LICENsuRE STATISTICS FOR 1973 38-39, App. Table 2 (Sept. 1, 1974).
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Many activities of professionals and professional associations besides fee
schedules should be subjected to antitrust scrutiny. In evaluating such
practices, the federal courts should, in the absence of congressional action,
apply the same standards that are applied to other occupations.
One can legitimately question the appropriateness of using antitrust
principles to regulate professions. These principles were developed in
other contexts, probably without considering the impact which they may
have in the peculiar circumstances of professional activities.13 6 Certainly,
application of rules developed in commercial contexts to professional ac-
tivities may have unforeseen and unintended results, some of which may
not be socially desirable. The current wave of suits against professional
organizations may be a resurgence of the nineteenth century populist,
egalitarian effort to deprofessionalize the professions and open them to
all.1 7 Conceding the validity of these concerns, 'the fact remains that the
question whether the antitrust laws ought to apply to the professions is
one for Congress. The Supreme Court has held-correctly, I think-that the
Sherman Act does apply to the professions. If the circumstances of the
professions warrant different treatment, only Congress is in a position to
make the necessary policy judgments. Congress has shown no hesitation
about exempting other types of activities when it believed* it desirable.188
Unless and until Congress acts, the federal courts have no choice but to
evaluate professional practices according to developed Sherman Act doc-
trine.
There is a need for a national policy on the professions and their
roles in society. Such a policy should emanate from Congress, but Congress
will need a great deal of input from professionals, academics, and lay
representatives. In particular, there is a need for further studies similar to
those done of the legal profession by Carlin, and of the medical profes.
sion by Freidson and others. 189 We need to know more about the internal
186. In a slightly different context, Professor Handler has pointed out that
the net result of every consent decree enjoining real estate boards from publishing
suggested rate schedules has been an increase, rather than a decrease, in real
estate commissions. Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era,
50 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 211, 230 (1975). Therefore, it is not certain that application of
antitrust principles to the professions will improve the quality or quantity of
services rendered the public.
187. POUND, supra note 114, at XXVII, 221-49, points out that the low point
of the legal profession (pre-Watergate) was from 1836 to 1870. Many states enacted
legislation eliminating or greatly reducing the requirements of formal trainingfor admission to the bar. Pound ascribes the reemergence of professionalism in
part to the development of bar associatioxis, beginning about 1870.
188. Cf. the McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, §§ 1-5, 59 Stat. 33-34, 15 U.S.C.§§ 1011-15 (1970), exempting insurance companies from antitrust coverage when
subject to state regulation; the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970) and the
Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970), exempting agricultural organizations. See
generally Pogue, The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, ABA SEcrION or
ANTrnusr LA.w PROC. 313 (1961).
189. See also C. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARcItFs: THE PROFESSIONS AND Gov-
ER.!ENT (1966), for an analysis of the effect the professions' political lobbying
has exerted on their status.
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and external relationships of the professions in order to formulate a co-
herent policy and establish fair and enforceable standards. Much has been
written by sociologists and others, but too little of this is known within
the professions.
It may seem anachronistic to suggest expansion of regulation into
professional fields at a time when there is considerable public interest in
"deregulation." It is true that regulation has a distressing tendency to be-
come pervasive and extend far beyond its original boundaries. In addi-
tion, the track record of government intrusions into commercial fields has
not been overwhelmingly successful. Although there is already extensive
regulation of the professions, it is done by private organizations which
work more for the benefit of the profession than the public. If there
are to be restrictions on the professions, it would be far better to have
them imposed by a politically responsible body in which the decision-
making power is vested in public members, rather than in professional
"experts."
Rather than develop such an elaborate administrative machinery, it
might be preferable to rely on a vigorous, literal application of the Sher-
man Act to professional practices. The bodies charged with enforcing the
antitrust laws, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission,
are already acquiring expertise in reviewing professional activities and
challenging those activities thought to be most serious. Such an approach
places the greatest responsibility on the free market system, allowing the
government to challenge deviations from that system. But, if this is to
work, given the limitations on budget and manpower of the enforcement
agencies, the professions will have to cooperate by taking a long, intro-
spective look at themselves and discarding those aspects of professional
practice which may be anticompetitive. In the meantime, courts should
feel free to condemn ruthlessly anticompetive practices.
1976]
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Comments
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE-
ENFORCEABILITPY UNDER MISSOURI LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Our economic system, much like our legal system, is a synthesis of
concepts that have proven their worth over many centuries. The heart of
a capitalistic system is competition. We depend on it to regulate supply
and demand which in turn sets prices and determines the optimum division
of labor. However, the common law quickly discovered that there were
certain types of "unfair competition" that could not be tolerated if the
economic system was to function properly. As a result, certain practices
were declared by the courts to be illegal per se.1 In many other situations,
the courts have left it to a party to protect himself by means of a re-
strictive covenant.2 This comment will discuss the enforceability of such
covenants and in particular those made ancillary to the sale of a busi-
ness or to an employment contract. Emphasis will be placed on the
Missouri law in this area and the factors which should be considered
in drafting such a covenant.
II. HisToIucAL DEVELOPMENT
The covenant not to compete has not always enjoyed the respecta-
bility, or at least tolerance, that it is accorded today. In the Dyer's Gase3
a dyer of cloth agreed that he would not practice his craft in a certain
town for six months. The medieval judge called on to enforce the con-
tract was astounded, declared it void, and stated: "By God, if the plaintiff
were here he should go to prison until he paid a fine to the king."4
The necessity of a long apprenticeship, the difficulty of travel, and the
scarcity of skilled workmen made enforcement of such contracts un-
thinkable.5
Over the centuries, the common law recognized a growing need for
such covenants. The early cases applied mechanical tests for determining
1. Trade secrets, for example, have been protected against appropriation
by former employees even in the absence of a prohibitory covenant. Likewise,
courts will enjoin the use of customer lists of a former employer. See 2 R. CALLMAN,
UNFAMR COMPEIMTON, TRADEmARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 52.1, 51.2 (c), 54.2,(c) (2)
(3d ed. 1968).
2. Thau-Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply and Gold Co., Inc., 518
S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1974), indicated the possibly disastrous consequences of failing to
provide the protection afforded by covenants not to compete.
3. Dyers Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, F. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1415).
4. Id.
5. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 23, 105 N.E.2d
685, 691 (C.P. Ohio 1952), for a discussion of the factors existing at that time
which made the covenant unreasonable.
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the validity of "contracts in restraint of trade."8 Mitchel v. Reynolds7
was the first case to impose reasonableness as the standard for determining
the validity of covenants not to compete and to place upon the draftsman of
the covenant the burden of showing that the restraint was reasonable. 8
However, Mitchel did not completely abandon the older mechanical tests
and stated that a covenant containing a general restraint-i.e., one un-
limited as to time and/or space, was void regardless of the circumstances.9
Even prior to Mitchel, the cases treated covenants protecting an em-
ployer from unfair competition by a former employee differently from those
which attempt to protect the purchaser. of a going business.' 0 One issue
debated today is whether there really is a valid distinction justifying
separate treatment."' It appears that the "snow-balling weight of au-
thority" does recognize a difference, 12 and as a result courts are prone to
look with less indulgence on covenants ancillary to a contract of em-
ployment than on those accompanying the sale of a business.' 3 This
judicial discrimination takes one of two forms. First, a court may require
more justification for the former type of covenant before finding it to be
reasonable. Alternatively, the court may declare the restraint to be reason-
able, but require greater proof of irreparable harm before granting an
injunction. Missouri courts have used both methods to show what appears
to be a greater dislike for covenants ancillary to employment contracts.' 4
However, in Haysler v. Butterfield15 a Missouri appellate court seemed
to favor abandonment of the distinction, stating: "[T]he ultimate question
should be the same in both cases-what is necessary for the protection of
the promisee's rights and is not injurious to the public."' 0
6. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 I-IARv. L. REv. 625
(1960).
7. 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
8. Id. at 349. The covenantee was forced to assume the burden to prevent
what the court termed the "mischief' caused by such restraints, namely, possible
loss of the employee's means of earning a livelihood, loss to society of the services
of a useful member, and possible monopolization.
9. 1 P. Wins. 181, 182, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348 (Q.B. 1711).
10. See Blake, supra note 6, at 630-32. But see Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545
(1868), and Mitchel v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 480, 79 S.W. 739 (St. L. Ct. App.
1904), in which general restraints were stated to be ipso facto void.
11. Blake, supra note 6, at 637-38.
12. Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 35, 105 N.E.2d 685,
703 (C.P. Ohio 1952).
13. Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 108 A. 541 (1919).
14. In Renwood Food Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 249 Mo. App. 939, 223
S.W.2d 144 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949), the court stated that a covenant would not
be enforced merely because of competition by the former employee, but also
required a knowledge *of trade secrets or an influence over customers of the em-
ployer. In Jaccard Jewelry Co. v. O'Brien, 70 Mo. App. 432 (St. L. Ct. App. 1897),
it was held that a court of equity would not enjoin a breach of a contract for per-
sonal services unless the services rendered were unique, individual, and peculiar.
15. 240 Mo. App. 733, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
16. Id. at 130, quoting from 14 S. WiLLISTON, THE LAw oF CONmAcrs § 1643
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The essence of the distinction between covenants in employment con-
tracts and those accompanying the sale of a business is the effect of the
restraint on the covenantor.17 In the former there is seldom equal bargain-
ing power between the employee and the employer. As a practical matter,
the prospective employee is forced to sign what is placed before him and
receives no extra compensation for executing his covenant not to compete.
In many cases employees have been required to sign such agreements as a
condition of their continued employment.' 8 Because the employee is in no
position adequately to protect his future, the courts have done so by re-
quiring the employer to assure the court that enforcement of the covenant
will not result in an undue hardship on the employee. Such concern is
not as necessary for the seller of a business. He is in a much better posi-
tion to bargain than an employee and often a significant portion of the
price he receives is attributable to his agreement not to compete. Thus a
distinction does exist between the two types of covenants which may
justify different treatment in certain circumstances.
III. REASONABLENESS AS A STANDARD
As a result of the decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds,19 the "rule of
reason" was forever imprinted upon covenants not to compete. Reason-
ableness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Courts have given the
term various definitions. In Presbury v. Fisher20 the Missouri Supreme
Court was first asked to decide whether a covenant against competition
was void as an unreasonable restraint of trade. The court cited only
Mitchel and upheld the covenant, stating:
The liberality of our laws, in suffering everyman to engage in
any trade or occupation he may think best, without any previous
apprenticeship, has blunted our perception of the utility of the
principle which avoids contracts made in restraint of trade.2 '
In taking this laissez-faire attitude,2 2 the court seemed to approve the use
of broad covenants not to compete. This is evidenced by the fact that
another case on the subject was not brought before the court for fifteen
years. In Long v. Towl23 the Missouri Supreme Court gave its first in-
terpretation of the rule of reason, indicating a partial retreat from its
position in Presbury:
17. See pt. V of this comment, infra.
18. See, e.g., R. E. Harrington, Inc. v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945 (St. L. Mo. App.
1968); City Ice and Fuel Co. v. Snell, 57 S.W.2d 440 (St. L. Mo. App. 1933).
19. 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
20. 18 Mo. 50 (1853).
21. Id. at 51-52.
22. The court in Presbury went on to state:
If there is an opening for any trade or business, how little is the com-
munity affected by the agreement of one that another should not engage
in it, when it is free for all others.
Id. at 52.
23. 42 Mo. 545 (1868).
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The prohibition should not extend any further than will fully pro-
tect the party for whose benefit the contract is made in his occupa-
tion or business. If the prohibition extends beyond this, it is an un-
reasonable restraint of trade, and will render the contract void.24
The early Missouri cases which followed, although attempting to
apply the rule of reason, established rather mechanical tests. One of
these tests was the general restraint-partial restraint distinction. It was
assumed that a restraint limited as to time and place was reasonable and
valid and one that was not so limited was void.25 Although some Mis-
souri courts quickly questioned the validity of this absolute rule,2 6 many
found it a convenient method to reach what was often a reasonable re-
suit.
In 1932 the Restatement of Contracts27 attempted to define the types
of contracts that were reasonable and those that were not. The draftsmen
explicitly rejected the general restraint-partial restraint test28 and let the
reasonableness of the particular restraint turn on the facts of each case.
The difficulty inherent in all attempts to define reasonableness stems
from the concept itself. Reasonableness is not a rule that can be applied
mechanically, but is instead a judicial balancing of conflicting interests. 2
Although Missouri courts seem reluctant to abandon certain of the ob-
jective tests,8O a better approach would be to weigh the interests of the
covenantor, -the covenantee, and the public, and to determine in light of
this evaluation whether the restraint in question is reasonable. The next
three parts of this comment examine these interests and attempt to ex-
plain their significance.
IV. REASONABLENESS AS TO THE COVENANTEE
The first interest to be considered in determining reasonableness is
the interest of the draftsman of the restraint. The buyer of an established
business generally acquires the goodwill 3 ' associated with it. This goodwill
is often due in large part to the efforts expended and relationships created
by the individual selling the business. As such, it is susceptible to de-
struction should the seller enter into competition with the buyer. Similarly,
the established business is continually striving to increase its goodwill,
largely through the efforts of employees hired to service old customers
24. Id. at 549.
25. Id. See also Mitchel v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 486, 79 S.W. 739 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1904); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1899).
26. Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171 (1876) (indefinite place); Gill v. Ferris, 82
Mo. 156 (1884) (indefinite time).
27. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 514-516 (1932).
28. Id. at § 515, comment c.
29. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 62 Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685,
(C.P. Ohio 1952).
30. See, e.g., American Pamcor, Inc. v. Klote, 438 S.W.2d 287 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1969).
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and secure new ones.3 2 Thus competition by a former employee can
also deprive the employer of his investment in goodwill. Because of
the delicate nature of goodwill, the owner of a business is allowed to
contract to protect it much the same as he would contract to insure
his plant and equipment.33 However, just as one seeking insurance must
have an "insurable interest ' 34 in an asset, one seeking to protect good-
will may not contract for protection beyond its limits.35 Because the threat
of unfair competition3 6 is usually limited to a given area for a given
period, the factors of time and space are important.
A. Spatial Limitations
As a general rule, a spatial limitation may not exceed the area in
which the covenantee has a business interest. Most modern businesses
compete within a relatively small area, usually limited to the boundaries
of a particular city. It is conceivable that as cities grow ever larger, a
covenant restricting competition within a city may be beyond the needs
of the covenantee; 37 however, in the past Missouri courts have regarded
such restrictions favorably.38 As businesses grew to encompass larger areas,
the territorial extent of a "reasonable covenant" likewise grew. Many
covenants have been drawn to prohibit competition within the city limits
plus a radius of X miles from the city39 to protect against suburban com-
petition. Such restraints are also considered reasonable if the draftsman
can show that his protectable interest extends to the additional area.4 0
Companies operating in rural areas, and those doing business in
large metropolitan districts often find it impractical to use municipal
32. Trade secrets are similar to goodwill in that they are essential to achieving
and maintaining a firm's competitive advantage over its rivals.
33. House of Tools & Engineering v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1973); Prentice v. Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
34. Alexander v. Griffith Brokerage Co., 228 Mo. App. 773, 73 S.W.2d 418
(K.C. Ct. App. 1934).
35. "It must appear that such a contract imposes no restraint upon one
party that is not beneficial to the other." Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545, 549 (1868).
36. Renwood Food Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d
144 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949), held that a covenant would not be enforced merely
because of competition by a former employee, but required a showing of factors
making such competition unfair.
37. For example, the buyer of a grocery store on the south end of Kansas
City would have trouble showing the danger of the seller opening a store in
North Kansas City.
38. Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884) (Mexico, Missouri); Peltz v. Eichele, 62
Mo. 171 (1876) (St. Louis, Missouri); Mitchel v. Branham, 104 Mo. App. 480, 79
S.W. 739 (St. L. Ct. App. 1904) (Portageville, Missouri).
39. Thompson v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d 465 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964); Hessel v.
Hill, 38 S.W.2d 490 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
40. In Thomspon v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d 465 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964), the
restrictive covenant excluded an opthamologist from practicing his profession
within 50 miles of St. Joseph, Missouri. The defendant opened an office in
North Kansas City, a distance of about forty miles. The court said that miles
meant air miles and found the restraint reasonable after finding that defendant
had treated 99 of his former patients from plaintiff's clinic in the thirty days
before the injunction was granted.
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boundaries as spatial restraints.4 1 The convenient alternative is to re-
strict -competition in a given county or counties. 42 Missouri courts have
allowed the use of county boundaries if the draftsman can show that his
business extends into any portion of the county.4 3 It appears likely
that in some cases the goodwill of a business may extend to a minor por-
tion of a neighboring county. To restrict competition in the total area
of that county would be of no benefit to that business and thus seems
unreasonable. However, because the Missouri courts have upheld such
restrictions in the past,44 this alternative may offer the greatest amount
of territorial protection for the smaller business.
Because the reasonableness of a spatial restraint is a function of the
interests of the business sought to be protected,45 a relatively large
business is entitled to a relatively large territorial restraint. In addition to
the size of a business, specialization may be considered in determining
the extent to which a business requires protection.4 6 In Harrington, Inc. v.
Frick4 7 an unemployment compensation consulting firm required its em-
ployees to sign a covenant restricting post-employment competition within
any state in which it was engaged in business at the time of the termination
of employment. The trial court enjoined two former employees from
engaging in any similar business in Ohio, Missouri, and Texas. The em-
ployees appealed, claiming that the restrictive covenant was geographically
broader than was necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests.
The appellate court held the restrictive covenant "fair to all concerned,"
considering that the plaintiff, a specialized corporation with a limited
clientele, had over 1,900 customers in the three-state area.
48
Harrington is consistent with the general rule that a large territorial
restraint will be upheld if it can be shown that the draftsman's vulnerable
interests are coextensive with the forbidden area. Applying this rule,
courts have found a worldwide restraint to be reasonable,49 and have up-
held restrictive covenants covering the entire United States.5 0 However,
41. For example, the metropolitan area of St. Louis contains over 100 mu-
nicipalities in Missouri alone.
42. See Haysler v. Butterfield, 240 Mo. App. 733, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1944) (county boundaries used to prohibit competition within a metro-
politan area); Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367 (K.C. Mo. App. 1900) (use
of a county restriction in a rural setting).
43. Athletic Tea Co. v. Cole, 16 S.W.2d 735 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929).
44. See cases cited note 42 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
46. House of Tools & Engineering v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D.
St. L. 1973).
47. 428 S.W.2d 945 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
48. Id. at 950.
49. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894]
A.C. 535, aff'g [18931 1 Ch. 630 (CA. 1892), in which the court held that a coven-
ant ancillary to the sale of a world-wide munitions firm which precluded the
seller from competing in a similar business anywhere in the world was reasonable
under the circumstances.
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at least one Missouri case 51 indicates that by seeking to overprotect his
interests the greedy draftsman may lose his protection entirely.
One method of limiting a post-employment restraint so as to be
reasonable without having to establish a territorial restraint is to draft
a covenant restricting former employees from soliciting clients of their
former employer.5 2 Such a restraint appears to be treated as reasonable
per se, because the goodwill of an employer dearly extends to his current
stock of customers,5 3 and the employee is not forbidden from opening a
competing business, even "at plaintiff's doorstep." 54
Notwithstanding the well-settled case law requiring a spatial limitation
to make a covenant reasonable, covenants are often still drafted without
such a limit.55 Such an omission will result in the invalidation of the
covenant. 56 It is also important to define clearly the extent of the ter-
ritorial restraint. If an ambiguity exists, the court will construe it against
the draftsman and invalidate what may be the most important part of
the restraint.5r The careful draftsman will make sure that his covenant
contains a clear and unequivocal spatial limit. He must also be sure that
he is able to show the necessity of the restraint.
B. Time Limitations
The general rules that apply to spatial limitations also apply to
time limitations in covenants not to compete. The time restraint may not
exceed that period during which the covenantee's goodwill is subject to
appropriation by the covenantor.58 The reasonableness of a time limitation
depends upon the length of this "vulnerable period." The distinction be-
tween time and space limits lies in the difficulty of ascertaining objectively
the period during which a former employee or owner retains substantial
influence over his former customers. As a result, courts seem to be
more lenient when considering a time restraint.
51. Mallinckrodt Chemical Words v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6 (St. L. Ct. App.
1899), affd, 169 Mo. 388 (1902).
52. See Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971):
It is universally recognized that an employer has a proprietary right in his
stock of customers and their good will and, if otherwise reasonable,
the courts will protect this asset against appropriation by an employee by
the enforcement of such a restrictive covenant not to compete.
Id. at 12.
53. See Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
54. Id. at 12.
55. Prentice v. Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
56. [W]e cannot find that the restraint imposed by the first restric-
tive covenant, wholly unlimited as to area, was reasonable and no greater
than fairly required for the protection of [the covenantees] who here seek
its shelter.
Id. at 461.
57. See Athletic Tea Co. v. Cole, 16 S.W.2d 735 (St. L. Mo. App. 1929), in
which the court refused to enforce a covenant restricting competition from "Im-
perial, Mo. and surrounding territory" and limited it to the city of Imperial only.
58. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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Missouri courts, although allegedly following a general rule,59 dis-
tinguish between covenants not to compete ancillary to the sale of a
business and those ancillary to an employment contract. When dealing
with the former, courts are likely to enforce vague, open-ended covenants, 60
and may even imply a time limit where none exists.61 On the other hand,
the latter must have a definite and reasonable duration.62
The same result would usually be reached by following the general
rule that the scope of a covenant may not exceed the covenantee's busi-
ness interest. 3 Several cases indicate that it is not unlikely that an in-
dividual who had sold an existing business or professional practice could
return many years later and establish a competing business, based heavily
on residual goodwill.64 The restraint needed in post-employment situations
is usually more limited, because the goodwill retained by an ex-employee
is usually more intangible. 65
Several recent cases involving employee covenants have found a
three year time limitation reasonable.6 6 Because the three year period is
evidently "safe," there is no apparent need to* resort to a shorter period. 7
However, a wise employer-covenantee should be prepared to substantiate
his need for any post-employment covenant with a term exceeding three
years.
V. R ASONABLENESS AS TO THE COVENANTOR
The Restatement of Contracts states that a covenant in restraint of
trade is unreasonable if it "imposes undue hardship upon the person re-
59. The general doctrine is that agreements in restriction of trade will be
upheld when the restriction does not go beyond some particular locality,
is founded on a sufficient consideration, and is limited as to time, place and
person.
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6, 14 (St. L. Ct. App.
1899).
60. Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884).
61. Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900).
62. Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Value Co., 354 S.W.2d 913 (St. L. Mo. App.
1962); Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Nemnich, 83 Mo. App. 6 (St. L. Ct. App.
1899).
63. Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545 (1868). See text accompanying note 23 supra.
64. Gill v. Ferris, 82 Mo. 156 (1884); Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367(K.C. Ct. App. 1900) (doctor returned seven years after selling his practice only
to be enjoined by an indignant court).
65. Thau-Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply and Gold Co., Inc., 518
S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1974), is a sad example where even a one-year covenant might have
protected a plaintiff who lost most of its employees and customers to a business
established by a former employee.
66. House of Tools & Engineering v. Price, 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1973); Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971); Harrington, Inc.
v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Thompson v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d
465 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
67. This is especially true because Missouri courts have held, in both sale
and employment situations, that a court of equity has the power to limit an in-junction "to such duration as is necessary to give an employer fair protection of
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stricted."68 Missouri courts have recognized the existence of such a factor,69
but have rarely used it to invalidate restrictive covenants. This reluctance
may result from a judicial recognition of the mobility of the American
people and the assumed availability of comparable employment in another
field.7O In Haysler v. Butterfield7l the court applied this reasoning to the
facts before it and stated:
In enforcing the contract no particular hardship will be worked
as to the defendants, for they can be employed in any business
except that of employment agency and, in that business, anywhere
except within the area generally known as "Greater Kansas
City."7 2
Applying such a rationale, it would be- hard to envision a situation in
which "undue hardship" existed. However, in Willnan v. Beheler73 the
Missouri Supreme Court, although finding a restrictive covenant reason-
able and awarding monetary damages for its breach, denied an injunction,
arguably because of "undue hardship." Willman involved a medical partner-
ship agreement whereby the junior partner agreed not to practice medi-
cine in St. Joseph for five years after leaving the partnership. Upon being
dismissed, the junior partner continued to practice in St. Joseph for almost
five years. The court stated that it would be inequitable to enforce the
contract because during the existence of the partnership defendant had
become an "established -and recognized medical practitioner and sur-
geon."7 4 It appears that the court believed that the hardship imposed out-
weighed the covenantee's need for protection. The same reasoning seems
applicable to many potential covenantors who have become expert in a
specialized field and would have difficulty finding other employment.
VI. REASONABLENESS AS TO THE PuRUc
The interests of the public weigh both in favor of and against the
validity of covenants not to compete. Freedom to contract in this area is
essential in our economy, because without its assurance a prospective
buyer might be driven from the "going-business" market and a prospec-
tive employer from the labor market. On the other hand, the public policy
against attempts to restrain competition has been clearly shown by the
great amount of legislation in this area.75
68. RESTATEmNT OF CONTRACTS § 515 (b) (1932).
69. Prentice v. Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
70. Renwood Food Products, Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223 S.W.2d
144, 151 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949).
71. 240 Mo. App. 733, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Ct. App. 1949).
72. Id. at 739, 218 S.W.2d at 131.
73. 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973).
74. Id. at 778.
75. E.g., Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); § 416.040, RSMo
1969. See also AmPicA BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIT ,
Disciplinary Rule 2-108 (1974), which states:
A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or em-
ployment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a
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The result of the balancing of these conflicting policies is that a
restraint on competition will be tolerated only if it is necessary to protect
a legitimate business interest. Further public interests can enter into this
process, however, resulting in an otherwise reasonable covenant becoming
unreasonable and unenforceable. For instance, it has been stated that
if a contract tends to create a monopoly or deprive the public of an un-
usual talent or productive ability, it will not be upheld.76 Nevertheless,
Missouri courts have been reluctant to use such policy arguments to, strike
down covenants not to compete. Presbuy v. Fisher77 indicates the weakness
of such an argument in Missouri:
[T]here is no practical man who would not smile at the concept
that the public welfare would sustain an injury by enforcing an
obligation like that involved in the present case.78
It is worthy of note that Presbuty involved a covenant executed by the
seller of a counterfeit detector. Such an enterprise, due to its specializa-
tion, seems particularly susceptible to monopolization. Later cases cit-
ing Presbury also involved areas where the possibility of monopolization,
or at least public injury, was present.79
In a relatively recent case80 the breaching party to a covenant not to
compete argued that such covenants violate section 416.040, RSMo 1969,
which declares that all contracts that tend to restrain trade are against
public policy and void. Although several states have statutes declaring
void certain types of covenants not to compete, the Missouri statute has
been interpreted only to prevent such things as price-fixing and unlawful
combinations, many of which also are forbidden by the Sherman Act.81
Thus, in the absence of expanded legislation, the task of protecting. the
lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by
the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retirement bene-
fits.
Although not expressly stated, the Code of Professional Responsibility also ap-
pears to prohibit the use of covenants not to compete ancillary to the sale of
a law business. Cf. Ethical Consideration 4-6, which states that a lawyer should
not attempt to sell a law practice as a going business, and Disciplinary Rule 3-102,
which prohibits dividing legal fees with a non-lawyer (which, in effect, is what
the seller/ covenantor would become). Cf. also American Bar Association Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion No. 266 (1945) ("The goodwill of the
practice of a lawyer is not ... an asset, which either he or his estate can sell.").
76. Haysler v. Butterfield, 218 S.W.2d 129 (K.C. Mo. App. 1944).
77. 18 Mo. 50 (1853).
78. Id. at 51.
79. See, e.g., Gordon v. Mansfield, 84 Mo. App. 367 (K.C. Ct. App. 1900),
in which the court enjoined a physician who sold his practice from reentering
practice in the county as long as the purchaser remained there. The judge made a
comment that many rural residents would challenge today: "It is a social con-
dition, of which we may take notice, that physicians are quite a numerous class
of the population of the state. . . ." Id. at 377.
80. State ex rel. Schoenbacher v. Kelly, 408 S.W.2d 383 (St. L_ Mo, App.
1966). But see Reddi-Wip, Inc., v. Lemay, 354 S.W.2d 913 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963),
where the court indicated that the statute in question might apply to covenants
not to compete.
8L Gerecht v. American Insurance CQ., 344 F. Supp. 1056 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
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public from unreasonable covenants -remains one for the Missouri courts,
a task that in the past has perhaps been taken too lightly.
VII. REMEDIES FOR B EAcH OF A COVENANT
If the draftsman of a covenant not to compete can convince the court
that the covenant is reasonable based on the criteria described above, the
court should grant a remedy if it is breached.8 2 However, the remedy the
court chooses will often have as much bearing on the effectiveness of a
given covenant as the language of the covenant itself. When a covenant
is breached, the covenantee has two possible remedies. He can, as in any
action on a contract, sue for the monetary damages arising from the breach.
Although a court will often award money damages even though they only
approximate the actual damages,83 in many cases the intangible nature of
goodwill prevents the ascertainment of present and future damages. As a
result, the preferred remedy, and at times the only effective remedy, is
to enjoin the covenantor from further breaches.
Missouri courts faced with the demand for injunctive relief have
given varying amounts of consideration to the .appropriateness of this type
of equitable remedy. In Mills v. Murray8 4 a Missouri appellate court held:
The injunctive remedy is peculiarly appropriate to prevent
the violation of reasonable non-competition covenants, particularly
where, as here, the full damage to be suffered by the breach could
be estimated only uncertainly.8 5
This liberal attitude toward injunctive relief was followed in House of
Tools v. Price,8 6 where the court reversed the lower court's denial of
relief and issued a permanent injunction after- finding only that the
covenant was reasonable and that it had been breached. In State ex rel.
Schoenbacher v. Kelly8 7 the court discussed the affect of recent legislation
on the equity jurisdiction of Missouri courts and concluded that a circuit
judge had the power to issue and enforce an ex parte restraining order
prohibiting violation of a covenant not to compete. In that case the court
noted that equity has granted injunctions forbidding competitive em-
82. See Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973): "Equity will not
suffer a Wrong to be without a remedy, and seeks to do justice and avoid in-
justice." Id. at 778.
83. In Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971), the court
stated:
In such a case, while the damages may not be determined by mere specula-
tion or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result
be only approximate.
Id. at 17.
84. 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
85. Id. at 18.
86. 504 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App., D. St. L 1974).
87. 408 S.W.2d 383 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
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ployment following the breach of an exclusive services contract even in
the absence of a post-termination covenant.88
The recent case of Willman v. Beheler8 9 indicates that the remedy of
injunction will not always be available to enforce a covenant not to com-
pete. In that case, the covenant prohibited competition by an ex-partner
for five years after the termination of the partnership. However, litigation
to determine the validity of the covenant consumed four years, during
which the ex-partner continued to practice medicine within the proscribed
territory. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of a
five-year injunction. The court stated that a court of equity is reluctant
to grant a mere money judgment, but went on to hold:
The only feasible way in which Article XXII [the covenant
not to compete] may be enforced in favor of the covenantee and
at the same time protect the covenantor against an unjust penalty
is to remand the cause for a hearing on the question of Willmanks
financial loss arising out of competition with Beheler.90
Thus Willman stands as a warning to the injured covenantee to seek
injunctive relief imediately by means of a restraining order or a tem-
porary iinjuncton,, to ayoid risking the loss of any equitable remedy. In
order to claim the'alternative relief, money damages, the court in Willman
stated that the injured party must be prepared to show that his losses
were sustained as a natural, direct, and immediate result of the covenantor's
breach. In order: to meet this difficult and conceivably impossible burden
the prudent draftsman would do well to consider the inclusion of a liqui-
dated damages clause. Such a clause was apparently approved in dictum in
State ex rel. Schoenbacher v. Kelly.91 The result would be a covenant
which provides the court with two viable alternatives on which to com-
pensate adequately an injured covenantee. 92
-. 88. The leadifig case on injunctive relief under these circumstances is Lumley
v. Wagner, 1: De G., M. Sc G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). Many jurisdictions
grn t injunctions to restrain violation by an employee of expressed or implied
negative covenants in' personal service contracts if the employee is a person of
"exceptional and unique knowledge, skill and ability in performing the service
called for in the contract." Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348
S.W.2d 37, 42 ('rex. Civ. App. 1961). On the other hand, under Roscoe Pound's
separate significance of the negative" theory, injunctive relief should be denied
unless "breach' of the negative involves a damage by itself apart from. or over
and above the breach of the affirmative." Pound, Progress of the Law-Equity, 33
HARv. L. REv. 420, 440 (1920).
* 89. 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973).
90. Id. at 778-79.
91. 408 SW.2d 383 (St. L. Mo. -App. 1966). Possible damages may.-be sub-
stantial, as in Thau-Nolde, Inc. v. Krause Dental Supply and Gold Co., Inc.,
518 S.W.2d 5- (Mo. 1974), where plaintiff claimed damages of over $117,000 as a
result of competition by former employees....
92. Including a liquidated damages clause in a covenant not to compete has
one potential danger. The breaching party could allege that the liquidated damages
clause provides an adequate legal remedy and thus injunctive relief should be
precluded. However, the general iule is' that the mere existence of. a liquidated
damages clause does not predude'injunctive relief. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 23
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Missouri courts have applied a variety of tests for determining the
validity of covenants not to compete. The result has often been to con-
fuse the attorney called upon to draft such a covenant as to what must or
must not be included therein. Although the balancing of a myriad of
factors is involved, the courts should find such a covenant valid and en-
forceable only if it is found to be reasonable as to the covenantee, the
covenantor, and the public. The resulting flexibility will become even
more important in the future as the courts will be forced, in the absence
of adequate statutory regulation, to deal with new attempts to limit com-
petition contractually. By concentrating on the general concept of reason-
ableness, Missouri courts can avoid the temptation to rely on mechanical
rules and place more emphasis on the equities involved in the given case.
HAROLD WILLIAm HINDERER III
LOCAL GOVERNMENT-COUNTY HOME RULE
AND THE 1970 MISSOURI
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Missouri is credited with giving municipal home rule its start in
1875,1 and is one of at least seventeen states that authorizes all or some
counties to adopt a home rule charter.2 These states have done so in an
attempt to create governmental authority which can "span the metropolitan
area from city to suburb and unify the resources of the area with metro-
politan wide responsibility." 3 Problems of pollution, traffic control, sew-
age and waste disposal, water and utility supply, health care, and welfare
financing require effective uniform county solution, without the delay of
obtaining approval from the state legislature. This feature is thought to
be embodied in county- home rule. Home rule under a charter government
can serve as:
[B]oth a political symbol and a legal concept. As a political symbol
it serves as a rallying point for those who support local autonomy
without undue interference by the state government. As a legal
concept its basic function is to distribute power between the
state and local governments.4
N.Y.2d 293, 296 N.Y.S.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 49 (1968). To be completely safe, how-
ever, the draftsman should include a clause saying that -the liquidated damages
provision is not intended to be in lieu of equitable relief.
1. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 16 (1875).
2. Glauberman, County Home Rule: An Urban Necessity, 1 URBAN LAWYER
170 (1969).
3. Id.
4. Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Ex-
perience, 33 Mo. L. REv. 45, 46 (1968).
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The Missouri constitution requires counties to be grouped into four
classes 5 and the legislature has done so, basing the classification on as-
sessed valuation. 6 The constitution provides that the organization and
powers of each class of county shall be defined by uniform general laws,7
but it further provides that counties with a population of 85,000 or more
may. frame and adopt a home rule charter form of government.8
The primary goal of county home rule is to give counties a certain
level of local autonomy by enabling them to act without prior authoriza-
tion from the state legislature. Prior to 1970, the charter county's source of
power was embodied in article VI, section 18 (c) of the Missouri constitu-
tion:
The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legis-
lative power pertaining to public health, police and traffic, build-
ing construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the
county outside incorporated cities; and it may provide, or au-
thorize its governing body to provide, the terms upon which the
county shall perform any of the services and functions of any mu-
nicipality, or political subdivision in the county, except school
districts, when accepted by vote of a majority of the qualified
electors voting thereon in the municipality or subdivision, which
acceptance may be revoked by like vote.
This section was amended in 1970 and now reads as follows:
The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legisla-
tive power pertaining to any and all services and functions of any
municipality or political subdivision, except school districts, in
the part of the county outside incorporated cities; and it may
provide, or authorize its governing body to provide, the terms
upon which the county may contract with any municipality
or political subdivision in the county and perform any of the
services and functions of any such municipality or political sub-
division.
The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legis-
lative power pertaining to any and all services and functions
of any municipality or political subdivision, except school districts,
throughout the entire county within as well as outside incorpo-
rated municipalities; any such charter provision shall set forth
the limits within which the municipalities may exercise the same
power collaterally and coextensively. When such a proposition is
submitted to the voters of the County the ballot shall contain a
clear definition of the power, function or service to be performed
and the method by which it will be financed.
This amendment has ostensibly given charter counties more and broader
powers in dealing with county problems and providing county services.
St. Louis County adopted the charter .form of government in 1950,
5. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
6. § 48.020, RSMo 1969.
7. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
8. Mo. CONsr. art. VI, § 18(a).
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and Jackson County did likewise in 1970. 9 Five other Missouri counties
now have sufficient population to qualify for charters and two more seem
on the verge of qualification. 10 There has also been a recent movement
for a constitutional amendment lowering the population requirement
to 80,000.11 Because of this increase in the number of counties eligible
for charter rule, section 18(c) of the Missouri constitution should become
increasingly important. This comment will attempt to analyze problem
areas solved and possibly created by the 1970 constitutional amendment
to section 18(c).
For the purpose of analysis, charter counties should be compared with
statutory counties.
II. THE STATUTORY COUNTY
A. Organization And Magnitude of Power
The organization of the government of all Missouri counties, except
for the two charter counties, is a creature of state statute. The county
court' 2 is the basis of county government, performing both legislative and
executive or administrative functions. One important administrative
function is the review of the budget of each county department. Although
it is called a court and its officials are called judges, the county court
performs. no judicial function. The court is composed of three or fewer
judges who are elected officials. Other major elected administrative
officials in statutory county government are the derk, collector of revenue,
assessor, treasurer, prosecuting attorney, sheriff, coroner, recorder of deeds,
surveyor, and highway engineer.13
Statutory counties may exercise only those powers granted to them
by the state. This principle has become known as Dillon's Rule, which
was expressed in Lancaster v. County of Atchison.14 Dillon's Rule states
that the only powers which counties may exercise are: (1) those granted
in express words; (2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
9. Freilich, Robards & Wilson, Home Rule for the Urban County: Observa-
tions on the New Jackson County Constitutional Charter, 39 U.M.K.C.L. Rnv. 297
(1971).
10. Buchanan County (86,915), Clay County (123,702), Greene County
(152,929), Jefferson County (105,647), and St. Charles County (92,986) all qualify
for charters. Boone County (80,911) and Jasper County (79,852) almost meet the
population requirement. 1973-1974 OFrICIAL MANUAL, STATE OF Missouti at 1164.
The University of Missouri-Columbia, Governmental Affairs Newsletter, Vol.
VII, Issue 3, at 2 (1972), indicates that Jefferson County voters narrowly rejected
a charter proposal, Buchanan County was in the drafting process and readying for
a vote, and Greene County was circulating petitions for a charter commission.
St. Charles County voters defeated a charter proposal on May 6, 1975. St. Louis
Globe Democrat, May 7, 1975, at 12B, col. 2.
11. Senate Joint Resolution No. 17 was introduced in the 78th General As-
sembly by Senators Marshall and Wiggins, calling for a constitutional amendment
lowering the population requirement to 80,000. Amendments were also proposed
to sections 18(b) and 18(f) of article VI. See pt. IV, § E of this comment, infra.
12. § 49.010, RSMo 1969.
13. §§ 51.010-61.010, RSMo 1969.
14. 352 Mo. 1039, 180 S.AV.2d 706 (1944).
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to the powers expressly granted; or (3) those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the county-i.e., powers that are indispensable
and not merely convenient. If there is reasonable doubt about a county
having a particular power, the courts resolve the doubt against the
county. Because of the rule, the county must look to the state legislature
for its power, and the power must be clearly stated or implied beyond
reasonable doubt.
The legislature has distributed these powers among the four classes
of counties, with some statutes pertaining to one or more counties and
some pertaining to all. The index to Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes
indicates some twenty pages devoted to indexing legislation for the City
of St. Louis and St. Louis County. Although St. Louis County has had
a home rule charter since 1950, much of the state legislation has been
passed at the county's request, apparently as a precautionary measure.
This indicates at least some amount of uncertainty as to what 'powers
charter counties may exercise independent of authorizing legislation.
The restrictive nature of a statutory county's power has been at
least partially responsible for the formation of many special districts
in Missouri. As of 1968, Missouri was eleventh in the nation in number
of local government units. Missouri contained 2,918 units, consisting of
school districts, townships, counties, municipalities, and 734 special dis-
tricts.15 Forming a special district is often the only feasible method of ob-
taining a desired service, although such a district may also be formed in or-
der to avoid the constitutional limitation an debt 16 or to finance a project
of countywide interest. 17 Whatever the reason for formation, special dis-
tricts are very cumbersome and often stand in the way of more compre-
hensive treatment of a problem.
B. The Case Law
The fact that statutory counties, under Dillon's Rule, possess no
powers except those conferred by statute has resulted in a less than vol-
uminous amount of case law concerning the exercise of powers by statu-
tory counties. Although the cases which have been decided seem quite
reasonable,' 8 the question remains as to why there have been so few
decisions. There are at least two possible reasons for this. It could
15. Missouri Has Too Many Local Governments, 24 J. Mo. B. 499' (1968).
Missouri had 57% of all road districts in the United States. A charter county,
St. Louis County, had 153 units of government, with 32 special districts. Id.'at 499,
500.
16. Mo. CoNsr. art. VI, § 26(a).
17. The Jackson County Sports Complex Authority was created by special
legislation. See § 64.930, RSMo 1969; Freilich, Robards & Wilson, supra note 9.
18. Counties were found not to possess the powers contested in County of
Platte v. James, 489 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. 1973) (county had no power tdl impose
zoning restrictions on incorporated area, even though the government of the
corporate area was not functional and had not been for some time), Fulton Nat'l
Bank v. Callaway Memorial Hosp., 465 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1971) (county hospital
had no authority to endorse notes with recourse, and therefore was not liable
when notes were not subsequently paid); State ex rel. Crites v. West, 509 S.W.2d
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mean that the counties have enough powers under the statutes to deal with
their problems. It seems more probable, however, that reported decisions
are few because county officials are very reluctant to act unless dearly
authorized by statute. One of the principal reasons for adopting a home
rule charter is to avoid the necessity of relying wholly upon legislative
authorization for power.
III. THE CHARTER COUNTY
A. Case Law Under the Prior Section 18(c)
Grants of power to charter counties have seemingly been restricted
in much the same manner that powers of statutory counties have been
restricted by Dillon's Rule. This restriction has been in the form of
judicial decision. In State ex rel. Town of Olivette v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Co.19 it was stated that the county charter embodies the
powers charter counties may exercise, and acts beyond the powers granted
or necessarily implied in the charter are void. In Schmoll v. Housing Au-
thority of St. Louis County20 the Missouri Supreme Court described St.
Louis County's charter as its "fundamental organic law" and said that a
charter county must look to its charter for its powers.
Language in both the Jackson County and St. Louis County char-
ters attempts to escape this restrictive interpretation of charter power by
asserting that "all powers possible for a county to have under the con-
stitution and laws of Missouri .... ,,1 reside in charter counties, and
that powers under the charter shall be liberally construed in favor of the
county.22 To date, no decision by Missouri courts has indicated whether
such language is effective in avoiding the restrictive interpretation of
charter power. There is, however, dictum in Readey v. St. Louis County
Water Co. 23 indicating that the Missouri Supreme Court was ready to
482 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1974) (power to dissolve a special fire protection district
was not necessary to or implied from express powers given by statute).
Implied powers to carry out the contested function were found in Everett V.
County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1955) (power of county to operate a
rock quarry was implied from the power to own real estate, construct and improve
roads, and condemn rock quarries for public purposes); State ex rel. Wahl v. Speer,
284 Mo. 45, 223 S.W. 655 (En Banc 1920) (statute empowering county to incur
debt to "build" a courthouse, implied spending the borrowed money for expan-
sion of the old courthouse site): Blades v. Hawkins, 133 Mo. App. 328, 112 S.W.
979 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908), affd per curiam, 240 Mo. 187, 144 S.W. 1198 (1912)
(power of county court to hire an accountant to examine county records was
implied from express power making county court the fiscal agent of the. county);
Sheidley v. Lynch, 95 Mo. 487, 8 S.W. 434 (1888) (power of county to erect a court-
house at county seat implied the power to purchase the necessary land).
19. 280 S.W.2d 134 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
20. 321 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1959).
21. St. Louis County Charter art. I, § 1.030 (1968). Jackson County Charter
art. I, § 3 (1970), is virtually identical.
22. Jackson County Charter art. I, § 5 (1970); St. Louis County Charter art.
I, § 1.040 (1968).
23. 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961).
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accept such language in a similar but earlier charter provision.24 If such
language is deemed insufficient to avoid the restrictive judicial interpre-
tation of charter power, a county must comply with this interpretation.
This would mean that a charter county would have to amend its charter
each time it wished to exercise authority not expressly or necessarily im-
plied in its charter. This would be a troublesome procedure because each
charter amendment necessitates a countywide vote.2 5
It should be pointed out that statutes pertaining to a particular
class of counties continue to apply to a charter county unless conflicting
charter county enactments should prevail. This principle is illustrated
by the Readey case, where the St. Louis County Water Company, pursuant
to an ordinance of the county council, added fluoride ions to water
supplied to municipalities within the county. The Missouri Supreme
Court found the county had the power to do so, but the power was not
derived from article VI, section 18(c) of the constitution, because the
pre-1970 version of that section did not permit counties to legislate in
incorporated areas. Instead, the decision was based on a statute that
authorized first class counties to enact ordinances which enhance the
public health.26
Apportionment of powers between charter counties and the state
may best be analyzed in terms of: (1) the scope of a home rule county's
power in the absence of express constitutional or statutory prohibition
or authorization and (2) whether state or county enactments prevail when
there is a conflict between them.27 A careful distinction should be made
between the two situations. "It is one thing to argue that there should
be no limit on .. .power in the absence of an express prohibition; it
is quite another thing to argue that . . . enactments should prevail over
conflicting statutes." 28 The power of a charter county to act in the
absence of express prohibition is still somewhat open to question because
most cases have arisen in the context of a conflict between state and county
enactments. When such a conflict arises, the test now used by Missouri
courts was stated in State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Campbell:29 "When
a conflict occurs, the resolution thereof, as a general principle, depends
24. Article I, section 2 of the St. Louis County Charter as it then appeared
stated: "The County shall have all the powers now or hereafter vested by the
Constitution and laws of Missouri. ." The Missouri Supreme Court apparently
accepted this provision by stating:
It appears, therefore, that by virtue of the constitutional, statutory, and
charter provisions last above set forth, the county council was and is
authorized to enact ordinances tending to enhance the health of all the
residents of St. Louis County.
352 S.W.2d at 625.
25. Jackson County Charter art. XV (1970); St. Louis County Charter art.
X (1968).
26. § 192.300, RSMo 1959.
27. This analysis was used for home rule municipalities in Westbrook, supra
note 4, at 46.
28. Id. at 47.
29. 498 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
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on whether the functions are 'private, local corporate functions' or 'gov-
ernmental.' "30 For example, in Casper v. Hetlage3l it was stated that
zoning of a charter county was not a governmental matter over which
the state retained control.32
A governmental interest was found to exist in State ex rel. Cole v.
Matthews,3 3 where it was determined that St. Louis County could not
purchase voting machines from the lowest bidder. The State Board' of
Election Commissioners preferred another type of machine. Elections were
found to be governmental in nature, and the State Board prevailed. A
recent opinion of the Office of the St. Louis County Counselor concluded
that the county could not require an affidavit of value to be filed with
each deed recorded by the Recorder of Deeds because it was thought
to be preempted by the uniform statewide system of recording which
was governmental in nature.34
In St. Louis County v. City of Manchester35 a charter county's right
to plan and zone was determined to be local in nature and was given
precedence over a city's statutory power to acquire sewage disposal fa-
cilities outside city limits. This decision is often cited for the proposition
that when county planning and zoning efforts conflict with other statutes,
charter counties will prevail whereas statutory counties will not. This
is a result of comparing City of Manchester with State ex rel. Askew v.
Kopp,386 where residents of a statutory county sought to prevent the City
of Raytown from acquiring sewage facilities outside the city limits pur-
suant to statute. In Kopp the city's statutory power prevailed. The opinion
30. Id. at 836.
31. 359 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1962).
32. In Casper St. Louis County, being a charter county, could vest the man-
agement of the county business in some other agency than a county court. County
courts, which a statutory county must utilize, must unanimously vote to rezone,
pursuant to section 64.140, RSMo 1959. St. Louis County did not require a
unanimous vote of its council, and in Casper it was held that such power to rezone
was local in nature and was not subject to the legislative power of the state.
Id. at 790. See also State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County, 478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.
1972) (charter county had powers pertaining to planning and zoning outside
incorporated areas under old section 18(c)); Dahman v. City of Ballwin, 483 S.W.2d
605 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972) (charter county's zoning power is in the public
interest to promote public health and welfare).
33. 274 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. En Banc 1954).
34. St. Louis Co. Counselor Op. No. DL68-59 (July 18, 1975). The affidavit
was sought to aid the County Assessor in updating countywide property values.
The opinion was based primarily on Chapter 59, RSMo 1969, which pertains to
Recorders of Deeds, and Chapter 442, RSMo, which pertains to the conveyance
of real estate. The opinion concluded these statutes indicated "statewide' concern.
It is questionable, however, whether this is really a case where the action sought
by the county conflicts with and is preempted by existing statutes. In Blades v.
Hawkins, 133 Mo. App. 328, 112 S.W. 979 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908), affd per curiam,
240 Mo. 187, 144 S.W. 1198 (1912), the power of a statutory county to hire an
accountant to examine county records was implied from the express power
making the county court the fiscal agent of the county.
35. 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. En Banc 1962). The City of Manchester sought to
condemn land for such facilities pursuant to sections 71.680, 79.380, RSMo 1959.
36. 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
19761
55
Tyler: Tyler: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
in City of Manchester distinguished Kopp, however, because in the latter
case private landowners were contesting the City of Raytown's action.
No controversy between Jackson County and the City of Raytown existed.8 7
In Appelbaum v. St. Louis County38 the county was found to have the
power to acquire land for the purpose of constructing an incinerator.
The land sought by the county was inside an incorporated municipality
and use of the land for incinerator purposes conflicted with the munic-
ipality's zoning restrictions. With partial reliance on statutes pertaining
to first class counties, 89 the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
The County Council has acted pursuant to these [statutory and
charter] authorities, and its power with respect to enactment of
ordinances which tend to enhance public health is not limited to
the power conferred by Article VI, Section 18(c) of the Missouri
Constitution .... 40
Although the Missouri decisions do not clearly define the powers
charter counties may exercise in the absence of express statutory or con-
stitutional prohibition or authorization, a recent opinion by the Missouri
Supreme Court could be construed as defining such powers. In Flower
Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Louis County4l a county ordinance
required shopping centers which were located in unincorporated areas and
which had parking areas in excess of 200,000 square feet to provide outside
security protection for shoppers. The licensed watchmen were to be em-
ployed by the shopping centers, and they were to have full power of
arrest and the use of weapons. The watchmen were to be under the direc-
tion and supervision of the Superintendent of Police of St. Louis County.
The ordinance was challenged on constitutional grounds. The Missouri
Supreme Court, while finding the ordinance constitutional, concluded
that St. Louis County lacked the authority to enact the ordinance because
police protection was a matter of statewide concern. The court did not
indicate whether the ordinance was preempted by existing statutes or
constitutional provisions requiring police protection to be provided by
the county, or whether they viewed the ordinance as an attempt to leg-
islate in the absence of any applicable statutory or constitutional authori.
zation. Flower Valley indicated that it makes no difference whether the
charter county's ordinance conflicts and is therefore preempted by an
existing state statute, or whether the ordinance is an attempt to legislate
in the absence of any statutory authorization-in either case the test is
whether the activity is of statewide or local concern. In speaking of
article VI, section 18(b) of the constitution, the court stated:
37. 360 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
38. 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1970).
39. Section 49.303, RSMo 1969, and section 64.320, RSMo 1969, authorize
first class counties to acquire land by eminent domain for the protection of public
health, and to construct and operate incinerators and land fills.
40. Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107, 112 (Mo. 1970).
41. 528 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
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In our opinion, the question whether owners of private property
may be compelled to provide police protection for shoppers is
also one of state-wide concern and may not be addressed by coun-
ties without constitutional or statutory authority more explicit
than is found in Art. VI, § 18(b).4
The court made no mention of section 18(c), which designates powers
that charter counties may exercise. The fact that only unincorporated
areas of the county were affected by the ordinance seems to indicate
that St. Louis County contemplated section 18(c) when it enacted the ord-
inance, because "police and traffic" was one of four express areas in
which counties could legislate for unincorporated areas under the earlier
section 18(c). The court reasoned that allowing such action by a county
could result in the apportionment of police and fire services to poten-
tially troublesome areas, with the resulting cost being assessed to the
private landowners in those areas. This policy reasoning is understand-
able, but the decision completely avoids the issue of whether a charter
county has the authority to take such action under section 18(c).
B. The Impact of the 1970 Amendment
The 1970 amendment to section 18(c) 43 consists of two paragraphs,
the first of which expands the legislative power that charter counties
may exercise outside incorporated areas of the county. Originally au-
thorized to legislate "pertaining to public health, police and traffic,
building construction, and planning and zoning, in the part of the county
outside incorporated cities. . ,"44 charter counties are no longer limited
to the four listed categories but may now legislate pertaining to "any and
all services and functions of any municipality or political subdivision,
except school districts, in the part of the county outside incorporated
cities. . ... 45
The second paragraph of the 1970 amendment allows charter counties
to exercise power pertaining to "all services and functions of any mu-
nicipality or subdivision, except school districts, throughout the entire
county within as well as outside incorporated municipalities . . ."46 This
paragraph had no earlier counterpart. The prerequisites to the exercise of
such countyvide power are probably the most important feature of the
1970 amendment to section 18 (c).
One article suggests that countywide action cannot be taken by
legislative enactment of the county because such measures must be sub-
mitted to the county voters.47 The second paragraph of section 18(c),
with reference to the exercise of countywide legislative power, reads in
pertinent part:
42. Id. at 754.
43. The amendment is set out at pt. I of this comment, supra.
44. Mo. CONSr. art. VI, § 18(c).
45. Mo. CONSr'. art. VI, § 18(c) 1970 amend.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Freilich, Robards 8& Wilson, supra note 9, at 332.
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The charter may provide for the vesting and exercise of legisla-
tive power.., any such charter provision shall set forth the limits
within which the municipalities may exercise the same power....
When such a proposition is submitted to the voters of the
County.... (emphasis added).
The initial part of the paragraph indicates such action might be taken
by the exercise of legislative power by the county, but the latter part of
the paragraph contemplates a countywide vote. Reading the paragraph
as a whole, it rather clearly indicates that a charter amendment is necessary
for any countywide measure.
St. Louis County officials also believe that countywide measures re-
quire a charter amendment. St. Louis County has made the only attempt
thus far to utilize the 1970 amendment. In 1971, ordinances calling for
charter amendments were passed by the county legislative body. The three
proposed charter amendments were all defeated at the November 2, 1971
election. The first amendment called for 24-hour police protection for all of
St. Louis County, the second for the adoption of a countywide minimum
housing code, and the third for the adoption of a countywide building
code. 4s The charters of both St. Louis County and Jackson County were
written prior to the 1970 constitutional amendment, and both charters
attempt to include all powers subsequently given charter counties by
statute or in the constitution.49 St. Louis County, however, required a
countywide vote and did not attempt to rely on such language in its charter.
Neither Jackson County nor St. Louis County have current plans to
48. The charter amendments, if adopted, would have consisted of the fol-
lowing:
1) Said charter as amended would require each city, county, town or village
police department in St. Louis County to provide patrol services and preliminary
investigative services at all times, and create a Police Standards Commission to
determine compliance with this requirement and further authorize the County
Council, after hearing, to direct the County Police Department to perform such
services where the responsible police department had failed to comply with this
requirement, the cost of such additional services to be paid by St. Louis County,
to be reimbursed by any municipality receiving such services;
2) Said charter as amended would authorize the County Council to enact
and provide for the enforcement of uniform building construction codes through-
out St. Louis County at the County's expense and to provide the terms on which
any municipality or fire district may enforce any such code at its own expense,
and would authorize any political subdivision to enact different provisions after
public hearing, and would also provide for enlarging the existing Building Com-
mission and the creation of the City Selection Committee and a Fire Safety Ad-
visory Board;
3) Said charter as amended would authorize the County Council to enact and
provide for the enforcement of a uniform housing code throughout St. Louis
County at the County's expense and to provide the terms on which any municipal-
ity may adopt and enforce such a code at its own expense, would provide for a
distribution of part of the County's expenditures to such municipalities, and
would also provide for the creation of a Housing Code Commission and a City
Selection Committee.
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Nov. 1, 1971, at 1-A, col 1.
49. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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propose any charter amendments, 50 indicating that no judicial decision
under the 1970 amendment will be immediately forthcoming. The con-
struction and interpretation of the 1970 amendment to section 18(c) must
await judicial determination, but certain issues concerning the amend-
ment that seem likely to arise in the future will be discussed in this
comment.
IV. THE 1970 AmENDMENT: ISSUES AND CONSTRUCTION
A. The County's Basic Authority Redefined?
The cases decided prior to the 1970 amendment limited a charter
county's power to legislate to matters of local concern, 51 as opposed to
matters of governmental or statewide concern. The earlier section 18(c)
specified four areas in which counties had legislative power: public health,
police and traffic, building construction, and planning and zoning. The
1970 amendment speaks of "any and all services and functions of any
municipality or political subdivision." It can be argued this changes the
test for when and on what matters a county may act. The term "services"
may indicate only those services which were formerly provided by a mu-
nicipality, or "functions" may expand the authority to other areas. "Func-
tions" seems to be a much broader term than "services" and may include
implementing or regulating local policy rather than merely the per-
formance of services.52 It is possible, however, that "services and func-
tions" was intended to include only services otherwise awkward or
impossible to fit under public health, police and traffic, building con-
struction, and planning and zoning-the enumerated categories of the
earlier section 18(c). Nevertheless, "services and functions" seem to indi-
cate that something more was intended under section 18(c), as amended,
than under the prior section.
The second paragraph of the 1970 amendment 53 empowers charter
counties to legislate countywide when approved by county vote. The
last part of that paragraph states that "the ballot shall contain a dear
definition of the power, function or service to be performed. . . ." Here
"power" is added to "function or service." "Power" did not appear in
paragraph one or in the first part of paragraph two. Such a term, when
coupled with function and service, seems to indicate that the amendment
changes a charter county's basic authority. Because "power" was not used
in paragraph one, it could be argued that charter counties have less au-
50. Telephone interview with the Office of County Counsel of both Jackson
and St. Louis Counties, July, 1975.
51. Casper v. Hetlage, 359 S.W.2d 781 (Mo. 1962); State ex rel. St. Louis
County v. Campbell, 498 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
52. In State ex rel. Cole v. Matthews, 274 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. En Banc 1954)
a charter county was held not to have the power to purchase voting machines
from the lowest bidder, as elections were said to be governmental in nature. If
the case had arisen under the 1970 amendment to section 18(c), the result might
have been different.
53. The amendment is set out at pt. I of this comment, supra.
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thority when legislating for unincorporated areas. It remains an open
question whether a charter county's basic authority has been altered to
exceed the power of providing constitutionally required services and
determining the manner in which they are to be provided. Section 18(c),
as amended, provides an argument that a charter county's authority has
been redefined.
B. Instrument of Grant or Limitation?
By definition, an instrument of grant gives charter counties only
those powers which are specified or necessarily implied in their charters.
An instrument of limitation, on the other hand, gives charter counties
all powers not prohibited by the constitution or by the charter. It is
clear from the language of section 18(c), as amended, that county charters
are instruments of grant.
Language in Jackson County's charter states:
The county shall have all powers possible for a county to have
under the constitution and laws of Missouri, as fully and com-
pletely as though they were specifically enumerated in this char-
ter... and all powers not expressly prohibited by the constitution,
or by this charter.54
'Whether this language will be successful in creating an instrument of
limitation has not been answered by the courts. If the courts view such
language as being ineffective in creating an instrument of limitation,
county legislation that was otherwise local in nature could be invalidated
if power to enact such legislation was not provided for in the county
charter.55
An argument against allowing such expansive language to create
an instrument of limitation is that section 18(c) is concerned with the
difficult subject of intergovernmental relations. Such matters should be
defined as dearly as possible in the charter. An instrument of limitation
would give a county all powers not expressly prohibited in the charter.
This would arguably result in less clarity, because there would be powers
existing outside the instrument.
C. Constitutional Conflicts
If a state statute provides the terms under which a charter county can
provide countywide services, the question arises whether the statute is
unconstitutional because of a conflict with sections 18(b) and 18(c) of
the Missouri constitution. Section 18(b) says in pertinent part:
The charter shall provide for ... the form of the county govern-
ment, the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms of office and
salaries of the county officers, and for the exercise of all powers
and duties of counties and the county officers. . ..
It can be argued that a statute allowing a charter county to provide
54. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
55. Freilich, Robards & Wilson, supra note 9, at 338.
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county-wide services would be unconstitutional, because charter counties
retain freedom, to choose the manner in which -to perform the services
required by the constitution.56 A state statute may require the result, but
where it also prescribes the manner in which the result shall be obtained,
a constitutional question is presented. For example, assume that a state
statute required all charter counties to provide a countywide system of
mosquito control, and that the system be implemented by a Mosquito
Control Supervisor who must not be a part of any other department or
agency of county government. It could be argued that the statute would
be -unconstitutional because it dictates the manner in which the service
is to be provided.
Where provisions of a county charter conflict with provisions of a
charter of a city within the charter county, the question arises as to
which governmental entity should prevail. For example, if a charter
county enacted a uniform countywide building code 57 and a charter city
within the county persisted in utilizing a less stringent code, a constitu-
tional conflict would be presented. The Missouri constitution provides for
both charter counties and charter cities. 58 In St. Louis County v. City of
Manchester59 the city sought to acquire land outside the city limits for
purposes of sewage disposal. The action was pursuant to statute, but was
contrary to the planning and zoning provisions of St. Louis County. St.
Louis County prevailed in that case, but the decision does not answer the
question posed because Manchester was not a charter city. In fact, the
Missouri Supreme Court declined to determine whether the county or
the city "occupies a superior position in the governmental hierarchy." 60
It would seem that in keeping with the spirit of the 1970 constitutional
amendment to section 18(c), the charter county should prevail. Section
18(c) requires a countywide vote. A charter city should not be able to
act contrary to the county charter when the county acts pursuant to a
majority vote of the residents of the county, which includes the voters of
the charter city. A contrary argument is based on the doctrine that when
there is conflict between two entities of government, the smallest local
unit of self government should prevail.
D. Problems of Interpretation
The last sentence of the second paragraph of amended section 18(c)
states that when countywide action is submitted to a vote, the ballot shall
contain "a clear definition of the power, function or service to be per-
formed and the method by which it will be financed." It could be argued
that the language having to do with the method of financing limits
56. Hellman v. St. Louis County, 302 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Mo. 1957); State v.
Gamble, 865 Mo. 215, 224, 280 S.W.2d 656, 660 (En Banc 1955).
57. St. Louis County sought to enact such a provision in 1971, but was un-
successful.
58. Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 18(a), 19.
59. 860 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
60. Id. at 642.
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countywide ,action, to powers, functions, and services which incur debt
and eliminates those powers, functions, and services of a regulatory nature
which are enforced or carried out by an existing county office. Additional
expense would undoubtedly be incurred for these regulatory functions,
but the expense may be absorbed by the county operating budget and
not require additional revenue measures. It seems doubtful that such a
construction was intended because this would force the charter .county
to incur additional debt each time it attempts to implement countywide
measures, and incurring such debt should not be encouraged. Moreover,
because incurring additional debt usually has little voter appeal, many
countywide measures would be doomed to failure in a countywide election.
The word. "clear" appearing in the last sentence of the second para-
graph of section 18(c) may present a point of challenge to future charter
amendments. A "clear" definition of the power, function, or service to
.be performed .and the method by which it will be financed would be
difficult to present in some cases. It seems doubtful that courts would give
a broad scope of review to a challenge that the ballot did not contain a
"clear" definition of the proposal. The acceptance of such an argument
would allow belated attacks on countywide legislation by parties who, if
genuinely interested or affected, could have asked for clarification prior
to submission to county vote. Another argument for a narrow scope of
judicial review was stated in Windle v. Lambert:61 "The general rule is
that courts will -not inquire into the motives of Legislatures where they
possess the power to act and it has been exercised as prescribed by
law. .... ,62 By analogy, if a charter county legislature has complied with
the state constitution and its own charter in enacting legislation, its enact-
ments should be subject to the same rule.
The second paragraph of amended section 18(c), having to do with
countywide services and functions, states that any such charter provision
"shall set forth the limits within which the municipalities may exercise
the same power collaterally and coextensively." There are at least three
ways this language could be construed. First of all, the phrase may imply
that the right to exercise the same power collaterally and coextensively
always resides in the city, and that this residual role may prevent the county
from completely taking over a service or function. Second, it may mean
that the city's collateral and coextensive power, if it exists at all in a
particular case, is to be limited by the charter amendment. Finally, this
particular phrase omits "political subdivision," which was used earlier
in the paragraph in conjunction with "municipality." This may indicate
that if the county wants to contract with any political subdivision other
than a city-e.g., a special road district, the charter does not have to set
forth the limits for collateral and coextensive exercise of the same power
by the political subdivision.
61. 400 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1966).
62. Id. at 93.
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The question whether a county can perform a countywide service
without all cities in the county having the same power may arise under
section 18(c). The second paragraph of section 18(c) refers to the "exer-
cise of legislative power pertaining to any and all services and functions
of any municipality or subdivision... throughout the entire county...."
Because of the language of amended section 18(c) refers to any municipal-
ity, it suggests that it is not necessary for all cities to have the power.
Article VI, section 16 of the Missouri constitution provides:
Any municipality or political subdivision of thig state may con-
tract and cooperate with other municipalities or political subdi-
visions thereof . for the planning, development, construction,
acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or
fdr a common service, in the manner provided by law.
Section 70.220, RSMo 1969, was enacted to implement article VI, section
16 of the Missouri c6nstitution.63 This statute requires that the subject
or purpose of any contract or cooperative action be within the scope of
the power of each municipality or subdivision. Because article VI, section
16 implies, that each municipality or subdivision shall have coextensive
power, it is questionable that this conflicts with section 18(c) as amended,
which allows counties to legislate countywide when approved by county
vote. Section 16, by the use of the language "may contract," speaks in terms
of voluntary action or cooperation. In contrast, section 18(c) speaks of
powers vested in a charter county by reason of its charter, the exercise
of these countywide powers, and the implementation of countywide pro-
grams. Because of this difference in intent, it is improbable that each
municipality and political subdivision in a county must have reciprocal
power before a charter county could adopt countywide measures.
E. Proposed Constitutional Amendments
A Senate joint resolution introduced in the last General Assembly 64
called for the submission to Missouri voters of amendments to sections
18(a),. 18(b), and 18(f) of article VI of the Missouri constitution. The
amendments to section 18(a) and 18(f) would have lowered the population
requirement for charter counties from 85,000 to 80,000 inhabitants, and
lowered the percentage of county voters required for a petition for a
charter commission from 20 to 8 percent of the total vote cast for governor
at the last general election. The amendment to section 18(b) would have
63. in School District of Kansas City v. Kansas City, 382 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.
En Banc 1964), the Missouri Supreme Court stated:
Section 70.220 follows the language of the constitutional provision, § 16
of Art. 6, but further spells out the requirement implicit in the Consti-
tution that the subject and purposes of the cooperative contract or action
shall be within the scope of the powers of the municipality or subdi-
vision...
Id. at -692.
64. Senate Joint Resolution No. 17, introduced in the First Regular Ses-
sion, 78th General Assembly (1974) by Senators Marshall and Wiggins.
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substituted "not prohibited" for "prescribed" in section 18(b), so that it
would have read as follows:
The charter shall provide for its amendment, for the form of the
county government, the number, kinds, manner of selection, terms
of office and salaries of the county officers, and for the exercise
of all powers and duties of counties and county officers [pre-
scribed] not prohibited by the constitution and laws of the state.0 5
The latter proposed amendment was intended to give charter coun-
ties greater powers,66 presumably in areas where there are no conflicting
legislative or constitutional provisions. There was some thought that the
legislature could act in matters of purely local concern under the prior
section 18(b). Where such a conflict occurs, and the matter is actually
determined to be local, the charter county should prevail under the
constitution as it now reads, provided the county has appropriate au-
thority in its charter. The amendment was opposed by the two charter
counties, St. Louis County and Jackson County, because they believed
that the present section 18(b) was adequate, and they were content with
its provisions.6r The resolution was passed in the Senate, but was not
acted upon by the House. If passed, the proposed section 18(b) would
change county charters from instruments of grant to instruments of lim-
itation, by the use of language similar to that found in both the Jackson
County and St. Louis County charters. 69 The charter counties apparently
believe that the language in their charters is sufficient and wish no further
tampering with section 18(b).69 It appears that there will be no further
immediate attempts to amend section 18(b), because the authors of the
proposed amendment will probably defer to the judgment of the charter
counties. There will, however, be further attempts to amend sections
18(a) and 18(f)70 inregard to the population requirement for charter
counties.
V. "OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
With the addition' of Jackson County as a charter county and the
possibility of more counties obtaining charters in the near future, the
65. Id.
66. Telephone interview with State Senator Larry Marshall, 19th District,
July 31, 1975.
67. Telephone interview with the Office of County Counsel of both Jackson
and St. Louis Counties, July 1975.
68. Jackson County Charter art. I, § 3 (1970); St. Louis County Charter art.
1, § 1.030 (1968).
69. Telephone interview with the Office of County Counsel of both Jackson
and St. Louis Counties, July 1975.
70. A 'measure which would grant the power to form charter governments
to all of Missouri's counties was approved by the Missouri House and sent to the
Senate for further consideration. This measure would eliminate the present 85,000
population requirement. Because such a measure would amend the state consti-
tution, if approved by the Senate, it will also have to be approved by a majority
of the voters in a statewide election, Columbia Daily-Tribune, Jan. 15, 1976, at 3,
col. 4. 1 " : !,I
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permissible scope of a charter county's power to legislate under section
18(c) will become increasingly important.
The legality or constitutionality of a particular action is not the
only problem charter counties face. Under the 1970 amendment, counties
can now legislate countywide if there is a charter amendment approved
by county voters. Political considerations, however, may restrict the use
of countywide legislation. Rather than viewing charters as county self-
government or as home rule, residents of outlying areas of the counties
may view them as similar to big city government or as another layer of
government being imposed on them. Outlying municipalities often feel
disenfranchised by attempts of others to act within their boundaries. At
least three reasons were given by incorporated areas within the county
for the opposition and ultimate defeat of the three St. Louis County pro-
posals: (1) anticipated higher taxes; (2) county takeover of municipal-
ities; and (3) countywide building and housing codes containing less
stringent provisions than the existing municipal codes." 1 Even with the
failure of such attempts at countywide measures, such attempts may have
value in bringing about the desired result through contract and compro-
mise, at least where incorporated areas fear a different result at a later
election.
The desirability and potential success of county home rule may well
turn on the geographical make-up of a county. St. Louis County is more
or less homogeneous and to a large extent incorporated. This situation
lends itself more readily to the concept of home rule. Jackson County, on
the other hand, contains two large cities, Kansas City and Independence,
with almost one-third of the remaining county being unincorporated.72
The budget of the City of Kansas City is approximately twice that of
Jackson County.73 In addition to problems of political division, this
creates funding problems for Jackson County, because it must come up
with an attractive program to persuade the voters to approve countywide
action, particularly where the action requires incurring additional debt.
Kansas City presently provides services to a large percentage of the county
voters, and these voters may be content with such services.
County government may seek to overcome such problems by showing
out-county areas the benefits of county home rule. Current plans in Jackson
County are to improve out-county relations with programs of bridge and
road improvement. There is also some discussion of eventual consolidation
of countywide logistical functions. 4
Though home rule provides counties with powers not found in statutes,
what home rule can offer a lightly urbanized county is subject to con-
jecture at this point. County home rule has met with two recent failures
71. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 28, 1971, at 6W.
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in Missouri. Both Jefferson County and St. Charles County have rejected
the county charter form of government. 75 This is apparently a manifesta-
tion of out-county fears that gaining power to act independently of the
state legislature in some areas may only result in the transfer of that power
to one city or interest group in the county. Such fears will arise at each
and every charter election, and, whether unfounded or not, will take some
time to allay.
The 1970 constitutional amendment has apparently given charter
counties more tools with which to work, but obtaining the approval of a
majority of voters for countywide programs may often be difficult because
of out-county opposition. Charter government does present many safe-
guards for out-county areas: the petition requirement to form a charter
commission, a countywide vote to adopt a charter, an elected county
legislative body, a majority vote of the county council, and a subsequent
countywide vote for countywide measures. These safeguards should be
sufficient to prevent any abuse of charter power. The 1970 amendment to
section 18(c) does not, however, clearly enumerate the powers of charter
counties. The uncertainty of what, if any, powers were added by the amend-
ment, the potential constitutional conflicts, and the interpretation prob-
lems must be resolved by judicial decision. A liberal judicial interpre-
tation of section 18(c) would seem desirable to enable charter counties






In recent years licensing of persons seeking to engage in various occu-
pations has been an ever-increasing phenomenon.' Occupational licensing
includes licensing of professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, and engi-
neers, as well as nonprofessionals, such as beauticians, barbers, boiler in-
spectors, and egg graders. It restricts certain occupations to those individuals
licensed by a particular state or subdivision of a state.2 Under a typical
75. See note 10 supra.
1. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS LICENSED
BY THE STATES, PUERTO Rico AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS (1968); B. SHI MERG, B.
EssER, & D. KRUGER, MANPOWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPA-
TIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SuM1-
BERG]. In 1968 the Council of State Governments listed sixty-seven licensed oc-
cupations including abstractor, accountant, attorney, and physician, as well as
auctioneer, barber, boiler inspector, cemetery salesman, egg grader, librarian, milk
weigher, photographer, used car dealer, horseshoer, feeder pig dealer, tattoo artist,
and hunting guide.
2. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREomi 137, 141 (1962); W. GELLHORN,
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 113 (1956).
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licensing scheme, the license may be granted only after satisfying require-
ments of a licensing board,3 such as passing an examination, and may be
subject to denial for other reasons.4 Those granting the license are usually
members of the same occupation as those seeking licensure. 5 Entry of new
members into a field, therefore, may be effectively controlled by those
already members of a particular occupation by denial of licensure. In the
same manner, behavior of those already in the occupation may be con-
trolled by the threat of license suspension or revocation.6
Restricting entry into an occupation and controlling behavior of those
already in the occupation have strong economic implications. Economic
theory7 has long recognized the effect of such a dosed market structure on
existing members of the occupation, consumers, and potential entrants into
the market.8 A dosed market structure, a cartel, may be defined as:
Monopolistic control of the supply of a product or service for the
purpose of enhancing returns to members of the cartel and pro-
tecting members of the cartel from price competition that would
reduce the return to a competitive level.9
The resultant higher profit margin for those already in the market'0
directly correlates with less efficient utilization of resources and less con-
sumer choice. 1 The cost of protection for cartel members is increased
price of the product or service to consumers and restricted access of pro-
spective entrants into the market. Imposition of a licensing requirement
magnifies the detrimental effects created by preexisting natural barriers,
such as large start-up costs, specialized knowledge, and patents. 12 Given
these effects, additional entry barriers, such as occupational licensing,
should be discouraged unless strong reasons exist for perpetuating them.
Conversely, a competitive economic model insures that resources would
be used more efficiently and beneficially for prospective buyers and sellers.' 3
In such a competitive system both buyers and sellers have alternatives.
"Buyers can choose among alternative sellers, and sellers are free to enter
any line of production they believe will be profitable."' 4 Sellers have max-
imum mobility; they can enter and leave various industries at will. Entry
3. SHIMBERG, supra note 1, at 8-9.
4. Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California: A Representative
Example, 18 STAN. L. REv. 640, 651-54 (1966).
5. BURAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ANTI-TRuST AND TRADE REGULATION RE-
FORT D-Z (No. 694, 1974); Barron, supra note 4, at 649.
6. Barron, supra note 4, at 644.
7. It must be remembered that economic models are just models and as
such may not accurately describe the complexities of the real world.
8. Barron, supra note 4, at 643.
9. Id. at 644.
10. J. BAIN, BARRIERS To NEw COMPTrIoN: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSE-
QUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 172-73 (1956); Barron, supra note 4, at 643.
11. J. BAn, supra note 10, at 207.
12. Id.
13. Barron, supra note 4, at 640.
14. Id.
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will be determined by the existence or absence of a profit factor. Buyers
also have maximum mobility; they are free to choose among all sellers of
a particular product or service. Selection by buyers will eliminate those
sellers who cannot utilize their resources most efficiently. Theoretically,
prices will reflect this competitive situation. If price exceeds cost of a
given product or service, profit will exist. Because there are no restrictions
on entry into this market, new sellers are free to enter. The presence of
new sellers in the market will cause a reduction in price to near cost. 15
This competitive market system is the focal point of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.16 In the main, the premises of the Act are coextensive with the
theories underlying this system. Many cartels which inhibit attainment of
this objective, therefore, have been condemned. 7 Although occupational
licensing produces the same economic effect, it has not traditionally been
recognized as a barrier to entry of the same posture. It is the purpose of
this comment to analyze the Sherman Antitrust Act as a vehicle for elim-
inating barriers to entry created by occupational licensing.
II. SCOPE OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACr
The jurisdiction of the Sherman Antitrust Act appears to be coexten-
sive with the commerce clause.' 8 The Act provides:
[Section 1] Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be ille-
gal ....
[Section 2] Every person who shall monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... 19
15. Id. at 640-41.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1890). See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S.
26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United
States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
17. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
[T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small,
is the freedom to compete .... Implicit in such freedom is the notion
that it cannot be foreclosed with rcspect to one sector of the economy
because certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure
might promote greater competition in another sector of the economy.
Id. at 610. See also Am. Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Patterson v. United States,
222 F. 599 (6th Cir. 1915); United Statcs v. National Retail Lumber Dealers'Ass'n,
40 F. Supp. 448 (D.C. Colo. 1941).
18. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 557-
59 (1944); cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2011-12 (1975); Burkc
v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948).
19. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
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The threshold question for analysis is whether occupational licensing is
within this jurisdictional purview.2 0
A. Trade or Commerce
At the inception of Sherman Act litigation, case law focused heavily
on whether the activity in issue could properly be classified as constituting
"trade or commerce."' 21 Early decisions limited the scope of "trade or
commerce" to production, distribution, and exchange of goods and trans-
portation. Manufacture of a product,22 personal efforts or services un-
related to production,2 3 and learned professions were not "trade or com-
merce" within the meaning of the Act.24 This narrow construction was
short-lived in the commercial context;2 5 subsequent cases developed an
expansive view of the "trade or commerce" requirement. 26 No longer are
manufacturing or personal services deemed outside "trade or commerce."
Learned professions, such as law, medicine, and engineering, have also
been found to be within the ambit of "trade or commerce." 27
The scope of activities considered "trade or commerce" has been
defined in United States v. American Medical Association28 as ". . . all
occupations in which men are engaged for a livelihood. '29 Applying this
definition, occupations subject to licensing would seem to fall within the
phrase "trade or commerce." Any remaining doubt as to the validity of this
conclusion has been erased by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia
20. Rasmussen v. Am. Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1973).
Conduct of the defendant is within the jurisdictional reach of the Sher-
man Act if Congress can prohibit that conduct under the Commerce
Clause .... Before this general test is particularized, an important dis-
tinction should be stressed-the distinction between jurisdictional ques-
tions ... and the question of a ... substantive violation of the Sherman
Act....
Id. at 521.
21. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); United
States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
22. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
23. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
24. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 2004(1975).
25. In noncommercial activity "trade or commerce" remains a stumbling block
to application of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Marjorie Webster Jr. College v.
Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (antitrust laws do not apply to school accreditation organizations because
the restriction is not with regard to commercial activity). Contra, Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2012-13 (1975).
26. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539, 547
(1944); United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 710 (D.C. Cir.
1940).
27. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2012-13 (1975).
28. 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
29. Id. at 710.
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State Bar.30 In rejecting the "learned professions" exemption to "trade or
commerce," the Court said:
[T]he nature of an occupation standing, alone, does not provide
sanctuary from the Sherman Act ... nor is the public service aspect
of professional practice controlling in determining whether Section
1 includes professions. Congress intended to strike as broadly as
it could in Section 1 of the Sherman Act .... 31
Given this broad statement, any allegation that occupational licensing
does not fall within "trade or commerce" would have little merit.
B. Among The Several States
Assuming that occupational licensing is trade or commerce, a second
requirement must be met before the Sherman Antitrust Act's jurisdiction
attaches: "trade or commerce" must be "among the several states." 2
"Trade or commerce" purely intrastate in character and effect fails to
meet this jurisdictional test.3 3
Most early cases turned on a local-interstate distinction in determining
whether this jurisdictional requirement had been met.3 4 One of the first
cases litigated under the Act, United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,35 held that
manufacture of goods was local in character and therefore outside the
Act's jurisdiction.3 6 Such a local analysis greatly limited the scope of the
Act.
Modem cases have rejected this local analysis. The distinct trend
has been an expansive construction of the commerce clause,3 7 resulting
in a broader jurisdictional reach for the Sherman Antitrust Act.3 8 Two
predominate theories have advanced this trend. The first of these, plenary
control, emphasizes the use of facilities of interstate movement.3 0 The
30. 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
31. Id. at 2013.
32. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
33. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). See also
Evanston Cab Co. v. Chicago, 325 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1963) (local operation of
taxicabs did not constitute interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act);
John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc. v. Fultz, 313 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wash. 1970)
(if all mortuary supplies were delivered to and came to rest in plaintiff's estab.
lishment and never resold, the Act's jurisdiction did not attach).
34. See, e.g., Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925); Hopkins v.
United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1
(1895).
35. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
36. Id. at 16.
37. Mandleville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
38. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
39. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1939);
Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1954).
In Rasmussen v. Am. Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1973), the court found
a local manufacturer of beverages had a sufficient relationship to the interstate
commerce in fluid milk to come within Congress' plenary control over interstate
commerce. The opinion, in dictum, indicated barbering may not satisfy the juris.
dictional requirements.
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second focuses upon the interstate impact of an activity-even one totally
local in character. 40
Under the first approach the scope of the commerce clause is based
on Congress' plenary control over the instrumentalities of interstate move-
ment.4 1 Through the "necessary and proper" clause, 42 this control reaches
back to the point of origin and forward to the point at which the modes
of interstate movement are no longer involved.4 3
Most likely, occupational licensing under state statutes would be
immune from Sherman Act jurisdiction under this rationale. Licensing
statutes center primarily on restricting the practice of an occupation
within a given state or subdivision and do not involve tangible interstate
movement.
The second approach is conceptually broader. This approach finds
its genesis in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.44
Marshall defined the scope of the commerce clause as commerce which
concerns or affects more than one state.4 5 It is unclear, however, what
requisite effect must be achieved to meet this constitutional test. The
predominate approach previously seemed to have hinged on whether
the cumulative impact of the activity actually exerted a substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce.4 6 If it did, then the activity-whether
purely local or not-was within the realm of the commerce clause. How-
ever, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States47 and Perez v. United
States48 the Court stated that the scope of the commerce clause included
intrastate activity which might have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.4 9 These two cases may indicate that potential (as opposed to
actual) and substantial interstate effect will be sufficient to bring the
activity within the reach of the commerce clause.
Restrictive interpretations of the commerce clause continue to surface,
however. A recent Supreme Court case, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,0
40. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 549-52 (1943); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942).
41. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Oklahoma-Texas Trust
v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939).
42. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
43. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
44. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
45. Id. at 7.
46. The fact that one individual's activity has a trivial impact on interstate
commerce is not sufficient to remove him from the scope of federal regulation. The
appropriate test is the cumulative impact of those similarly situated. See Wickard
v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1943). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
47. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
48. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
49. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971).
50. 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
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seemingly resurrects the earlier "actual effect" argument.5 1 While finding
restraint on the availability of legal services substantially affects inter-
state commerce, the Court based its analysis on the local-interstate dis-
tinction.52 Giting numerous factors, the Court concluded that "a sub-
stantial volume of commerce was involved."53 Goldfarb indicates that facts
showing actual and substantial interstate effect must be alleged to meet
the Sherman Antitrust Act's jurisdictional requirements. Thus, the Court
may be retreating from the "potential interstate effect" test applied in
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Perez.5 4
The impact of this decision on occupational licensing litigation cannot
be underestimated. By requiring actual effect, occupational licensing stat-
utes which create a cartel-like impact, but fail actually to affect a sub-
stantial volume of commerce, may be immune from antitrust action for
failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.
III. THE STATE AcTION EXEMPTION
Even if occupational licensing falls within the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Sherman Antitrust Act, a major obstacle confronting antitrust
litigation is the state action exemption. Licensing is primarily achieved by
state statute. In Parker v. Brown55 the Supreme Court found California's
statutory program regulating prices, disposition, and production of raisins
ultimately moving in interstate commerce outside the purview of the Act. 0
The rationale of this decision rested on the premise that Section 1 of the
Act was directed at private action rather than state action:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.5 7
Respect for federal-state comity and ultimate preservation of the fed-
eral system also influenced the Parker holding.5 8 Emphasizing action by
independent state officials, sanctioned by legislative mandate, Parker
formed the basis for a judicially created state action exemption to the
Act.5 9 The purpose of this exemption was to exclude state-compelled anti-
51. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
52. 95 S. Ct. at 2011-12.
53. Id. at 2012.
54. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
55. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker involved a suit brought by a California
producer and packer of raisins. The suit challenged California's Agricultural Pro.
rate Act. The Act required each raisin producer to d~liver over two-thirds of his
crop to an" agency authorized by law to control marketing and eliminate competi-
tion, thus increasing the price of raisins. A three judge federal court enjoie en-
forcement of the Act finding that it: (1) viblated the Sherman Antitrust Act; and
(2) constituted an undue burden on commerce. The Supreme Codirt reversed.
56. Id. at 352.
57. Id. at 350-51.
58. Id. at 351. See also P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE 243-44 (1970).
59. Pogue, The Rationale of Exemption from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTi-TRusT
SEc.rON 313, 325-26 (1961).
[Vol. 41
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competitive goals and means from the scope of the Act. Underpinning this
exemption was the perceived congressional directive to prevent only pri-
vate anticompetitive actions. 60
The scope of the state action exemption has been left unclear by
subsequent decisions. Attempts at definition generally emerge in one of
three patterns. The majority of federal courts have adopted a three-pronged
mechanical approach.61 A substantial minority embrace a more flexible
variation of the three-pronged mechanical approach. 62 Finally, a few
courts interpret the state action exemption along the lines of a police power
rationale.63
Those circuits adopting the three-pronged mechanical test embrace a
restrictive view of Parker.64 Attempts at definition of this test can best
be illustrated by Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Penn-
sylania.6 5 In that case, the defendants argued that state regulation of the
insurance business and state approval to operate as an insurance carrier in
Pennsylvania exempted them from an action brought under the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Rejecting this contention, the court stated that ". . . regula-
tion and supervision alone do not constitute a delegation of governmental
authority."6 6 Further case law using this mechanical test has refined the
exemption and three essential elements have emerged: (1) a legislatively
created entity; (2) furtherance of an express public policy; and (3) express
statutory authorization to utilize anticompetitive means to achieve the
specific governmental purpose expressed.6 7 Absence of one of these ele-
ments precludes application of the state action exemption.
Other circuits have adopted a more flexible approach. These circuits
have not required all three elements of the mechanical test to be present
before the state action exemption is applied. 68 Rather, emphasis has been
60. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
61. See New Mexico v. Am. Petrofina, 501 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1974); Hecht
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Whitten v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d
870 (4th Cir. 1966); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Mass. Port Authority, 362
F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F. Supp.
1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Schenley Indus. v. N. J. Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n,
272 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1967); Marnell v. United Parcel Serv., 260 F. Supp. 391
(N.D. Cal. 1966).
62. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 'F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 95
S. Ct. 2004 (1975); Washington Gas Light Co.* v. Virginia Elec. & Pwr. Co., 438
F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971); Asheville Tobacco v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
63. See Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894, 900, 902 (D. Md. 1956);
cf. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 345 (1904).
64. Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970). "The
Court's emphasis [in Parker] on the extent of the state's involvement preclude[s]
the facile conclusion that action by any public official automatically confers ex-
emption." Id. at 30.
65. 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
66. Id. at 1112.
67. Id. at 1111.
68. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Pwr. Co., 438 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1971).
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placed on the existence of statutorily created state machinery and state
supervision implementing an important state policy.69 If these factors are
present, the Parker state action exemption will apply. This approach
differs from the mechanical test in that it does not require an express
statutory goal of anticompetitive activity, nor does it necessarily require
expressly authorized anticompetitive means to achieve the state policy.
The emphasis of this approach focuses upon a statutorily created agency
and an overriding public interest. Failure to control affirmatively the activ-
ities of such an agency,70 or expressly to set out approval of anticompetitive
goals and means in the enabling statute71 does not preclude application
of the state action exemption.
The third interpretative approach, present in a few cases, rests its
analysis primarily upon state regulation falling within the scope of a
state's police power.72 This approach emphasizes a state's compelling in-
terest in protection of public health, safety, and other valid interests.
Presence of such an interest, without more, triggers the state action exemp-
tion.73 Absence of express state anticompetitive goals, authorization of
anticompetitive means, or lack of state supervision do not in themselves
preclude application of the state action exemption.
The continued predominance of the mechanical test was recently
thrown into question by the Goldfarb decision.7 4 The Supreme Court did
not expressly adopt the mechanical test enunciated in lower court de-
cisions, nor did it cite to any case law adopting this test in support of its
position.7 5 Rather, the Court, while recognizing the existence of a state
statute and state agency, expressed the prerequisites for the state action
exemption as "activity compelled by the state as sovereign." 70 The Court,
in dictum, stated:
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the
practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part of
their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid
69. Id. at 251-52.
70. Id. at 252.
71. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 95 S. Ct.
2004 (1975); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co., v. Aluminum Co., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971).
The concept of state action is not susceptible to rigid, bright-line rules.
Each case must be considered on its own facts in order to determine
whether or not the anti-competitive consequence is truly the action of
the state.
Id. at 1294.
72. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956). See also Olsen
v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904) (a pre-Parker case holding licensing of river pilots
properly within the state's police power).
73. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956).
74. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
75. The Goldfarb opinion did, however, cite Olsen v. Smith, discussed note
72 supra. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
76. 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2015 (1975).
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interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing
practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.7
The Goldfarb rationale for the state action exemption approximates the
third interpretative approach. The opinion may indicate a shift toward a
broader exemption coextensive with a state's police power.
Expansion of the state action exemption would have strong repercus-
sions in occupational licensing litigation. Occupational licensing, by its very
definition, is statutory. It may very well be argued under the police power
test that such licensure is properly deemed a "compelling interest . . . of
the state to protect public health, safety, and other valid interests. .. 7
If this argument is sustained, occupational licensing would be immune
from the remedial efforts of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Similarily, if the second approach were applied, occupational licensing
could properly be found within the state action exemption if a statutorily
created licensing agency was deemed to further an important state policy.
The exemption would apply regardless of the lack of affirmative control
over licensing activities or absence of an express statutory intention to
utilize anticompetitive means toward achievement of an anticompetitive
goal. Consequently, the cartel-like effect of licensing statutes would be im-
posed without inquiry into the presence of legislative intention to impose
such a result.
Under the three-pronged mechanical test, occupational licensing would
not be exempt per se from the thrust of the Act. Although occupational
licensing has its genesis in state statutes, this alone would not invoke the
state action exemption. Generally, monopolistic public policy is not ex-
pressed in the licensing statutes, nor are anticompetitive means authorized
to achieve a monopolistic policy. Absence of either of these elements would
preclude invocation of the state action exemption and subject occupa-
tional licensing to antitrust litigation.7 9
Such a strict construction of Parker comports with the basic policy
underlying the Act.80 Although designed to apply solely to private action,8 1
the objective of the Act is to promote and protect a competitive economic
system and exceptions to its application should be narrowly construed.
This goal would not be vitiated by a narrow construction of the Parker
exemption. Indeed, the Court in Parker stated that the exemption did not
apply to private action masquerading as state action.8 2 Furthermore, the
Parker decision was influenced by the existence of an express federal
policy coextensive with state policy.83 California had adopted a state
77. Id. at 2016.
78. Id.
79. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa.
1969).
80. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
81. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
82. Id. at 351.
83. See P. BENSON, supra note 58, at 244.
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statute similar to the Federal Agricultural Agreement Act. The California
statute covered areas of commerce in which Congress had not expressly
legislated, but which directly effectuated policies of the federal statute.
This consistency of interest, arguably, was the pivotal factor in the Parker
decision. Accordingly, this factor should limit the scope of the state
action exemption to state programs consistent with an express national
policy.8 4
The narrow three-pronged mechanical test is the most favorable to
litigants attacking occupational licensing. Unless an express state policy,
expressly authorizing anticompetitive means is sanctioned for use by a
legislatively created entity, the state action exemption should not apply
and occupational licensing would not be immune from the reach of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
IV. AN UN4REASONABLE RESTRAINT op TRADE
Assuming occupational licensing is not immune from the Sherman
Antitrust Act by reason of the state action exemption, liability is not auto.
matic. Liability under the Act is based upon an activity's injury to the
public.8 5 A corollary to finding public injury is a finding that the activity
in issue is unreasonable under the facts of the particular situation80 or be-
cause the very nature of the activity is unreasonable per se.87
The reasonableness standard is a judicially created concept.88 It finds
statutory support, however, in the express statutory policy to promote com-
petition and protect the public from the effects of a noncompetitive
market.89 It follows that only conduct that offends this statutory policy
should be condemned as an unreasonable restraint of trade.90
Determining what constitutes unreasonable activities or practices is
84. Cf. Hecht v. Pro-Football, 444 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
85. Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Board of Trade, Inc., 266 F.2d 636, 644 (5th
Cir. 1959).
86. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911); Lynch v. Mag-
navox Co., 94 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1938); Sandidge v. Rogers, 167 F. Supp. 553,
559-60 (S.D. Ind. 1958). See also Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519
(10th Cir. 1950).
87. Certain activities are per se unreasonable-i.e., the activity is so likely to
injure the public under any set of circumstances that no inquiry is made into the
existing fact situation. Courts have found price fixing, division of markets, group
boycotts and tying arrangements to be per se unreasonable. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 856 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
88. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). See generally Bloom, What is Anti-
trust?, 9 N.Y.L.F. 5, 8 (1963); Jones, Historical Development of the Law of
Business Competition, 86 YALE L.J. 207, 220 (1926).
89. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
To preserve from undue restraint the free action of competition in inter-
state commerce was the purpose which controlled Congress in enacting
this statute [Sherman Antitrust Act], and the courts should construe the
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a difficult task. Courts must analyze all economic factors peculiar to the
particular trade or industry and- their effect on the competitive market.91
Pertinent factors considered in making this determination traditionally
include: (1) the intensity and dimension of the relevant market; (2) the
history of the restraint; (3) the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable; and (4) the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be attained.
92
Examination of occupational licensing statutes in terms of all the
above factors is a prerequisite to finding a licensing scheme an unreason-
able restraint of trade. Each licensing scheme would have to be examined
in light of its particular factual context. The last two of the above- fac-
tors particularly lend themselves to a general analysis.
The nature of the restraint imposed by occupational licensing is a
barrier to entry.93 Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that most
occupational licensing statutes have an inhibiting effect on free competi-
tion thereby causing public injury.94 A case study reported by the Federal
Trade Commission is illustrative.9 5 The study compared television re-
pair rates in two states, one utilizing a licensure system and the other a
certification system. The licensing state had repair bills twenty percent
higher than those' in the nonlicensed system. This study strongly suggests
that the effect of such licensing statutes, by limiting the number of sellers
of a product or service, is to force prices to a high, noncompetitive level.
The last factor encompasses a balancing test. Proponents of occupa-
tional licensing argue that public health and welfare would be endangered
in the absence of regulatory statutes. Therefore, they contend, occupational
licensing statutes protect the innocent public against the abuses of charla-
tans and insure that only competent persons are allowed to engage in the
occupation.96 This argument might have significant merit in a situation
where an unwary consumer who is victimized by an incompetent practi-
tioner would suffer irremediable harm, such as medicine, law, and other
professions, but it loses its potency in the nonprofessional area.
A pivotal argument in support of finding occupational licensing an
unreasonable restraint of trade in nonprofessional fields is the availability
91. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
92. Id. at 238.
The legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement con-
cerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy compe-
ion.
93. Occupational licensing statutes would not fall within the per se categories
and thus would necessarily have to be found unreasonable in the circumstances to
be subject to action under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
94. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
95. FE.D. TADE Comm'N, BUEAu or EcoNoMicS, REGULATON Or Tm TELE-
VISION REPAIR INDUSTRY IN LOUisIAIA AND CALIFORNIA, A CAsE STUDY (1974).
96. See W. GELLioRN, supra note 2, at 109.
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of alternative methods which advance the same interests that licensing
purports to further.97 By either registration or certification the public in-
terest can be protected without the resultant public injury imposed by a
licensing scheme.
Registration is the least restrictive alternative. By requiring all in-
dividuals who wish to practice a given trade to register with the state,
consumers may choose among all available sellers. Any seller who does not
sufficiently produce will eventually be cast aside in favor of sellers
whose products or services measure up to consumer standards.08
Certification is a second available alternative. Under a certification
scheme a governmental agency may certify an individual as qualified to
practice a particular trade, but may not prevent noncertified persons
from selling the same product or service.99 Consumers are thus given the
choice of selecting among all available sellers. Simultaneously, certification
assures that those certified are competent.
Perhaps the most persuasive factor courts should consider in de-
termining the reasonableness of occupational licensing statutes is the policy
underlying the Sherman Antitrust Act itself. This policy was most aptly
stated in Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United States:100
It [the Sherman Antitrust Act] rests on the premise that the un-
restrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best al-
location of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions. But even were that
premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by
the Act is competition.10'
Occupational licensing statutes inherently conflict with this policy
by creating barriers to entry. To find a licensing statute reasonable, courts
must analyze the factors previously listed. Only if the competitive policy
of the Act is outweighed by competing public interests should occupational
licensing be deemed reasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
Occupational licensing statutes present an analytical dilemma. Most
certainly, many statutes blatantly offend the competitive economic policy
the Sherman Antitrust Act seeks to advance. However, these statutes may
be immune from the thrust of the antitrust remedies because of lack of
jurisdiction under the commerce clause or the state action exemption. Any
litigant seeking to subject occupational licensing to antitrust analysis will
be faced with these problems.
97. See M. FRIEDmAN, supra note 2, at 148-49; Barron, supra note 4, at 660-65.
98. See Barron, supra note 4, at 662, 664.
99. See M. FRiEDA , supra note 2, at 149; Barton, supra note 4, at 663.
100. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
101. Id. at 4.
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The major problem facing courts in occupational licensing litigation
will be the determination of which statutes should be preserved. Not
every occupational licensing scheme should fall under the Act. In many
professions it may be persuasively argued that licensing is the only adequate
safeguard preventing irreparable public injury. This argument is par-
ticularly strong in the legal and health professions. In both, the con-
sumer may not have sufficient knowledge or expertise to choose a qualified
practitioner. A wrong choice could be an irreversible decision jeopardizing
life or property. In such situations public policy must be counterbalanced
against economic ideals. Where the reasonableness of the restraint of trade
outweighs the competitive philosophy of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the
competitive ideal must give way to prevent public injury.
KATHLEEN SOWM STOLAR
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Recent Cases
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT- BOTH SWORD AND SHIELD
IN MISSOURI
State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink'
* Defendant was involved, in an automobile collision in which the
driver of the other vehicle was killed. The wife of the deceased filed suit
for the wrongful death of her husband. Defendant's answer generally
denied the plaintiff's allegations and asserted contributory negligence as
a defense. Both parties appeared at the appointed time for the taking of
depositions. The plaintiff's deposition was taken first and she answered
all questions. The defendant was then sworn and plaintiff's counsel began
to take his deposition. The defendant gave only his name and address and
thereafter refused to answer any questions on the ground that to do so
might incriminate him. At trial, the plaintiff moved to strike the defend-
ant's answer pursuant to section 491.180, RSMc, 1969, which provides:
If a party, on being duly summoned, refuse [sic] to attend and
testify, either in court or before any person authorized to take his
deposition, besides being punished himself as for a contempt, his
petition, answer or reply may be rejected, or a motion, if made by
himself, overruled, or, if made by the adverse party, sustained.
The trial judge indicated his intention to sustain the plaintiff's mo-
tion. The defendant sought and obtained a preliminary writ of prohibi-
tion from the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District. The writ was
transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri where it was made per-
manent. The court held that where a defendant seeks no affirmative re-
lief and makes a good faith assertion of his constitutional privilege to
remain silent at the first opportunity, a trial court would exceed its juris-
diction if it entered an order striking the defendant's answer.
Although in both the United States and the Missouri constitutions
the privilege against self-incrimination is phrased in terms of criminal pro-
ceedings, the privilege is available to witnesses in both criminal and civil
actions.2 Generally speaking, a penalty may not be imposed against a
party who makes a valid assertion of this privilege.3 However, a majority of
1. 514 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
2. For a general discussion as to the scope and problems of the privilege,
see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2254-66 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see also State
ex rel. North v. Kirtley, 327 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Morgan, The Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949).
3. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garnty v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In none of these cases was the
party seeking any affirmative relief or asserting any affirmative defenses.
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jurisdictions4 have refused to allow either a plaintiff5 or defendant6 to
obtain affirmative relief while refusing to testify on matters which, if
known, might bar the granting of such relief. The rationale behind this
approach is that the fifth amendment was not intended to be "both a
sword and a shield."7
Under this reasoning, the privilege against self-incrimination is an-
alogous to the doctor-patient privilege. A patient has the right to pre-
vent his physician from testifying;s however, this privilege is waived if
the patient files a suit for personal injuries because such a suit places
the patient's physical condition in issue.9 Similarily, if a party's cause of
action is based on facts peculiarly within his knowledge, that party waives
the privilege against self-incrimination as to these facts when he seeks
such affirmative relief.10 The Pulliam court endorsed this reasoning, say-
ing: "It is not unfair to preclude one who invokes the assistance of the
courts from recovery when he refuses to produce evidence peculiarly within
his knowledge pertinent to his right to recover."" The question to be pur-
sued by this note is whether asserting an affirmative defense constitutes
"invoking the assistance of the courts."
Some courts have refused to allow the assertion of an affirmative de-
fense by a defendant who invokes the fifth amendment in connection with
the proceedings. In Rubenstein v. Kleven12 an unmarried woman brought
an action against a married man for breach of a contract under which the
plaintiff was to render companionship and other services to the defendant.
The defendant's answer asserted the illegality of the alleged contract as
a defense. At deposition, the defendant asserted the privilege against self-
incrimination in response to certain questions to which an affirmative
answer might have indicated adultery. The United States District Court
of Massachusetts held that the defendant could not assert the affirmative
defense of illegality, based on a criminal act involving himself, while
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. The court said further
4. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.Sd 545 (1965).
5. Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1964); Minor v. Minor, 282
So. 2d 746 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Franklin v. Franklin, 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En
Banc 1955); Schrad v. Schrad, 186 Neb. 462, 183 N.W.2d 923 (1971); Levine v.
Bornstein, 6 N.Y.2d 462, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959); see also Note,
28 FoRDnAif L. REv. 557 (1959); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 426 (1959), both not-
ing the Levine case.
6. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958), reh. den., 356 U.S. 948
(1958); Nuckols v. Nuckols, 189 So. 2d 832 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Berner v.
Schlesinger, 175 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1957); Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62, 298 P.2d
485 (1956).
7. See generally Independent Products Corp. v. Lowe's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266,
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Annot., 4 A.L.R.Sd 545 (1965); Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 818
(1960).
8. § 491.060, RSMo 1969.
9. State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
10. Geldback Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Mo. 1969).
11. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
12. 150 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1957).
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that the defendant could not use "the testimony of any witness" or estab-
lish that the acts occured "simply by inference" while claiming the privilege
against self-incrimination.' 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
upheld the dismissal with prejudice of a defendant's affirmative defenses
and counterclaims where the defendant had refused to answer interroga-
tories on the ground that to do so might incriminate him.14 The decision
was based on a finding of bad faith on the part of the defendant, but
the following language indicates the court's position in relation to the in-
vocation of the fifth amendment by a party asserting an affirmative defense:
[T]he right to assert the privilege does not, a priori, free the
claimant of the responsibility to respond in pre-trial discovery
when information sought bears upon the claimant's own counter-
claim and affirmative defenses.' 5
In Pulliam the Missouri Supreme Court discussed and expressly af-
firmed' 6 Franklin v. Franklin.'7 Franklin was a divorce case in which the
plaintiff wife, relying on the fifth amendment, refused to answer written
interrogatories regarding the status of her previous marriage. This re-
fusal was held to justify striking her pleadings. The court recognized her
right to assert the privilege, but said she may not by virtue of that privilege
obtain affirmative relief.'8
The Pulliam court also expressly affirmed'0 Geldback Transport, Inc.
v. Delay.2 0 Geldback was a replevin action against two defendants wherein
one defendant cross-claimed alleging that he was entitled to possession of
the chattel in question. His co-defendant sought by interrogatories to dis-
cover how and from whom this right to possession was obtained. Follow-
ing the cross-claimant's refusal to answer on the ground that to do so
might incriminate him, the trial court dismissed the cross-claim. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the dismissal on the basis that a party should not
be allowed to seek affirmative relief without disclosing the basis of his
claim.2 '
13. Id. at 48.
14. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th
Cir. 1973). The dismissal was based on FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2), which provides:
[TMhe court in which the action is pending may make such orders in re-
gard to a failure to obey an order to provide discovery as are just, and
among others the following:
C. An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against the disobedient party.
15. 481 F.2d at 1213 (emphasis added).
16. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
17. 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En Banc 1955).
18. Id. at 485.
19. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
20. 443 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1969).
21. Id. at 121.
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The affirmation of Franklin and Geldback by the Pulliam court main-
tained the long-standing position of the Missouri Supreme Court that if
the privilege against self-incrimination is asserted by a party seeking af-
firmative relief, the trial court may strike that party's pleadings.22 The
application of this statutory sanction23 is generally held to be within the
discretion of the trial court, to be reversed only in cases of clear abuse.24
Such a striking is not a violation of due process.25 The importance of
Pulliam is that implicit in the court's decision is the concept that a party
is not "invoking the assistance of the courts" when he asserts an affirma-
tive defense. Pulliam stands for the proposition that a party in Missouri
can both plead an affirmative defense and invoke the fifth amendment
during all phases of the proceeding. As pointed out by the dissenting
opinion of Judge Finch,26 the majority's refusal to equate an affirmative
defense with affirmative relief is open to criticism.
The defendant in Pulliam not only denied his own negligence, but
also asserted that the plaintiff's deceased was negligent. Contributory
negligence is an affirmative defense r with the burden of proof on the de-
fendant.2 8 The existence of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is a complete bar to his recovery.2 9 Assuming that the defendant
in Pulliam was in fact negligent, there arose in the plaintiff a right of
action, such right being the personal property of the plaintiff.30 Assume
also that, in the absence of contributory negligence, a jury would award
damages of $50,000, thereby assigning a dollar value to his "prop-
erty." If the defendant is successful in establishing a defense of con-
tributory negligence, the plaintiff will be unable to collect any of this
claim. As a practical matter, the defendant is seeking affirmative relief
from the court in the full amount of plaintiff's claim. If the defendant
was seeking a set-off of all or part of plaintiff's claim via a counterclaim,
and at the same time asserting a privilege against self-incrimination as to
some element of his counterclaim, the court would deny him this af-
firmative relief.31 Yet, the court in Pulliam said that absent some bad
faith or waiver on the part of the defendant, a trial court would exceed
its jurisdiction by striking the affirmative defense of contributory negli-
22. Franklin v. Franklin, 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En Banc 1955).
23. § 491.180, RSMo 1969.
24. Graveman v. Huncker, 139 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1940); Frankel v. Hudson,
271 Mo. 495, 196 S.W. 1121 (1917); State v. Buckstead, 399 S.W.2d 622 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1966); State v. Reagan, 382 S.W.2d 426 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964); Kaiser
v. Gardiner, 211 S.W. 883 (St. L. Mo. App. 1919); Dustin v. Farrelly, 81 Mo. App.
380 (1899).
25. Miles v. Armour, 239 Mo. 438, 144 S.W. 424 (1912).
26. 514 S.W.2d at 562.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (c); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.10.
28. Mo. APPR. INST. §§ 32.01-.06 (1969).
29. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 at 425 (4th ed. 1971).
30. See generally C.J.S. Property § 9 at 175; Clark v. Baker, 186 Ga. 65, 196
S.E. 750 (1938); Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N.E. 197 (1892).
31. Geldback Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1969).
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gence, even though the defendant, by virtue of the fifth amendment, con-
ceals facts essential to that defense. To deny affirmative relief in one situa-
tion and grant what amounts to affirmative relief in the other is arguably
inconsistent.
If the defendant in a civil suit is allowed to assert both his privilege
against self-incrimination and an affirmative defense, he has a decided
advantage. The party bringing the action must submit to being fully de-
posed, but will be effectively denied the right to take the defendant's
deposition, and will thereby be deprived of a prime opportunity to obtain
admissions and impeachable statements. Furthermore, the plaintiff must
face the perils of cross-examination at trial, while the defendant sits com-
fortably behind the fifth amendment.
The Pulliam court acknowledged that . . . in some situations the
ruling . . . will present hardships to other litigants."' 3 2 Such hardships
would be greatly reduced if the court would apply consistent reasoning
and bar affirmative defenses as well as direct affirmative relief when a
party utilizes the fifth amendment shield.
JOEL WILSON
BANKRUPTCY-
LOSS OF EXEMPTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY-
THE SECTION 6 PROVISO
In re Myers'
Ten days before filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, the bank-
rupt conveyed title to residential property, which she had held as sole
owner, to her husband and herself as tenants by the entirety. The trustee
in bankruptcy filed a petition to take possession and control of the prop-
erty on the ground that the conveyance was fraudulent under section 67d
of the Bankruptcy Act.2 After a hearing, the referee found that the transfer
was made without fair consideration, at a time when the bankrupt was
insolvent, and with actual intent to defraud creditors, in violation of
sections 67d(2)(a) and 67d(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.3 He ordered the
22. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
1. 383 F. Supp, 251 (W.D Mo. 1975).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1970).
3. Sections 67d (2) (a) and (2) (d) provide that:
Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one
year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this
Act by or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time
of such transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consid-
eration by a debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, with-
out regard to his actual intent; or... (d) as to then existing and future
creditors, if made or incurred with actual intent as distinguished from
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conveyance set aside and possession of the premises given up for sale by
the trustee. The bankrupt objected to the referee's order alleging that it
made no provision for her homestead exemption as provided by section
513.475, RSMo 1969.4 The referee rejected this claim on the ground that
the proviso to section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act5 specifically provides that
the bankrupt cannot claim an exemption in property recovered by the
trustee. Pursuant to section 39c of the Bankruptcy Act,6 bankrupt sought
review of the referee's order disallowing the homestead exemption. On
review, the district court upheld the referee's order.7
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act provides:
This title shall not affect allowance to bankrupts of the exemp-
tions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by
the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in
the State wherein they have had their domicile ... 8
It is well-established that this language "makes the state laws . . the
measure of the right to exemptions" 9 allowed a bankrupt. This means that
the variety of exemptions allowed by state law are to be recognized in
bankruptcy, as well as the construction state courts have given the exemp-
tion laws.10 State law, however, is not always the only consideration, be-
cause "even if the state law permits the exemption, it also must be one
allowable under federal law."" The federal law which must be considered
in bankruptcy is, of course, the Bankruptcy Act itself.
In 1938 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act by passing the Chand-
ler Act.12 This Act added the following proviso to section 6:
4. Section 513.475, RSMo 1969, provides:
The homestead of every housekeeper or head of a family, consisting of
a dwelling house and appurtenances, and the land used in connection
therewith, not exceeding the amount in value herein limited, which is
or shall be used by such housekeeper or head of a family as such home-
stead, shall, together with the rents, issues and products thereof, be exempt
from attachment and execution, except as herein provided; such home-
stead in the country shall not include more than one hundred and sixty
acres of land, or exceed the total value of fifteen hundred dollars; and
in cities having a population of forty thousand or more, such homesteid
shall not include more than eighteen square rods of ground, or exceed
the total value of three thousand dollars; and in cities having a popula-
tion of ten thousand and less than forty thousand, such homestead shall
not include more than thirty square rods of ground, or exceed the total
value of fifteen hundred dollars; and in cities and incorporated towis
and villages having a population of less than ten thousand, such home-
stead shall, not include more than five acres of ground, or exceed the
total value of fifteen hundred dollars.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 67c (1970).
7. 383 F. Supp. at 262.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
9. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 312 (1924).
10. See Phillips v. C. Palomo &e Sons, 270 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1959). See
generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 6.03 [3] at 798-803 (14th ed. 1975).
11. In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 272 F. Supp. 451, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1968).
12. Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575. 52 Stat. 847, 11 U.S.C. § 324 (1970).
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Provided, however, that no such allowance shall be made out of
the property which a bankrupt transferred or concealed and which
is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this Act for
the benefit of the estate, except that, where the voided transfer
was made by way of security only and the property recovered is
in excess of the amount secured thereby, such allowance may be
made out of such excess.' 3
Prior to the adoption of this proviso there was a split of authority as to
whether a bankrupt could claim exemptions in property that had been
recovered by the trustee in bankruptcy following the bankrupt's fraudulent
conveyance of the property.14 "Most of the decisions had reference to the
applicable state law, since the Bankruptcy Act had no express provisions on
the subject."' 5 Where such claims were made, the decisions allowing the
exemptions rested on one of two bases. First, to the extent of the exemp-
tion, the conveyance was considered not to have harmed creditors.' 0 Sec-
ond, the statutory provision for the homestead exemption was deemed
to be for the benefit of the bankrupt's family as well as the bankrupt; thus,
to deny the exemption would be to give "creditors a profit out of the
attempted fraud, at the expense of the family...... ."u Some decisions deny-
ing the exemptions rested upon the ground that the bankrupt forfeited
his exemption by his fraudulent conduct.' 8 Others held that when the
conveyance was set aside as fraudulent, title did not again vest in the bank-
rupt; thus, the bankrupt owned no property out of which an exemption
could be claimed at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed.' 0
Congress enacted the proviso to section 6 in an effort to resolve this
conflict. 20 Judges, 21 commentators, 22 and treatises 23 all seem to agree that
13. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
14. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 6.11[4], 856-57 (14th ed. 1975); 161 A.L.R.
1009, 1018-1019 (1946).
15. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY jf 6.11[4], 856-57 (14th ed. 1975).
16. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 140 F. 257 (D.C. Wash. 1905). This is the view
taken by Missouri courts. See cases cited note 36 infra.
17. See, e.g., Cox v. Wilder, 6 Fed. Cas. 684 (No. 3,308) (C.C. Mo. 1872).
18. See, e.g., In re Hupp, 43 F.2d 159 (S.D. Cal. 1930); In re Coddington,
126 F. 891 (M.D. Pa. 1904).
19. See, e.g., In re Heeg, 22 Am. Bankr. R. 120 (D.C. Ref. Wisc. 1932).
20. In the proviso added to [section 6] no allowance shall be made for ex-
emptions out of property which is recovered after a preference or fraud-
ulent transfer. The decisions are conflicting and it is considered that the
law should be made clear that a bankrupt should not profit at the ex-
pense of the creditors from the efforts of the trustee in undoing the bank-
rupt's own acts.
HR. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937).
21. See, e.g., In re Grisanti, 58 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ky. 1945):
[I]t was the intention of Congress in enacting this proviso in the 1938
Act to dear up this conflict by making the matter uniform throughout
the country and not to permit an allowance to be made out of property
which is recovered after a preference or fraudulent transfer.
Id. at 647. Accord, In re Rogers, 45 F. Supp. 297, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
22. [I]t would seem that a bankrupt may not claim a homestead in prop-
erty fraudulently conveyed, transferred by way of preference, or concealed
from the trustee and creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings.
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this proviso effectively eliminates a bankrupt's right to claim exemptions
in property once it has been recovered by the trustee after having been
fraudulently conveyed by the bankrupt. In Myers the referee found the
conveyance of the bankrupt's homestead to be fraudulent. The bankrupt
did not seek review of this finding.2 4 The referee set aside the conveyance
and correctly denied the bankrupt's claim to a homestead exemption under
the proviso to section 6.
Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act allows the trustee to assume the
position of a creditor who possesses a lien on the property of the bankrupt.25
Thus, where state law dictates that an exemption cannot be claimed
against a creditor who has levied on property of the debtor, it also cannot
be claimed against the trustee, who represents all creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding.26 Bankrupts have lost their homestead exemption, for ex-
ample, by failing to perfect the exemption with a filing required under
local law declaring their residence a homestead. 27 Such a result would
not occur where no filing is required to perfect a homestead or other
exemption.28
In Missouri, the homestead exemption is automatically perfected
against all causes of action which mature after the filing of the deed vesting
title in the debtor.29 To establish a homestead in Missouri the debtor is
merely required to own and occupy the residence as a homestead.30 Fail-
ure to continue to meet the requirements of ownership and occupancy may
be deemed a waiver or abandonment of the homestead exemption. What
constitutes an abandonment depends upon the facts of each case.31 For
Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1318 (1950).
23. Under the terms of the Act of 1938, the conflict has been stilled....
It is dear, therefore, that wherever the trustee recovers property transferred
or concealed by the bankrupt, or where any transfer can be avoided under
the terms of the Act, the bankrupt will not be allowed to amend his sched-
ules and claim exemptions out of that particular property, save in the
situation within the "except" dause.
IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 6.11[4], 857 (14th ed. 1975).
24. The referee's finding that the conveyance was fraudulent and may be
set aside in toto, even though a portion of the property may have been exempt,
was undoubtedly correct under sections 67d(2)(a) and 67d(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy
Act. See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARv. L. Rlv. 1289, 1318 (1950):
[I]f both the homestead and nonexempt property are fraudulently con-
veyed in one parcel, or if an excessive homestead or one reachable by some
creditors is fraudulently conveyed, the trustee may set aside the transfer
and the bankrupt can not claim a homestead exemption. (Emphasis
added).
See also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 67.30, 490 (14th ed. 1975).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
26. Meyers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622 (1943); White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310
(1924).
27. See 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY if 6.15, 877 (14th ed. 1975).
28. See, e.g., In re Trammell, 5 F.2d 326 (N.D. Ga. 1925).
29. Dent v. Dent, 350 Mo. 560, 568, 166 S.W.2d 582, 586 (1942); Palmer v.
Omer, 316 Mo. 1188, 1194, 295 S.W. 123, 125 (1927).
30. Rouse v. Caton, 168 Mo. 288, 296, 67 S.W. 578, 579 (1902).
81. New Madrid Banking Co. v. Brown, 165 Mo. 32, 37, 65 S.W. 297, 299(1901).
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example, although a lease of property which was a homestead may consti-
tute abandonment, it has been held that temporarily renting the homestead
does not.82 A valid conveyance by a debtor of his homestead clearly consti-
tutes an abandonment of the claim to the exemption. 83
A conveyance which consists only of exempt property cannot be set
aside in a Missouri state court as a fraud against creditors, even though
made without consideration and with intent to defraud creditors. This is
because creditors could not have reached the property even if the convey-
ance had not been made. 34 Where a transfer is made of property which
includes exempt homestead property, but is in excess of the exemption
allowed with respect to acreage or value,3 5 the conveyance may be set aside
as fraudulent. The debtor, however, may still claim his homestead exemp-
tion out of the property conveyed on the theory that, to the extent of
the exemption, the conveyance was not fraudulent.3 6 Simply stated, the law
of Missouri is that the conveyance of a homestead is fraudulent only to
the extent that the value of the property conveyed exceeds the exemp-
tions which could have been claimed therein had it not been conveyed.
Therefore, such a conveyance does not destroy the exemption.
Were state law the only factor to be considered, then, the bankrupt
in Myers would not have lost her homestead exemption by her convey.
ance of the homestead property, even though the property conveyed may
have been in excess of the exemption and in fraud of her creditors. Where
exemptions are claimed in a bankruptcy proceeding, however, state law
is preempted by the Bankruptcy Act. "Once bankruptcy has intervened, the
time manner and conditions under which such exemption may be claimed
as against the trustee are matters of federal law, and are determined by the
Bankruptcy Act."37 In Myers the proviso to section 6 preempted Missouri
law to deny the bankrupt her exemption.
32. Spratt v. Early, 169 Mo. 357, 369, 69 S.W. 13, 17 (1902).
33. Mercantile Bank v. Becker, 43 S.W.2d 862, 863 (1931).
34. This proposition is accepted by both state courts and bankruptcy courts.
See Phillips v. C. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959); Kilgo v. United
Distributors, 223 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1955); Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467 (5th
Cir. 1945); Bostian v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1951); Moberly v. Watson, 340
Mo. 820, 102 S.W.2d 886 (1937); May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 4 S.W.2d 769 (1928);
Armor v. Lewis, 252 Mo. 568, 161 S.W. 251 (1913); Seilert v. McAnally, 223 Mo.
505, 122 S.W. 1064 (1909); Reed Bros. v. Nicholson, 189 Mo. 396, 88 S.W. 71
(1905); Starn v. Smith, 183 Mo. 464, 81 S.W. 1217 (1904); Spratt v. Easley, 169
Mo. 357, 69 S.W. 13 (1902); Rose v. Smith, 167 Mo. 81, 66 S.W. 940 (1901); Bar-
tels v. Kinninger, 144 Mo. 370, 46 S.W. 163 (1898); Hart v. Leete, 104 Mo. 315,
15 S.W. 976 (1891); Davis v. Land, 88 Mo. 436 (1885); State v. Diveling, 66 Mo.
375 (1877).
35. See statute quoted note 4 supra.
36. See Bank of New Cambria v. Briggs, 361 Mo. 723, 236 S.W.2d 289 (1951),
where, in a suit by a levying judgment creditor, it was held that a conveyance
of homestead property by an insolvent debtor was fraudulent only to the extent
that the property's value exceeded the exemption. See also Moberly v. Watson,
340 Mo. 820, 102, S.W.2d 886 (1937); May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 4 S.W.2d 769
(1928); Reed Bros. v. Nicholson, 189 Mo. 396, 88 S.W. 71 (1905).
37. Gardner v. Johnson, 195 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1952). The court in
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The Missouri practitioner should be mindful of the differences be-
tween ordinary debtor-creditor cases and those involving bankruptcy. Where
the debtor seeks an exemption in property, the fraudulent conveyance of
which has been set aside by a levying creditor, the debtor will generally
be allowed the exemption. Where bankruptcy is involved, however, the
proviso to section 6 will apply and the exemption will be denied. The only
exceptions to the application of the proviso appear to be where the trustee
has set aside a general assignment for the benefit of the bankrupt's cred-
itors38 and where the transfer that was set aside was made by way of
security within the "except" clause to the proviso.39
Counsel for an insolvent client should advise against conveying or
concealing property out of which exemptions may be claimed, in order to
avoid the proviso's application. If a fraudulent conveyance of homestead
property has already been made, as was the case in Myers, the debtor should
attempt to have the conveyance rescinded prior to any action by the trustee
to recover the property. If this is done, it may be argued that the proviso
applies only if there has been a recovery of property under the Bankruptcy
Act, and that a voluntary recovery by the bankrupt is not such a recovery.
BRuCE H. BEcKETr
Gardner denied a claimed exemption out of property recovered by the trustee
under the proviso to section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, holding that setting aside
a fraudulent conveyance did not revest title in the bankrupt so as to allow him
to claim an exemption out of the property so recovered, and that even if title did
return to the bankrupt, the proviso would bar an amendment of his schedules
of property and exemptions claimed. For other cases concerning the application
of the proviso, see In re Smith, 366 F. Supp. 1218 (D.C. Idaho 1973) (the proviso
has no application where the conveyance of bankrupt's homestead was by deed
of trust for security purposes); In re Sherk, 108 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ohio 1952)
(where trustee recovered money settlements from transferees of the bankrupt
in lieu of setting aside the transfers as fraudulent, the bankrupt was denied an
exemption out of those settlements); In re Grisanti, 58 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ky.
1945) (where a creditor was denied status as a secured creditor because the en-
cumbrance given him by the bankrupt was fraudulent, the bankrupt's claimed
homestead exemption in the encumbered property was denied); In re Rogers, 45
F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1942) (bankrupt could not claim exemptions out of
the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy he owned which he had at-
tempted to conceal from the trustee in bankruptcy).
38. In re Knapp, 319 F. Supp. 1070 (S.D. Ill. 1970); IA COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTcY ff 6.11[6], 860-63 (14th ed. 1975).
39. IA CounR ON BANRu-rcy ff 6.11[4], 857 (14th ed. 1975).
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BANKS AND BANKING-
BANK CHARTERS IN MISSOURI-
A NEW APPROACH?
Central Bank of Clayton v. State Banking Board of Missouri1
In October 1971, five officers of the Bank of St. Louis filed articles
of agreement for the incorporation of a new bank with the Missouri
Commissioner of Finance.2 The bank was to be called the Central Bank
of Clayton. In accordance with section 362.030, RSMo 1969,3 the Com-
missioner ordered an investigation to determine if the incorporators had
complied with statutory requirements. After a two month investigation,
the Commissioner issued a charter for the proposed bank, finding that "all
the requirements of sections 362.020; 862.025; and 362.030 RSMo have
been met." The Commissioner's decision was made without a contested
hearing, although he did receive and include in the record letters of
protest from existing Clayton banks.
An appeal to the State Banking Board was certified by the pro-
testing Clayton banks, alleging that the convenience and needs of the
community did not justify the granting of a new bank charter. The Board
held a hearing on the appeal at which evidence relating to the "con-
venience and needs of the community to be served" by the new bank was
taken. Three expert witnesses testified and two others submitted reports.
The Board also received the report of the Commissioner's investigation.
The Board revoked the charter, finding that the evidence did not sup-
1. 509 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
2. The chartering procedure in Missouri is set out in sections 362.015-.040,
RSMo 1969, and consists of five or more people filing articles of agreement
to incorporate with the Commissioner of Finance. The Commissioner then con-
ducts an investigation to determine if the statutory requirements of section
362.030 have been met. No hearing is required. If the Commissioner is satis-
fied that the requirements have been met, the charter is issued and recorded
in the county or city in which the corporation is located.
3. This section provides in part:
1. When any bank or trust company has filed . . . its articles
of agreement, paid all incorporation and other fees in full, as required
by law, and provided the cash required by law, the commissioner . . .
shall cause an examination to be made to ascertain whether the requisite
capital of the bank or trust company has been subscribed in good faith
and paid in actual cash and is ready for use in the transaction of
business of the proposed bank or trust company, and whether the
character, responsibility and general fitness of the persons named in
the articles of agreement are such as to command confidence and
warrant belief that the business of the proposed corporation will be
conducted honestly and efficiently . . . and if the convenience and
needs of the community to be served justify and warrant the opening
of the bank or trust company therein, and if the probable volume of
business in such locality is sufficient to insure and maintain the
solvency of the new bank or trust company and the solvency of the
then existing banks and trust companies in the locality, without en-
dangering the safety of any bank....
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port a finding that the convenience and needs of the community would be
served by granting the charter. The Board found that the applicant had
failed to show a "public need" for the new bank or any complaints about,
or inadequacy of, present banking services.
The Circuit Court of St. Louis County affirmed and held that this
finding was supported by competent and substantial evidence on the record
as a whole. Central Bank and the Commissioner appealed to the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the St. Louis District. The court reversed the circuit
court and the Banking Board as to the finding that "the convenience and
needs of the community to be served" had not been met and reinstated the
Commissioner's order.4
Banking has been a heavily regulated industry for many years. Bank
regulation began a quarter of a century before insurance regulation and
more than forty years before public utility regulation,5 but the regulation
in the early stages was not as pervasive as today. The bank chartering process
was originally the province of the legislature and all charters had to be
approved by that body. A 1915 statute, which established requirements
for opening branch banking offices, contained the first real statutory
criteria for establishing banks or offices.6 In the same year, the State
Banking Department was created and given some of the powers it has
today. Before that year the chartering of state banks was increasing and
the only ground upon which the state could decline to charter a bank
when five incorporators filed an application was the dishonesty of the
persons applying.7 Attempts to limit the granting of charters were gen-
erally unsuccessful during this period and some commentators have attrib-
uted that to a distrust by Missourians of any limitation which might
permit a concentration of the money power in a few hands.8 In 1927
the chartering statute was amended, giving the Commissioner the authority
to make an investigation to determine "if the probable volume of business
in such location is sufficient to insure and maintain the solvency of the
then existing bank or banks in such location, without endangering the
safety of any bank in such locality as a place of deposit of public or pri-
vate moneys .... 9
The key statutory requirement for chartering was added to section
362.030 by the Banking Act of 1941.10 The amendment required an exam-
ination into "the convenience and needs of the community." Almost all
states have enacted similar provisions requiring proof of "public necessity,"
4. 509 S.W.2d at 194.5. Davis, Banking Regulation Today: A Banker's View, 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 639 (1966).
6. Mo. Laws 1915, at 14, § 25.
7. See Mo. Laws 1915, at 129, § 59; State ex tel. Jones v. Cook, 174 Mo.
100, 73 S.W. 489 (1903).
8. F. HEur, BANKING DEvELoP NNTs IN MISSOURI 15 (1939).
9. Mo. Laws 1927, at 217, § 2.
10. Mo. Laws 1941, at 670, 674.
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"public needs," "public demand," or that the "public convenience and
advantage will be served" by the issuance of the charter."1
The major goal and perhaps the entire justification for the rigid and
pervasive regulation of banking is a sound and healthy banking system.
This goal requires maximum profits, which are a function of the amount of
business transacted. Generally, the greater the number of banking units in a
given area, the less business each competitor will attract. 12 Therefore, un-
bridled competition is in some ways incompatible with a healthy banking
system.' 3 Yet to the extent that competition is curbed by legislation, the
consumer is forced to pay more for the services he receives. 14 Normally, ques-
tions of entry and expansion are solely the choices of private entrepreneurs.
However, in the banking industry, the final decision in this area has been
assigned to regulatory agencies.' 5 Regulators are required to encourage
competition while attempting to maintain a healthy and solvent banking sys-
tem. This delicate balancing problem is the main issue confronted by
the court in Central Bank.'6
Cases interpreting statutes such as that in Missouri can be broadly
divided into three categories of chartering policies. Although all the
11. See Note, Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger Laws:
Competition Frustrated, 71 YALE L.J. 502, 510-511 & nn. 72-88 (1962).
12. Generally "efficiency" is associated with competition. Under
conditions of "perfect" competition profits are maximized at prices
and levels of output which bring about an optimum allocation of
resources. . . . Consequently, so the argument runs, the more "com-
petitive" an industry, the more "efficient" it is.
Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, 3 NAT. BANK. REv. 1, 2 (1965).
13. Other considerations, however, make it difficult to choose be-
tween the objectives of "efficiency" and "soundness." For example,
competition forces "inefficient" firms to leave the market because they
cannot charge prices high enough to cover the costs. Under monopo-
listic conditions, high cost firms are afforded a certain degree ofimmunity from the forces of competition, which permits them to operate
inefficiently and still survive. Thus a monopolistic industry is more
compatible with the goal of maintaining a "failure-proof" banking
system, while competition is more compatible with the goal of
"efficiency."
Id.
14. See Marshfield Community Bank v. State Banking Bd., 496 S.W.2d 17(Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973). The court stated:
To that extent, then, public policy which encourages free compe-
tition runs counter to the public interest which requires its regulation
in these cases, and some adjustments of priorities, some balancing of
equities, must consequently be made. The question is: Where shall
the line be drawn to avoid undue repression on the one hand and
prevent unfair advantage on the other?
Id. at 29.
15. See generally Peltzman, Bank Entry Regulation: Its Impact and
Purpose, 3 NAT. BANK. REv. 163, 174 (1965).
16. We must consider what value of (sic) Constitution and laws
placed on competition, under what circumstances and for what reasons
can competition be stifled by regulation for the public good, and what
type of evidence will justify interference with competition by regula-
tion for a good reason.
509 S.W.2d at 181.
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statutes are similar,' 7 the difference in interpretation based upon the pre-
sumed intent of the legislature has led to wide variances in each of entry
and expansion.
The first policy is an outgrowth of the bank failures of the 1930's.
Few states escaped massive assaults on their banking laws 'after the experi-
ences of that era. The result was a framework of laws that placed a pre-
mium on solvency and, more importantly, upon protecting the weaker
banking units from excessive competition from stronger, and frequently
larger, banks.'s The few states which continue to follow this theory rec-
ognize that the protection of existing units and their profits is the primary
and overriding goal of regulation. The method used to achieve this goal
is a chartering requirement of "absolute need." No new bank can be
chartered without a showing that the existing banks can continue to
thrive and that the proposed new bank can become solvent and prosper
without drawing business from existing banks.' 9 This was the rule in many
states until the advent of deposit insurance, increased supervision and
regulation, and the passage of time helped to restore public confidence
and faith in banking institutions. 2 0
The second policy is a result of this increased confidence in banking
and the recognition that competition is necessary to achieve the most ad-
vantageous prices for consumers. Although recognizing that safety and
solvency are important ingredients of the statutory scheme of banking reg-
ulation, this theory balances that goal against the increased efficiency to
be gained by allowing additional competitive units in an area. This inter-
mediate approach has been favored by many courts.21
The third policy falls somewhat short of the complete freedom of
entry which appeared in the late 1830's as a result of the "free banking"
17. See Note, Bank Charter, Branching, Holding Company and Merger
Laws: Competition Frustrated, 71 YALE L.J. 502 (1962).
18. See generally F. HELM-Is, BANKING DEVELOPImNTS IN MISSOUIU (1939);
Townsend, History of Missouri Banking Legislation, 18 V.A.M.S. 321, 360-67 (1949).
19. See Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 P. 80 (1911): ,
An unnecessary bank in a community is not a thing of passive
uselessness only, and so merely of no benefit. It is an active disturber
of the financial peace, to the detriment of the public welfare, and it is
not very material whether we say that public harm will be prevented
or that public good will be promoted by its suppression.
Id. at 609, 118 P. at 85.
20. Davis, supra note 5, at 640.
21. See Banking Bd. v. Turner Indus. Bank, 437 P.2d 531 (Colo. 1968);
National Bank of Tampa v. Green, 175 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1965); Moran v.
Nelson, 322 Mich. 230, 33 N.W.2d 772 (1948); Britton & Koontz First Nat'l
Bank v. Biglane, 285 So. 2d 181 (Miss. 1973); First Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass'n v. Dep't. of Banking of Neb., 188 Neb. 215, 196 N.W.2d 105 (1972);
Wall v. Fenner, 76 S.D. 252, 76 N.W.2d 722 (1956); Chimney Rock Nat'l
Bank v. State Banking Bd., 376 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Cf.
Goldy v. Henry, 443 P.2d 994 (Colo. 1968) (charter denied after balancing
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acts. 2 2 The emphasis in this theory is on encouraging competition if at all
feasible, and protection of- existing banks is determinative only upon a
clear showing that insolvency would actually result from chartering the pro-
posed bank. 3
Prior Missouri cases dealing with bank chartering have relied heavily
on the findings of the Banking Board. The two major cases viewed the
role of the courts, as merely determining whether competent and substan-
tial evidence on the record supports the Board's findings. In Suburban
Bank of Kansas City v. Jackson County State Bank24 the proposed bank was
.only the second. bank to enter a growing and prosperous area. Under
:even the most restrictive chartering test the applicant would succeed on
these facts and the court in Suburban Bank affirmed the issuance of the
charter, pointing out. that the solvency of the existing banks would not
be affected and that both banks could prosper in the community. Compe-
tent and substantial evidence on the whole record was again the test in
:Marshfield Community Bank v. State Banking Board.2 5 The court affirmed
the Board's decision denying the charter. However, the court examined
the evidence in somewhat greater detail than in Suburban Bank of Kansas
City, and pointed out the need for balancing the competing considerations
of bank safety and industry competition. The evidence showed that the
applicant would probably be insolvent within two years, but the opinion
indicated that the court's primary concern was with insuring bank safety
instead of promoting competition.20 The court in Central Bank reexam-
ined the interpretation of the chartering statute and brought Missouri
closer to the third approach.
Section 362.030(1), RSMo 1969, requires the Commissioner to consider
several factors before issuing a certificate of incorporation to a proposed
bank. Two of these factors are the most important. First, the Commissioner
must determine that the "probable volume of business . .. is sufficient
22. See Davis, supra note 5, at 639.
23. Application of Burill, 262 Minn. 270, 114 N.W.2d 688 (1962); Ap-
plication of State Bank of Plainfield, 61 N.J. Super. 150, 160 A.2d 299 (1960).
In Application of Howard Say. Inst. of Newark v. Howell, 32 N.J. 29, 159
A.2d 113 (1960), the court said:
The public should always be entitled to increased interest rates and
greater service and convenience which proper competition may well
bring. Mere sufficiency of existing facilities . . . is not in and of itself
sufficient basis to deny establishment of a new institution or branch
if the general economy of the area and its reasonable potential are
such that there is room for further installation without causing ex-
cessive competition with real harm to any institution or unduly
affecting the banking structure at large.
id. at 49-50, 159 A.2d at 125.
24. 330 S.W.2d 183 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
25. 496 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973).
26. If a storekeeper, in an excess of competitive zeal, works
himself into. bankruptcy, the loss is his; but if a bank fails, the domino
reaction to its fall brings the whole community down with it, as those
of us who survived the debacle of. the Great Depression so well remember.
Id. at 29 n.13.
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to insure and maintain the solvency of the new bank or trust company and
the solvency of the then existing banks and trust companies in the local-
ity. . . ." Second, the Commissioner must determine that ". . . the con-
venience and needs of the community to be served justify and warrant the
opening of the bank or trust company .... "
The application of these two statutory determinates to the chartering
process requires a consideration of three somewhat competing factors. Two
of these are related to the test of probable volume of business, and the
other is related to the convenience and needs of the community. The
probable volume of business factor first anticipates proof that the new
bank can look forward to solvency in the proposed location. This requires
an examination of its prospects for profitable operation in the chosen
locale. Almost all courts profess to be interested in the solvency of the
new bank and entry is therefore permitted only when the bank can show
that it can develop sufficient business to cover costs plus a certain level of
profitability.
The second statutory consideration illustrates a competing interest in
the probable volume test which must be considered. The Commissioner
must consider whether the new bank will endanger the safety of existing
banks in the locality. In those states that adopt the third approach of
allowing freer entry, this consideration is relegated to a position of lesser
importance. If the other requirements are met, the only protection afforded
existing institutions is upon a showing that the chartering of the applicant
bank will result in actual insolvency of existing banks.
With this in mind, the third consideration relating to "convenience
and needs" is more easily placed in focus. This is determined first from
the consumer's viewpoint, and in the freer entry states is limited to this
perspective. Any review of the new bank's effect on competitors, except
as those effects impact upon consumers, moves the inquiry from that of a
freer entry approach back to the balancing approach.
An examination of the factors which the court in Central Bank found
to be relevant in reaching its decision reflects a policy of allowing some-
what freer bank entry. In finding that the protection of the statutory
criteria for chartering extended to depositors and customers but not to
competing banks, the court said: "The [convenience and needs considera-
tion] does not contemplate preventing new banks from entering a market
because existing banks are rendering adequate services."'27 Focusing on
the new bank itself is the first step. One of the leading indicators of con-
venience and needs among banking experts is the prospect of the new
bank's profitable operation. In fact, the court in Suburban Bank of Kansas
City v. Jackson County State Bank28 indicated that substantial deposits
and business projections should be enough in itself to meet the test. Ac-
cordingly, the court in Central Bank said that the amount of future de-
27. 509 S.W.2d at 184.
28. 330 S.W.2d 183, 187 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959).
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posits of the proposed bank may be considered, but the factual basis for
these projections should be closely scrutinized.2 9 The court also ,suggested
that the new bank's impact on the economy of the community to be served
is relevant and can be determined by: (1) the number of lending alter-
natives available to small business and consumer borrowers; (2) the actual
competition among existing units in the area;3 0 and (3) whether credit
is readily available within reasonable bounds to all sectors of the local
economy. Also found to be relevant was evidence which showed that de-
posits in existing banks were growing faster than the normal indicators
of need for banking facilities. However, the court rejected the opponent's
evidence on this point-which showed that population and household growth
rates were declining and retail sales were dropping while deposit growth
was climbing at an annual rate of 13.6 percent.3 1
The court did not require the proponents to show a "need" for the
bank in the community or produce evidence of complaints about existing
banks. This is consistent with the approach to entry taken by the court.
However, if produced, evidence of this sort would certainly be considered
relevant.3 2
On the other hand, the court found that much of the opponent's
evidence was irrelevant to the statutory considerations: (1) evidence
that the new bank would affect the growth rate of existing banks; (2)
evidence that the new bank would draw deposits from the area already
served by existing units; (3) evidence that the area banks may increase
their promotional activity because of the new entry; and (4) evidence
that the proposed bank would add little or nothing to the driving
convenience of the people in the community. This is also consistent with
the court's approach to chartering, because these factors focus on the
effect of the entry on the profits of existing units. As mentioned earlier,
29. 509 S.W.2d at 187.
30. See 509 S.W.2d at 187. Actual competition among existing units can
be a nebulous concept. It may be measured in terms of indicators such as
interest rates paid on deposits held by the bank. or the interest rate which
the bank charges its customers for various loans. Some experts have concluded
that the concentration of banks within a given market area is a good statistical
indicator of competition. Edwards, supra note 12, at 25, 32. Nonetheless,
measuring competition in the banking industry is not readily accomplished, and
this factor may be more easily stated by the courts than proven by a litigant.
31. This apparent inconsistency was explained by the facts that the op-
ponents of the charter failed to consider the growth of the community as an
office and commercial services area and that the opponents' daytime' em-
ployment figures were substantially lower than those furnished by the com-
mercial reporting agencies. 509 S.W.2d at 189.
32. Requiring evidence of this nature indicates a restricted entry approach.
Evidence that there is an absolute need" for another bank or that tnere are
numerous complaints with -existing facilities is difficult to adduce. Reliance
on this evidence usually serves to protect existing units and prevent new units
from entering. See Moran v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 230, 235, 33 N.W.2d 772, 777
(1948); Suburban Bank of Kansas City v. Jackson County State Bank, 330
S.W.2d 183 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959); Application of Howard Say. Inst. of
Newark v. Howell, 32 N.J. 29, 159 A.2d 113 (1960).
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consideration of the effect on the profits of existing units is irrelevant
unless the evidence tends to prove that actual insolvency will result.
Even the rejection of evidence as to driving convenience can be justi-
fied on the facts of this case, although this factor is consumer-oriented
and therefore normally relevant.33 The court also discussed evidence
that entry of the new bank would diminish the ability of the largest area
bank to compete with the metropolitan banks. The court rejected this
evidence as unsubstantiated. Such evidence should probably be deemed
irrelevant, because it focused on the protection of existing banks.3 4
The courts of other states have considered several factors in
addition to those reviewed by the court in Central Bank. These include:
(1) adequacy of services now provided compared to the needs of residents
and the new services to be offered by the applicant bank;35 (2)
ability of existing banks to handle potential growth;3 6 (3) number of
persons in the area desiring to use the proposed bank and the amount
of business they would generate; 37 (4) population growth; 38 (5) char-
acter of the community and surrounding area;39 (6) the wealth and
earning capacity of the residents; 40 and (7) the concentration of busi-
ness establishments. 4' These factors are not inclusive, and keeping in
mind the policy that the chartering statute seeks to further, the relevancy
33. The analysis of driving convenience is based on the assumption that
the volume of business a new bank attracts will vary proportionately with
the amount of driving time customers must expend to reach the new bank.
The evidence in this case tended to show that the area within a five minute
radius of the new bank was also within a five minute radius of at least three
other banks. Accordingly, the fact that the new bank would add little or
nothing to the driving convenience of the community would not be very
probative. However, where the closest bank in the community is thirty minutes
from some residents and a proposed bank would be considerably more con-
venient in terms of driving time, such evidence should be allowed as relevant
and probative of the "convenience and needs of the community."
34. The opinion indicated that the court considered at least seven other
factors which are presumably relevant: (1) the growth of the area to be served;
(2) the date the last bank was chartered in the area; (3) the business and
commercial growth in the community; (4) the estimated buying power of
area residents; (5) the size and deposit growth of existing banks; (6) the
number of existing banks in the area; and (7) the proposed location of the
new bank.
35. Jackson v. Valley Nat'l. Bank, 277 Minn. 293, 295, 152 N.W.2d 472,
474 (1967). This evidence would be relevant to the community need for the
bank, a criterion which the court in Central Bank said was not required to
be shown, but could nonetheless be relevant. See note 32 supra.
36. 277 Minn. at 293, 152 N.W.2d at 472. This factor pertains to the
probability that the new bank will operate profitably.
37. Id.
38. See Application of Burrill, 262 Minn. 270, 114 N.W.2d 688 (1962), where
the court suggested that public demand might be inferred from a tremendous
expansion in the population and economy.
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of others can be readily ascertained. Questions remain, but Central Bank
seems to mark a definite choice by the Missouri courts of a freer approach
to the chartering process. This is certainly the trend in many other
states, and according to some economists, long overdue.4 2
In spite of the trend toward encouraging competition in the field
of banking, a word of caution is appropriate. It is not clear whether
the decrease in the number of bank failures since the 1930's is attrib-
utable to increased state regulation of entry or to federal legislation
such as that which established deposit insurance and increased the
effectiveness of the Federal Reserve System. But the failure of a bank,
whether insured or not, has so great an effect on the economy of the
whole community43 that the important consideration is to avoid the
catastrophic structure which results from excessive chartering and over-
banking.
The consumer-oriented approach in Central Bank is commendable
and possibly the most popular in the short run. However, the banking
structure as a whole must be considered and concern for solvency should
override considerations of immediate advantages from increased com-
petition. Competition in the banking industry is subtle yet effective
even with a smaller number of units.
The impact of Central Bank remains to be seen. At least on the
surface the case moves Missouri closer to a freer chartering approach.
The rejection of evidence that the new bank would draw deposits from
existing banks and slow their growth rate reflects a greater concern
for competition and increased efficiency, with a subsequent disregard
of the historical concern for existing banks. Although the conservative
approach of the past is being reexamined in Missouri, the banking
industry is still based upon the concepts of capital investment and
allocation of resources which are factors for entry in any industry.
As such, entry decisions carry sanctions of their own which will help to
discourage imprudent entry attempts and help maintain a stable system.44
Kim R. MOORE
42. See Peltzman, Bank Entry Regulation: Its Impact and Purpose, 3
NAT. BA. RFv. 163 (1965).
43. Berle, Banking Under the Anti-trust Laws, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 589 (1949).
A bank failure is a community disaster, however, wherever, and
whenever it occurs. While competition may be desirable up to a point
in deposit banking, there is a clear bottom limit to its desirability....
The economic and social premises of the Sherman Act in respect
of other businesses are not fully accepted by the Congress, the States,
or the public as the only considerations applicable to deposit banking.
Id. at 592. See generally Jacobs, The Framework of Commercial Bank Regu-
lation: An Appraisal, 1 NAT. BANK. REv. 343 (1964).
44. See generally Abramson, Private Competition and Public Regulation,
1 NAT. BANK. REv. 101 (1963).
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COMMERCIAL LAW-CONVERSION LIABILITY OF
COLLECTING BANK TO PAYEE OF A NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT AND THE DEFENSE OF UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 3-419(3)
Cooper v. Union Bank1
Bernice Ruff had financial difficulties as a result of gambling debts.
In 1963 she retained the services of an attorney, Joseph Stell, to repre-
sent her in litigation brought by her creditors. Not long thereafter Mr.
Stell employed Miss Ruff as his secretary and bookkeeper. Between De-
cember 14, 1965, and February 20, 1967, Miss Ruff took 29 checks in-
tended for her employer and forged the necessary endorsements. She cashed
some of the checks and deposited the others in her own account. She
withdrew all funds prior to the discovery of the forgeries. 2 Stell and his
partners brought an action for conversion against the collecting and
the payor banks.3 The California Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment
for defendants, 4 concluding that Uniform Commercial Code section
3419(3)5 provides a complete defense for both collecting and payor
banks so long as they act reasonably and in good faith.6 The Supreme
Court of California affirmed the nonliability of the payor banks7 and
1. 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
2. Miss Ruff pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery.
3. A drawee/payor bank is the bank upon which the check is written. A
collecting bank is any bank that handles the instrument prior to its receipt by the
payor bank. UNIFORM COAMERClAL CODE § 4-105.
4. Cooper v. Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 351, 103 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1972).
5. UNIFORM COMmERcIAL CODE § 3-419 (3) provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive indorsements
a representative, including a depositary or collecting bank, who has in
good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards
applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instru-
ment or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the true owner isnot liable in conversion or ot erwise to the true ow er beyond the amount
of any proceeds remaining in his 
hands.
The word "Code" is substituted for the word "Act" in the California statute.6. Transferees of instruments with forged indorsements cannot claim to beholders in due course. Whaley, Forgery and the Holder in Due Course: The Com-
mercial Paper Puzzle, 78 CoM. L.J. 277 (1973).7. The court disagreed with the lower court on the applicability of the
defense of section 3-419 (3) to payor banks. The supreme court found that the
payor banks were not liable because the suit against the collecting banks operatedas a ratification of the payment by the payor banks. In the three instances where
there was no ratification the payor bank was allowed to utilize the defense of
section 3-406, which provides:Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes . . . to the
making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the
alteration or lack of authority .. against a drawee or other payor who
pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the i eason-
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the collecting banks for all instruments received after April 1, 1966;8 how-
ever, the court reversed the lower courts and held the collecting banks
liable for checks handled before that date. The reversal rested upon an
interpretation of Uniform Comercial Code section 3-419(3).
Two reasons were given for holding that section 3-419 (3) does not
limit the liability of collecting and depositary banks. First, the banks
had the proceeds. Under bank collection theory, when the payor bank
transmits funds to the collecting bank in return for the forged instrument,
it is transmitting its own funds. A suit for conversion against the collecting
bank ratifies this transfer, so that the collecting bank holds the proceeds
in a constructive trust for the payee. Because the payee has not ratified
the transfer of funds to the forger, the money given to the forger is the
bank's. The second reason for avoiding the defense was that the legis-
lature did not intend to change pre-Code law holding collecting and de-
positary banks liable to the payee.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, a majority
of jurisdictions, including California and Missouri, held a collecting bank
liable to the payee if the bank took a check upon an unauthorized en-
dorsement.9 Sometimes this liability was for conversion,' 0 sometimes as-
sumpsit.11 A recent case said collecting banks are liable, but the theory
behind the liability is unimportant.'2
The Uniform Commercial Code followed pre-Code law in holding a
collecting and depositary bank liable to the payee for conversion if it pays
a check which has not been validly endorsed. 13 However, section 3-419 (3)
8. The court relied on section 3-404 and the accompanying official comments.
Section 3-404 (1). Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as
that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is pre-
cluded from denying it .... (emphasis added).
Comment 4. The words "or is precluded from denying it" are . . . to
recognize the negligence which precludes a denial of the signature.
This is a novel use of this section, and is discussed in 5 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 319,
333-35 (1974). But cf. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Bank, 431 F.2d 341,
344 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Florida law) (defense of contributory negligence is
not available in an action for conversion).
9. See cases collected in Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 670 (1965).
10. Kansas City Cas. Co. v. Wesport Ave. Bank, 191 Mo. App. 287, 177 S.W.
1092 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
11. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co. v. South Side Bank, 224 Mo.
App. 876, 27 S.W.2d 768 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930); Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Tr. Co.,
263 S.W. 1038 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924).
12. Chemical Workers Basic Union v. Arnold Say. Bank, 411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo.
En Banc 1966) (dictum).
13. UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 3419 (1) (c). An instrument is converted
when it is paid on a forged indorsement. Stone 9- Webster Eng. Corp. v. First
Nat. Bank, 345 Mass. 1, 6, 184 N.E.2d 358, 361 (1962); Belmar Trucking Corp. v.
American Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 31, 34, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247, 251 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
See Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 932, § 34 (c).
Although subsection (1) (c) says "forged indorsements," courts have inter-
preted this to include unauthorized indorsements. R. ANDERSON, 2 ANDERSON ON
THM UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1034 (2d ed. 1971). An unauthorized signature
includes a forgery. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201 (43).
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seemingly limits this liability14 to the remaining funds if the bank acts
in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards.15
The prevailing rule prior to Cooper was that a collecting bank's liability
to the true owner 16 was reduced by whatever amounts were paid out.
17
However, only one reported case1 s has used section 3-419 (3) to deny re-
lief to a payee. One well-known work attributes this paucity to deliberate
manipulation by the courts.19 The most common method is to find that
the bank did not act in a reasonable commercial manner,20 although some-
times courts simply ignore the section.2 ' One court found that the bank
was not a representative 22 in the ordinary check handling situation. The
state of the law prior to Cooper was that a collecting bank's liability
could be limited if the requirements of section 3-419 (3) were met-but
the courts rarely found that they were.
The defendant collecting and depositary banks in Cooper asserted
nonliability to the payee under section 3-419 (3)-i.e., no proceeds remain-
ing in their hands. The lower courts sustained this defense, but the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, after redefining proceeds,2 3 found that they
retained the proceeds and thus were liable to the plaintiff. Cooper is a re-
versal of prior understanding, but not case law, 24 of the meaning of "pro-
14. A collecting bank may be liable to other banks under sections 3-417 and
4-207 even if no proceeds remain; but the payee cannot recover directly against
the collecting bank under these warranty sections. See text accompanying notes
53-61 infra.
15. Forman v. First Nat. Bank, 320 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (dictum).
16. Section 3-419 speaks of the "true owner" of an instrument, rather than
the payee, but for the purposes of this note, the terms are assumed to be synono-
mous.
17. "To the extent it pays cash over the counter to the thief it has no pro-
ceeds." J. WHrr.E & R. Sunrrims, UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE 502 (1972) (herein-
after cited as WHrE &: SiMMEms).
"Hence, a collecting bank which has remitted the proceeds of a check which
has a forged indorsement would not be liable to the owner...." Murray, Ne-
gotiable Instruments, 20 U. MIain L.R. 225, 237 (1965).
18. Messeroff v. Kantor, 261 So. 2d 553 (Fla. App. 1972).
19. So much for the work of the Code draftsmen. Thereafter, the courts
have taken up section 3-419 (3), and what they have done to it shouldn't
happen to a dog. The courts have ingeniously evaded the restrictions in
3-419(3)....
W-rrE & SumsmEs, supra note 17, at 504.
20. Hermetic Refrig. Co. v. Central Valley Nat. Bank, 493 F.2d 476 (1974);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Nat. Bank, 431 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1970);
Belmar Trucking Corp. v. American Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 31, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247
(Civ. Ct. 1970); Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246
A.2d 162 (1968), aff'd, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460 (1969).
21. Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bank, 253 Cal. App.
2d 368, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1967).
22. Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 84 Dauph.
280 (C.P. 1965). Cooper also came to this conclusion.
23. The Cooper definition of proceeds is criticized in Note, 74 COLUm. L. REv.
104 (1974); Note, 5 RuTGERs-CAMDEN L.J. 319 (1974).
24. The only other case that has discussed the nature of "proceeds", Ervin
v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 84 Dauph. 280 (C.P. 1965),
came to the same conclusion as Cooper, namely, when a depositary bank releases
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ceeds" as used in section 3-419 (8). The effect of its definition of "proceeds"
is that no matter how much the depositary bank gives to the forger,
the bank will still have all of the proceeds remaining in its hands.
The Cooper court began its analysis by asking two questions: "first,
did [the depositary banks] receive any proceeds and second, have they
parted with any proceeds they may have received? ' 2 5 In answer to the
first, the suit brought by the payee against the depositary bank ratified
the collection of the proceeds from the payor bank; therefore, the de-
fendant collecting banks did receive the proceeds. This answer is not con-
troversial and is well-supported in case law. But the answer to the sec-
ond question, the finding that the bank retained the proceeds even
after releasing to the forger amounts equal to the proceeds, was not so
obvious.
In support of its holding that the depositary bank gave its own funds
to the forger while retaining the proceeds, Cooper makes several points.
There is the general point that ratification of the collection is not a
ratification of delivery to the wrong person. And in the case of an in-
strument cashed over the counter,2 6 the bank must be giving its own
money because it has not yet collected the proceeds. As for an instrument
deposited, the court relies on the doctrine of constructive trusts. The court
said that agency ceases after the collection process is completed and the
bank becomes a debtor to the true owner. The money collected is mingled
with the bank's funds and thus the money received by the forger is the
bank's money, while the bank holds the proceeds of the collected in-
strument in a constructive trust for the true owner.21
The court's reasoning is open to criticism in several respects. First,
the court assumes that "proceeds" is a word of art, with a highly tech-
nical meaning. The absence of any Code definition 28 would seem to
negate this inference and suggest an ordinary meaning for the word. An
ordinary understanding would be that once the depositary bank gives
value for the instrument and is in turn given value for the instrument by
the payor bank, it has parted with the proceeds. Second, even assuming
that "proceeds" has a technical meaning in the bank collection situation,
funds to a forger, it is giving away its own money, while the proceeds collected
from the payor bank are held for the true owner. See also United States v.
Collins, 464 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (no conversion since the bank paid its own
money on a draft with a forged indorsement).
25. 9 Cal. 3d at 376, 507 P.2d at 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
26. Some commentators have suggested that a bank is not a representative
when it cashes a check (and therefore purchases the instrument with its own
funds), but is when it accepts it for deposit. Farnsworth and Leary, UCC Brief No.
10: Forgery and Alteration of Checks, 14 PRAc. LAw. 75, 79 (March, 1968). Eroin
rejected such a distinction. 38 D. g C.2d at 478, 84 Dauph. at 283, as did Cooper.
9 Cal. 3d at 380, 507 P.2d at 616, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 8. This rejection is criticized in
Note, 74 CoTJum. L. REv. 104 (1974).
27. 9 Cal. 3d at 379, 507 P.2d at 615, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
28. "Proceeds" are not defined in Articles 3 or 4. The definition given in
section 9-306 (1) does not apply.
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the court's definition is questionable statutory construction because it is
apparently irreconcilable with the language of section 3-419 (3). That sub-
section says liability for conversion is limited to the amount of proceeds
remaining in the bank's hands; a clear implication that it is possible for
no proceeds to remain in the bank's hands. Yet, under the Cooper defini-
tion, it is practically impossible for the depositary bank not to have the
proceeds remaining in its hands.2 9 A final criticism of the court's "pro-
ceeds" argument is the lack of authority for its application of the con-
structive trust theory to the Code and to the forged endorsement situation.3 0
On balance, whether Cooper's definition of proceeds is correct is a
close question. On the one hand, it is supported by the only other court
to face the issue31 and by the many pre-Code cases saying the proceeds
are held in trust for the true owner.32 On the other hand, the Cooper
definition makes section 3-419 (3) a nullity, which violates one of the first
principles of statutory construction, namely, that a statute should be con-
strued so as to give meaning to every part. The answer would seem to lie
with the intent of the drafters and the legislators.
The California Supreme Court found no intent on the part of
either draftsmen or the legislature to change the pre-Code law that collect-
ing and depositary banks are liable to the true owner for conversion if they
take an instrument with a forged endorsement.3 3 The court placed sig-
nificance on the fact that section 3-419 (3) uses the ambiguous word "pro-
ceeds" instead of expressly absolving collecting and depositary banks if
they gave "value" for the instrument. The court went on to say that
neither the draftsmen nor the legislature had any reason for making direct
suits against the collecting and depositary banks more difficult, because
these banks will ultimately be liable anyway,3 4 and that requiring un-
economical circuity of action violates the purposes of the Code and creates
'.a significant potential for injustice."3 5 Furthermore, the court pointed
29. The only time the bank will not have the full proceeds is when cash
on hand goes below the face amount of the instrument.
30. The court relied on 5 R. ScoTr, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 540 (3d ed. 1967) and
Jennings v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216 (1935). An ex-
amination of Scott reveals that the treatise is concerned with the claims of de-
positors, creditors, etc., against a bank that has failed, not instruments collected
upon a forged indorsement. Likewise, Jennings involved a bank failure and not a
forged indorsement situation.
31. Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 38 Pa. D. & C. 2d 473, 84 Dauph.
280 (C.P. 1965).
32. Some pre-Code Missouri cases used the word "proceeds" in a similiar
way as used in Cooper. See Strong v. Missouri-Lincoln Tr. Co., 263 S.W. 1038
(St. L. Mo. App. 1924); Aetna Cas. &c Surety Co. v. Lindell Tract Co., 348 S.W.2d
558 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Chemical Workers Basic Union v. Arnold Say. Bank,
411 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. En Banc 1966). See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Fidelity Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 232 Mo. App. 412, 109 S.W.2d 47 (K.C. Ct. App.
1937).
33. This is criticized in Note, 23 CATHOLIC U.L.R.v. 163 (1973).
34. UNIFoP ComumFaRcuAL CODE §§ 4-207, 3-417.
35. 9 Cal. 3d at 382, 506 P.2d at 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
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out that the comments to section 3-419 (3) do not indicate any change in
the law.36 And finally, the court found that section 3-419 (3) was not meant
to apply to the ordinary bank collection transaction, 7 because all of the
illustrations and cases cited in the comments deal with the situation where
an innocent broker sells stolen securities for his principal.
Criticism of the Cooper divination of legislative intent can focus
on two areas; the weakness of the evidence supporting the "no-change"
contention, and other evidence strongly suggesting that a change was
meant.
To begin with, the court said the Code should and could have said
"for value" instead of the ambiguous word "proceeds" if collecting and
depositary banks are to be exonerated when they release funds to the
forger. This assumes that "proceeds" is an ambiguous term. Prior to
Cooper, however, there was no difficulty in understanding what "proceeds"
meant. Even if "proceeds" is an ambiguous term, no special significance
should be placed on bad draftsmanship.
The court also said there is no reason why the Code should present
impediments to direct suit by the payee against collecting and depositary
banks; therefore, there are no impediments. This argument overlooks the
background against which the Code was drafted. Although most states al-
lowed a payee to sue any bank which handled the instrument, a substan-
tial number of states did not allow the payee to sue the drawee bank88
and a few other states did not allow him to recover from collecting
banks.3 9 The Code does not explain why it was drafted in this way, but
possibly there was a compromise on the issue. The draftsmen might have
been influenced by the civil law.40 At a more basic level, the interests of
the banks might have influenced the draftsmen.4' The point is, there might
have been many reasons why the Code modified the pre-Code rule.
Evidence of the function of section 3-419 (3) as a defense is found in
Official Comment 6,42 which explicitly forsees that a collecting bank will
36. The court characterizes Official Comment 5 as saying that section 3-419 (3)
is a codification of prior case law and California Comment 5 as saying the section
is consistent with prior California law.
37. Accord, Comment, 45 U. COLO. L. Rav. 281 (1974); Note, 25 HASTINGS
L.J. 715 (1974).
38. California Code Comment 3 to § 3-419.
39. Soderlin v. Marquette Nat. Bank, 214 Minn. 408, 8 N.W.2d 331 (1943).
This is still true in Louisiana. Smith v. Louisiana Bank 8: Trust Co., 255 So.2d 816
(La. App. 1971).
40. For a comparison of Anglo-American and Continental law, see Kessler,
Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863 (1938).
41. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted, 61 YAL.E L.J. 334 (1954); Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Un-
der the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62
YAIm L.J. 417, 469 (1953); WHITE & SUmmERs, supra note 17, at 505 n.18.
42. Official Comment 6 reads:
Thus a collecting bank might be liable to a drawee bank which had been
subject to liability under this section, even though the collecting bank
might not be liable directly to the owner of the instrument.
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not always be liable to the payee, even though it will be liable, to the
drawee bank. This comment seems inconsistent with the Cooper definition
of proceeds under which the collecting bank will always be liable to the
true owner.
The court saw another indication that no change was intended in
California Code Comment 5, which says section 3-419 (3) is consistent with
prior California law.43 But a reading of the full text of the comment erodes
the comment's credibility, because it incorrectly summarizes the Code and
prior California law as allowing good faith as a complete defense to con-
version.44 The court went on to find support in Official Comment 545 by
characterizing it as saying that section 3-419 (3) is "merely a codification
of prior decisions," 46 and since the prior decisions referred to are cases
of an investment broker selling stolen securities, section 3-419 (3) does not
refer to the bank collection situation. But the comment does not say
the section is a codification of prior case law. Rather, it says subsection
(3) adopts the rule of decisions which limit a good faith representative's
liability to the proceeds remaining in his hands. If the "decisions" re-
ferred to are investment broker cases which held an agent not liable after
he turned the proceeds over to his principal, then it may be significant
that the comment says "adopt the rule," rather than "adopt the decisions."
Apparently, the draftsmen intended to extend the rule to the bank col-
lection situation, because section 3-419 (3) defines a representative as in-
cluding depositary and collecting banks. An even more compelling argu-
ment that Cooper is wrong in limiting section 3-419 (3) to the investment
broker situation is that investment securities47 and the liability of brokers4s
thereon are covered by Article 8 of the Code and not Article 3. 49
The intent of the draftsmen to provide a defense to collecting and
43. California Code Comment 5 reads:
Subdivision (3) is new statutory law. Its basic premise that a person deal-
ing in good faith with the property of another is not liable for conversion
is consistent with prior California law on the tort of conversion.
The Missouri Code Comment reads: "Subsection (3) is new and is self-explanatory."
44. For example, Cooper held the collecting banks liable for conversion, even
though the lower court "concluded that all defendants . . . had acted in good
faith.... ." 9 Cal. 3d at 375-76, 507 P.2d at 613, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
45. Official Comment 5 reads:
Subsection (3), which is new, is intended to adopt the rule of decisions
which has held that a representative, such as a broker or depositary bank,
who deals with a negotiable instrument for his principal in good faith is
not liable to the true owner for conversion of the instrument or otherwise,
except that he may be compelled to turn over to the true owner the
instrument itself or any proceeds of the instrument remaining in his
hands....
46. 9 Cal. 3d at 382, 507 P.2d at 617-18, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
47. For a technical definition, see section 8-102.
48. UNIFORm COmmRCIAL CODE § 8-318 provides in part:
An agent . . . who in good faith . . . has received securities and sold,
pledged, or delivered them according to the instructions of his principal
is not liable for conversion . . . although the principal has no right to
dispose of them.
49. UNIFoRM Co.rN ERCIAL CODE § 8-102 (b) provides in part: "A writing which
1976]
105
Tyler: Tyler: Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
depositary banks is dear. Official Comment 550 says section 3-419(3) adopts
the rule of those cases which limit a representative's liability. Official
Comment 651 foresees that collecting banks will not be liable to the payee
in some situations, even though the drawee bank will be. The very in-
clusion of the subdivision in the section on conversion and forged indorse-
ments raises the natural inference that the limitation of liability applies
to collecting and depositary banks which handle instruments containing a
forged indorsement.
Once it becomes evident that the draftsmen intended section 3-419 (3)
as a limitation on conversion liability, the proper definition of "proceeds"
is obvious-the amount forwarded from the payor bank in exchange for
the instrument less the amounts paid out to the forger. The Cooper
definition cannot withstand close scrutiny, because it violates the intent
of the draftsmen and the purpose of subdivision (3).
The bases for the Cooper interpretation of section 3-419 (3) are un-
sound. The court did not, however, decide the case solely on the basis
of statutory construction; it made a policy choice in favor of payees and
against collecting banks. 2 As a matter of policy, the court may well have
been right. No commentator or court has praised the process whereby the
payee sues the drawe'r,53 who sues the drawee bank,54 who sues the inter-
mediary bank who sues the depositary bank,5 5 whereas several have con-
demned it.56 Defenders of this circuitous method say it is necessary be-
cause the defenses which may not be available in a direct suit by the payee
against the depositary bank are available in the longer route. 7 The weak-
ness of this argument is that most of the defenses spoken of are either
is a security is governed by this article and not by Uniform Commercial Code-Com-
mercial Paper.... UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 83-103(1): "This Article does not
apply to. . . investment securities."
50. See note 45 supra.
51. See note 42 supra.
52. Apparently the interpretation of the Code as given in Cooper was entirely
the court's own and was made without benefit of arguments and briefs of the
opposing counsels. 5 RuTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 319, 821 n.15 (1974).
58. UNIFORM CoMzramcAr CODE § 3-804. The payee can also sue the drawee.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419(1).
54. See UNIFORM COMmRmCIAL CODE § 4-401.
55. See UNIFORM COMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-207, 3-417, describing the warranty
of good title.
56. "[T]he Code unreasonably promotes circuity of action. "[N]eedless
circuity of action." O'Malley, Common Check Frauds and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 23 RuTxnms L. REv. 189, 267 (1969). Comment, Allocation of Lossesfrom Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 YA.x L.J. 417, 471 (1953). Cf. Sales Promotion Executives
Ass'n. v. Schlinger & Weiss, Inc., 234 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Civ. Ct. 1962) (pre-Code):
"There's no need to cross the Mississippi by way of Siberia." Id. at 787.
57. O'Malley, Common Check Frauds and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23
RTGERrs L. RrEv. 189, 284 (1969). Cf. Dawson Textile Corp. v. Flatbush Check
Cashing Serv., Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 293, 329 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Civ. Ct. 1972); Stone &
Webster Eng. Corp. v. First Nat. Bank, 845 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 858 (1962). How-
ever, in Stone the court said: "Cases where the payee has acquired rights in an
instrument may stand on a different footing." Id. at 8, 184 N.E.2d at 363 n.4.
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available only when the drawer is the plaintiff58 or are as readily available as
a defense 59 by collecting and depositary banks as by any other defendant.6 0
As a practical matter, the drawee banks might be located all across the na-
tion and the expense of bringing suit in a distant forum might be so
great, that the payee would have to bear the loss. The court felt this to be
unjust, and more than one commentator has agreed that the better rule
would be to allow direct suit.61
The Cooper definition of proceeds may be correct under bank collec-
tion theory, but it is obvious that the draftsmen of section 3-419 (3) had
a broader definition in mind. The draftsmen intended to limit the con-
version liability of collecting and depositary banks, a goal that cannot be
achieved under Cooper. On the other hand, the Code is so complex that
the court may have been correct in asserting that the legislature neither
knew nor intended such a result. And as a matter of fairness and economy,
the Cooper solution is superior to the Code.
v- Other courts will have to face this same problem and should consider
two other relevant factors: uniformity and the true rule. Uniformity is
the reason for the existence of the Uniform Commercial Code.6 2 Although
it would be desirable for all courts to interpret the Code correctly, this
will not happen; California is a precedent setter. Perhaps it would be
better if all jurisdictions uniformly interpreted section 3-419 (3) incorrectly
than to have a "majority rule" and a "minority rule." A second factor to
consider is what could be called a "true rule." Although courts have said
collecting and depositary banks can limit their conversion liability, the
courts almost never allow them to do so. Perhaps it would be better to
emasculate section 3-419 (3) openly than to do so by setting an impossible
standard of reasonableness for banks. These two factors, plus sympathy
for the payee, would lead a court to adopt the Cooper definition of
proceeds.
ROBERT E. YOUNG
The banks prefer the circuitous route because it increases the likelihood of
someone else shouldering the loss. On occasion the collecting bank will escape
liability because the payor bank asserts a successful defense against the drawer
under section 4-406. Other times the collecting bank will be able to defend suc-
cessfully against the payor bank under sections 4-207 (4) and 4-406 (5). And often
the payor bank will be in such a distant forum that the payee cannot afford to sue.
58. UNIFOnr COMMrFCIAL CODE § 4-406.
59. See, e.g., UNIFORm CosEaCIAL CODE § 1-201 (43) (an unauthorized in-
dorsement means one without actual, implied, or apparent authority); § 3-404 (an
unauthorized signature can be ratified).
60. WHrrE &c Sum1amRs, supra note 17, at 503. For example in Cooper the
collecting banks were in as good a position as anyone to show that the payee had
been negligent, and were able to do so successfully.
61. 9 Cal. 3d at 382, 507 P.2d at 617, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 9. Funk, The Fate of
the Instrument in the Hands of the U.C.C., 87 BANKING L.J. 502, 507 (1970);
WmT Sc SummRms, supra note 17, at 505. Cf. Comment, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 102 (1971).
62. Schnader, Looking Ahead at the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Bus.
LAw. 771, 772 (1964); Schnader, The New Movement Toward Uniformity in Com-
mercial Law-The Uniform Commercial Code Marches On, 13 Bus. LAw. 646, 655(1958).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATIONS-THE SPEECH OR DEBATE
CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS ISSUED TO
THIRD PARTIES-NO RIGHT TO QUESTION THEIR
CONSTITUTIONALITY ON FIRST
AMENDMENT GROUNDS
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund'
In January 1970 the United States Senate passed a resolution au-
thorizing the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security to make a study
of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950.2 Pursuant to its mandate the subcommittee began an
inquiry into various activities of the United States Servicemen's Fund
(U.S.S.F.) to determine whether it was potentially harmful to armed
service morale.3 The subcommittee issued a subpoena duces tecum to a
New York bank where the organization had an account, ordering the bank
to produce all records involving the account. The U.S.S.F. brought an ac-
tion to enjoin implementation of the subpoena. Because of an earlier
decision that jurisdiction and venue lies only in the District of Columbia
in actions against congressional committees, 4 suit was filed in Washing-
ton, D.C. As a result, the New York bank was not subject to proper
service. The only parties before the court were Chairman Eastland, Senate
members, and the Chief Counsel of the subcommittee.
The U.S.S.F. alleged that enforcement of the subpoena should be en-
joined because: (1) the authorizing resolution and subcommittee action
implementing it were not within a "legitimate legislative sphere" and
thus the legislators were not immune under the speech or debate clause
of the Constitution; 5 and (2) even if the immunity applied, answering the
subpoena duces tecum would constitute a violation of its first amend-
ment rights. The U.S.S.F. further claimed that issuing the subpoena to a
third party deprived it of the ability to refuse to answer. Such refusal
might have led the Congress to institute a contempt action,0 in which
the U.S.S.F. could have raised the first amendment issue.7
1. 95 S. Ct. 1813 (1975).
2. S. Rys. 341, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 1974 (January 80, 1970).
3. The U.S.S.F. is a nonprofit membership corporation supported by con-
tributions. It established coffeehouses near domestic military installations and
aided in the publication of an underground paper which communicated its
philosophy to armed service personnel concerning United States involvement in
Southeast Asia.
4. Liberation News Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1970).
5. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, d. 1. The language in question states that "for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they [members of Congress) shall not be
questioned in any other place."
6. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970), provides for punishment of any person who was
summoned as a witness to give testimony or to produce papers upon matters
under proper inquiry and wilfully makes default or refuses to answer questions
upon appearance.
7. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 854 U.S. 178 (1957).
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After a hearing on the merits, the district court denied the permanent
injunction. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.
The Supreme Court reversed, dismissing the complaint. The Court found
that issuance of the subpoena was within a "legitimate legislative sphere"
and hence the committee was absolutely immune from being questioned.
Because the privilege is absolute, first amendment rights play no part
in a case where a private citizen attempts to interfere with an ongoing
congressional activity.
The speech or debate clause of the Constitution provides legislators
and their aides with immunity from judicial review if their actions are
within a "legitimate legislative sphere." The purpose of the clause is to
provide legislators with immunity for any speech or debate in either
House and to protect legislators from being questioned in any other
place. The clause enables legislators to function independently, free from
"intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hos-
tile judiciary,"8 and reinforces the separation of powers embodied in the
Constitution. However, it is not the purpose of the clause to protect all
conduct in which a legislator engages. Although the immunity is broad,
it is not unlimited.9 The term "legitimate legislative sphere" has been
adopted to define the limits of the immunity. In order for a congressman's
activities to be immune from judicial review, they must be within this
sphere. In Gravel v. United States'o the Supreme Court defined "legitimate
legislative sphere" as:
[That range of activity which is] an integral part of the delibera-
tive and communicative processes by which Members participate
in committee and House proceedings with respect to . . . pro-
posed legislation or . . . other matters which the Constitution
places within the jurisdiction of either House."
In United States v. Brewster'2 the Court referred to the sphere as includ-
ing "acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process."' 3
Unusual or irregular acts would not be immune from judicial questioning.
Both congressional investigations' 4 and the issuance of subpoenas' 5 have
been found to be acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative
process.
8. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).
9. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 515 (1972); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
10. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
11. Id. at 625.
12. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
13. Id. at 525.
14. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539,
544-45 (1963); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); McGrain v.
Daughtery, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
15. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 201 (1957); 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970);
see Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investiga-
tion, 40 HA1v. L. REv. 153, 159 (1926).
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Watkins v. United States16 further developed the "legitimate legisla-
tive sphere" concept. The Court stated that to be within the protection of
the speech or debate clause a congressional investigation "must be related
to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate legislative task."' 7 A legitimate
task is the enactment of valid legislation and appropriations in reference to
it. The subject must be one on which legislation or appropriations could
be made. It is only then that the investigation is an integral part of the
legislative process. A second requirement of Watkins is that the com-
mittee be instructed as to what it is to do with the power delegated to
it.1s These instructions can be transmitted through the authorizing resolu-
tion, the Chairman's statement, or the nature of the proceedings them-
selves. Through some means the committee's jurisdiction and purpose
must be spelled out so that their actions conform with the will of the
parent body. A third requiiement is that there exist a nexus between the
subject matter of inquiry and the individual under investigation-i.e.,
a demonstrable relationship between the individual's activities and the
legitimate legislative task.19 If these requirements are met, congressional
activities are within the "legitimate legislative sphere." The ensuing im-
munity under the speech or debate clause extends to legislative aides and
employees. However, they are immune only insofar as their conduct would
.be protected if performed by the legislator himself.20
The Court in Eastland devoted considerable time to the conclusive
finding that an investigation and issuance of a subpoena are "an integral
part of the deliberative and communicative process . .. ."z In con-
trast, the Court gave only 'cursory treatment to the requirements set
down for congressional investigations in Watkins. In two paragraphs the
Court determined that all requirements were met. The majority opinion
states that the inquiry was related to a legitimate task because the sub.
ject was a proper one for legislation,2 2 the authorizing resolution was
unambiguous,2 3 and there was a prima facie case showing the need for
investigation of the U.S.S.F.2 4 Irrespective of the wisdom of such brevity,
the Court was probably correct in finding that the requirements of
Watkins were met.
The U.S.S.F. alleged that the production of its bank accounts, includ-
ing the names of contributors, was unconstitutional because such' pro-
16. 854 U.S. 178 (1957).
17. Id. at 187; accord, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12
(1959).
18. 354 U.S. at 209.
19. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546(1963); United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 352,
488 F.2d 1252, 1283 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
20. Gravel v4 United States,.408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972).
21. 95 S. Ct. at 1821-22.
22. Id. at 1822-23. , -
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duction would force public disclosure of beliefs and associations of private
citizens and deter them in their exercise of first amendment rights.25 It
asked the Court to protect these rights by adopting some exception to
the immunity of legislators and their aides acting within a "legitimate
legislative sphere."
In the past, three exceptions to the broad immunity given Congress by"
the speech or debate clause have been discussed or applied by the
Court. The first applies when the "aggrieved" party is a defendant in
a criminal contempt proceeding.26 In such cases an -individual's con-
stitutional rights may be asserted as a defense.2 7 The Court justified this
"exception" on the grounds that an 'interference with congressional action
has already occurred when the case reaches the judiciary.' In addition,
in a contempt proceeding Congress is seeking the aid of the courts to
enforce its actions;28 thus, Congress has waived its immunity. This ex-
ception did not extend to Eastland where the U.S.S.F. sought the aid of
the fedeial courts.29
In Gravel v. United States3 o and Powell v. McCormack31 the Court
discussed a second theory limiting the immunity of the speech or debate
clause. Under this theory, whereas legislators issuing an unconstitutional
order are immune from judicial interference, those parties 'executing that
order may be subject to the power of the courts if their acts are "non-
essential" to legislating. If the decision is illegal, and the act "non-essen-
tial," the aggrieved individual may seek redress from the employee or aide
who executed the decision. Acts which have been determined "non-es-
sential"' to legislating include the private publication of papers,3 2 the
barring *of a legislator from the floor of Congress,83 'and the imprisonment
of one who refused to honor a congressional inquiry.34 This the key term
is "non-essential," but no clear definition of the phrase carn be found in
Gravel or in other cases discussing this exception. In all of these situa-
tions, however, a planned or completed legislative act was to some extent
frustrated. Thus it seems safe to conclude that an act may have a sub-
25. An organization is allowed to sue in behalf of its members so that their
rights may be protected. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958).
26. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); "Flaxner v. United
States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
27.. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
28. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 216 (1957).
29. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1824-25
n.16 (1975).
30. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
31. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
32. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
33. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
34. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Judicial proceedings were
not involved in this case. Here the House' itself ordered and caused the imprison-
ment of Kilbourn. By allowing an action to lie against the sergeant at arms, the
Court had determined the execution of an act involved in 'enforcing a congres-
sional subpoena to be "non-essential."
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stantial effect upon the underlying purpose of the order and yet be deemed
"'non-essential."3 5 '
The majority of the Court in Eastland discussed the idea of allowing
an action to lie against those individuals who executed the subpoena, but
rejected it. The Court declared summarily that although some acts of em-
ployees are not "essential to legislating," "quite the contrary is the case
with a routine subpoena intended to gather information. ... 36 Unfor-
tunately, the Court did not find it necessary to define the term "non-
essential" nor distinguish other cases which allowed an action against
those executing. congressional decisions. The concurring opinion would
have applied the Gravel exception if the individual who executed the sub-
poena had been before the Court.37
A third theory, suggested in Kilbourn v. Thompson3s and the court
of appeals' decision in Eastland,8 9 is that in "extraordinary situations"
direct action may be allowed against the legislators. Although Kilbourn
first suggested this exception, it offered little description as to what con-
stitutes such a situation. It briefly referred to legislative actions with
criminal purposes.
The court of appeals' opinion in Eastland expanded this concept to
include "unique circumstances . . .which . . . demonstrate that such
Member's presence in the litigation is unavoidable if a valid order is to
be entered by the court to vindicate rights which would otherwise go un-
redressed." 40 Eastland presented such circumstances. The U.S.S.F. could
not force the subcommittee affirmatively to use the courts. In addition,
the only parties before the Court were those who caused the subpoena
to be issued, whose actions were within a "legitimate legislative sphere,"
and were immune. Therefore, absent direct action against the legislators,
the U.S.S.F. had no remedy.
The Supreme Court rejected the concept that direct action could be
allowed in extraordinary situations.41 The Court accepted the absolute
nature of the immunity conferred by the speech or debate clause. Realiz-
ing the potential for abuse by unconstitutional acts within a "legitimate
legislative sphere," the Court bowed to "the conscious choice of the Fram-
ers [of the Constitution] buttressed and justified by history."42
The Court thus found no applicable limitation of congressional im-
munity. The Court deemed it of the utmost importance that legislative
proceedings not be delayed by judicial questioning. The subcommittee's
inquiry in this case was frustrated for five years by the actions of the
85. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 (1972).
86. 95 S. Ct. at 1824.
37. Id. at 1828.
38. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
89. United States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252 (1978).
40. Id. at 1270
41. 95 S.Ct. at 1828.
42. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972).
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U.S.S.F. The Court reacted against that delay.43 The decision shuts the
door completely to individuals who allege that their constitutional rights
were violated by an affirmative action of Congress. No leeway is given to
accommodate a case where the legislative interest is insignificant, whereas
the individual's interest is great. The Court will, however, continue to
declare congressional activities unconstitutional and provide remedies
when an individual asserts constitutional rights in a criminal contempt
proceeding. 44
In light of the Court's determination that judicial review of legisla-
tors' activities is limited in this context to finding that the actvities are
or are not within a "legitimate legislative sphere,"45 a more probing look
into the satisfaction of Watkins' requirements' seems fitting. The cursory
examination undertaken by the Court in Eastland belittles the impact
that judicial review can and should have on congressional investigations
through a determination that the activities are within a "legitimate legis-
lative sphere."46 Ideally, the legislature should realize that its actions
are examined extensively to insure compliance with the Constitution.
If the purpose of the speech or debate clause is to insure the in-
tegrity of the legislative branch by preventing intimidation by other
branches and to free the legislative process from delays initiated by
citizens, the majority opinion best accomplished it. The Gravel exception,
by disallowing the execution of legislative decisions, plays as much havoc
with the integrity of the legislature as direct judicial invalidaton of con-
gressional action. However, previous cases have accepted such interference
in order to protect an individual's constitutional rights.4T If the purpose
of the clause is to "assure the independence of the legislators and their
freedom from vexatious and distracting litigation," 48 the court of appeals'
decision also accomplished that purpose by providing some protection to
both the citizens and the legislators.
The anomalous result of the Supreme Court's decision in Eastland is
that whether an individual can protect his constitutional rights when
threatened by a congressional subpoena within a "legitimate legislative
sphere" depends upon such factors as: whether the subpoena is directed
to the individual or his bank; whether the individual's bank can be served
43. 95 S. Ct. at 1825.
44. Id. at 1824 n.16.
45. Id. at 1820, 1827.
46. For an extensive examination, see United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
42-46 (1953) (the "legitimate legislative sphere"); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 201-06 (1957) (dear understanding of purpose and jurisdiction); United
States Servicemen's Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252, 1271-74 (1973) (dissenting
opinion) (the nexus between inquiry and individual).
47. Power v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); For an excellent
discussion, see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); Reinstein and Silver-
glate, Legislative Privilege and the Separtion of Powers, 86 HARV. L. Rxv. 1113
(1973); Note, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 780 (1973).
48. 95 S. Ct. at 1828.
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with process; 49 whether the individuals who executed the subpoena are
included in the suit; and which branch of government is abridging the in-
dividual's rights. It now appears that an individual's constitutional rights
rest on precarious grounds. It is not apparent that the Constitution demands
this result. The Court has avoided creating needless friction with legis.
lators, but unfortunately the citizen has gotten the rub.
LINDA M. CASTLEMAN-ZIA
CRIMINAL LAW-WITNESSES-SCOPE OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT
State v. Booth'
Defendant Booth was charged with second degree murder. At trial,
defendant testified about the events leading to the killing and admitted
the act, claiming self-defense. He concluded his testimony on direct ex-
amination by stating that he got into his car and left the scene. Over de-
fendant's objection, the prosecutor was allowed to ask defendant what he
had done with the alleged murder weapon after he left the scene. De-
fendant was convicted and appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the St. Louis District. The court found that the trial court erred in allow-
ing the prosecutor to ask defendant about his disposition of the murder
weapon, because the subject was not referred to either directly or indirectly
in the direct examination and was thus beyond the proper scope of cross-
examination.2 The court held, however, that this was not reversible error,
because defendant failed to preserve the issue for review.3
At common law the defendant in a criminal case was incompetent to
49. "The U.S.S.F., if able to obtain jurisdiction over the New York bank,
might obtain relief. Because the bank is involved in executing the legislative de-
cision but is under no immunity, the court could issue an injunction against it.
The U.S.S.F. could bring an action in New York against the bank under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. But under FED. R. Crv. P. 19 it would have to be determined if
Congress is an indispensable party. Assuming the court would proceed without
the committee, it is questionable that the court would render a decision which
would leave the bank with two conflicting orders to obey. This alternative open
to the U.S.S.F. is unlikely to prove helpful.
A second source of relief would be for the bank to refuse to comply with the
subpoena and thus be held in contempt. Standing problems may be presented
if the bank attempts to assert the organization's defenses. See California Banker's
Assoc. v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1512 (1974); Note, 88 HARV. L. Rlv. 423 (1974).
1. 515 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
2. See § 546.260, RSMo 1969. Missouri allows wide-open cross-examination
of other witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings. § 491.070, RSMo 1969.
3. Defendant did not set out the answer he was required to give or state
how he was prejudiced in either his points relied on or his motion for new trial.
515 S.W.2d at 590. See Mo. R. CriM. P. 27.20. The case was reversed for failure
to instruct on self-defense. The court decided the cross-examination question be-
cause it might reoccur at retrial. 515 S.W.2d at 589.
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testify. Missouri first removed this incompetency by statute in 1877. 4 The
Missouri Supreme Court soon held that a defendant who chose to take
the stand under the statute could be cross-examined on any relevant
matter.5 In response, the legislature enacted a statute limiting this wide
scope of cross-examination.6 A defendant or his spouse who chose to take
the stand under the new statute would only be "liable to cross-examination,
as to any matter referred to in his examination in chief." 7 What is a
"matter referred to" has since been the source of considerable litigation,
but is still difficult to determine.8 The difficulty only arises when a
criminal defendant or his spouse takes the stand. In 1905 the legislature
codified the common law allowing wide-open cross-examination of all
other witnesses. That provision is now section 491.070, RSMo 1969.
The rule has not imposed strict limits on the cross-examiner. 9 The
supreme court has continually said that the state is not confined to a mere
categorical review of the direct testimony,10 that the cross-examination may
cover any matter "within the fair purview"'1 of the direct,1 2 and that a
defendant who refers to a subject in a general way may be examined in
detail on4t.'3
In fact, a general denial alone may subject the defendant to a wider
scope of questioning than detailed alibi or self-defense testimony. In
State v. Scown 14 the defendant denied performing an abortion on the night
in question. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to ask a wide range of
questions, most of which asked for explanations of the state's evidence re-
garding defendant's connection with the premises where the crime al-
legedly occurred. The supreme court found that the defendant's statement
on direct amounted to a denial, not just of the crime, but of the state's
evidence as well, and approved cross-examination on those matters.15 In
4. Mo. Laws of 1877, at 356.
5. State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 (1878).
6. § 1918, RSMo 1879. The statute is unchanged in its present form, § 546.260,
RSMo 1969.
7. § 546.260, RSMo 1969. "Examination in chief" means the direct ex-
amination.
8. State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo. En Banc 1967); State v. Wil-
liams, 519 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
9. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 190 Mo. 449, 89 S.W. 377 (1905), where a de-
fendant accused of establishing a lottery denied employment by the Mexican
Lottery Company, he could be cross-examined with questions designed to show
he had some connection with the organization. The court said the statute does
not allow a defendant to take the stand, negate the state's evidence by answering
a few carefully chosen questions, and then avoid cross-examination on the issues
thus raised.
10. State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968).
11. This refers to what actually was asked on direct, and not what could
have been asked.
12. State v. Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1970).
13. State v. Scown, 312 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1958).
14. Id.
15. But see State v. Kelley, 284 S.W. 801 (Mo. 1926), which held that de-
fendant's general denial of robbery on direct was not a sufficiently broad refer-
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State v. Whiteaker16 the defendant claimed amnesia for the period dur-
ing which the crime occurred. The court found no error in allowing the
prosecutor to ask the defendant if he could have killed his wife.17
Whiteaker is an indication that the more general the direct testimony is,
the wider the allowable scope of cross-examination may become.
The limited cross-examination statute provides that the defendant
"may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness." 18 Thus, al-
though the prosecutor 9 cannot attempt to elicit answers covering factual
areas not related to the direct examination, he can ask questions designed
to test the defendant's memory or the accuracy of his testimony.2° For ex-
ample, in State v. Phillips2l the defendant testified on direct that he was
drunk and sleeping in a truck during the commission of the alleged bur-
glary. The court held that he could be asked on cross-examination if he
drove the truck away. Even though outside the scope of direct, the question
was proper as bearing on the credibility of defendant's claim of drunken-
ness. Similarly, a defendant may be cross-examined about a previous con-
fession, even though he did not refer to it on direct examination. 22 If
the defendant asserts an alibi on direct examination, the prosecution can
test his memory by asking him where he was on the same date of a prior
month or year.23 Thus, questions clearly designed to discredit the defend-
ants testimony need not be limited to the scope of direct. However, as the
emphasis of the cross-examination shifts toward the addition of new evi-
dence to the state's case, a closer relationship to the direct examination is
required.
A survey of the cases prior to Booth indicates that few questions are
outside the proper scope of cross-examination and even fewer constitute
reversible error. Those rare cases often involve clear violations of the
statute. An example is State v. Black,2 4 where the defendant was accused
of manslaughter, allegedly effectuated by beating his daughter. His wife2 5
testified about defendant's treatment of their children on direct. It was
held reversible error to allow the prosecutor to ask the wife if the de-
fendant also beat her.26
ence to the incident to allow the cross-examiner to ask if defendant got any
money from the victim and, if so, how. Id. at 802.
16. 499 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 949 (1974).
17. Id. at 419.
18. § 546.260, RSMo 1969.
19. The statute also applies to questions by the court. State v. McClinton,
418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Banc 1967); State v. Grant, 394 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1965).
20. State v. Brown, 312 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1958).
21. 480 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. 1972).
22. State v. Kaufman, 254 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. 1953).
23. State v. Abbott, 245 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1952); State v. Davit, 343 Mo. 1151,
125 S.W.2d 47 (1938).
24. 360 Mo. 261, 227 S.W.2d 1006 (1950).
25. Section 546.260 applies to both defendant and his spouse.
26. 360 Mo. at 270, 227 S.W.2d at 1011.
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More common are situations such as the one in State v. Northington.27
On direct, defendant testified that he had six rounds in his revolver be-
fore the encounter and that he shot in self-defense. The court found it
within the proper scope of cross-examination to ask when he loaded his
revolver and where the gun was the afternoon before the shooting. The
decision may have been influenced by the fact that the defendant's answer
to the question, which showed that he was a county constable authorized
to carry the weapon, was favorable rather than harmful to him.
An attempt to summarize the cases and state a general rule delineating
the allowable scope of cross-examination would be fruitless. 28 Many de-
cisions have been expressly limited to their facts and courts have often
disclaimed an ability to add definitiveness to the statute.2 9
Once a question has been found to be outside the proper scope of
cross-examination, the court must determine whether its admission was
prejudicial. The supreme court has stated two apparently conflicting views
on this subject. In State v. McClinton3 o the court said that such cross-
examination is "generally held to ... constitute reversible error."3 1 The
authorities cited were State v. Santino,3 2 which said prejudice would be
presumed absent clear evidence to the contrary, and State v. Pierson,33
which dealt with errors prejudicial under any test.3 4 A year later, the
court again cited Pierson, this time for the proposition that cross-examina-
tion beyond the scope of direct was not grounds for reversal unless "ma-
terial or prejudicial to the accused's substantial rights."35 Thus asking the
defendant if he had been drinking prior to the crime was held not preju-
dicial, because the question was immaterial.30 The trend of the cases seems
to follow the latter rule by implication, but the status of the law is far
from dear.
The handling of the question of prejudice in Booth is of little help
in settling the law in this area. The court avoided a discussion of the
issue by pointing to the defendant's failure to show how he was preju-
diced.3 7 Clearly this was not an application of the rule that prejudice will
be presumed.38 Yet the court, in finding the questions beyond the proper
27. 268 S.W. 57 (Mo. 1924).
28. The courts have not adequately defined what the phrase "referred to"
in the statute means.
29. State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1967).
20. Id.
31. Id. at 59.
32. 186 S.W. 976 (Mo. 1916).
33. 331 Mo. 636, 56 S.W.2d 120 (1932).
34. Among other things, the prosecutor asked defendant if he was willing
to go into the entire transaction or if there were some matters he would rather
not discuss. Id. at 645, 56 S.W.2d at 123.
35. State v. Moser, 423 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1968). The Pierson court had re-
quired that the question be "on a material point or .. .prejudicial to the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant." 331 Mo. at 645, 56 S.W.2d at 123.
36. State v. Moser, 423 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. 1968).
37. See note 3 supra.
38. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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scope of cross-examination, cited McClinton,39 which purports to follow
that rule.40
The statute provides little protection to the defendant, even when the
trial court sustains his objection to cross-examination on matters not re-
ferred to on direct. When the defendant takes the stand, he waives his
constitutional protection against self-incrimination and has only the
statute to shield him.41 Although there is some suggestion that the outer
limits of cross-examination of a criminal defendant may be constitutionally
imposed,42 no case law requires the statutory rule.43 The United States
Supreme Court has even found a waiver of the right against self-incrimi-
nation by a defendant who voluntarily took the stand in a civil denaturali-
zation proceeding.44 In addition, although the statute may protect the
defendant from the prosecutor's questions, it does not limit what the prose-
cutor may say in dosing argument. Once the accused decides to testify, the
prosecutor, in dosing argument, may "make any legitimate comment upon
his testimony" 45 including the defendant's failure to explain the state's
evidence against him. 40 Thus, the jury is permitted to draw inferences
which-would be improper if the defendant chose not to testify at all.47
_clear ruling is needed to specify when allowing cross-examination to
exceed the proper scope will be reversible error. A presumption of preju-
dice is not warranted because the questions will not always be prejudicial,
as cases like State v. Northington48 show. The requirement that the ques-
tion be on a material point is equally hard to support. A question that
exceeds the scope of direct is no less prejudicial because it is also imma-
terial; in fact, it may be more prejudicial for that reason. A more de-
fensible position would be to require the appellant to demonstrate a clear
likelihood of prejudice from the question. Deciding whether a question
is prejudicial or merely harmless error should be no more difficult in
these cases than it is for other instances of inadmissible evidence.
There appears to be no strong reason for limiting cross-examination
of criminal defendants. In those jurisdictions that limit all cross-examina-
tion, the primary justification for the rule is that it requires the parties
39. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
40. The same court recently said that such questions were not reversible
error unless "prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused," citing Moser.
State v. Rice, 519 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
41. State v. Scown, 312 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. 1958).
42. C. McCoRMiCK, EvWNscE § 26 (2d ed. 1972).
43. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), held that defendant's "waiver
is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume
it at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing." Id.
at 497.
44. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
45. State v. Dxew, 213 S.W. 106, 107 (Mo. 1919).
46. State v. Ayres, 314 Mo. 574, 285 S.W. 997 (1926).
47. § 546.270, RSMo 1969.
48. 268 S.W. 57 (Mo. 1924). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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to present their facts in order.49 That reasoning has little application to
the Missouri statute because the prosecutor must present his case before
the defendant takes the stand. The statute does not place strict limits on
the prosecutor, who can ask questions relating to impeachment and can
comment in dosing argument on the defendant's limited testimony even
if defense counsel's questions have been carefully designed to restrict the
cross-examination. 50
The effect of the statute is to allow a defendant to make only a par-
tial waiver of his right against self-incrimination, thus affording him
greater protection than the Constitution requires. This additional pro-
tection may be important in at least two situations. First, a defendant
being tried for two or more unrelated crimes may wish to testify as to
one, but not the other. Second, where a defendant asserts an alibi at trial
after remaining silent during arrest and detention, he can avoid ques-
tions like "Why didn't you tell this story to the police?" and thus prevent
the jury from drawing improper inferences from his earlier exercise of
fifth amendment rights. However, these minimal benefits are outweighed
by the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the rule. The cases
are so numerous, diverse, and contradictory that there is authority to sup-
port either side of most arguments regarding the proper scope of cross-
examination. In addition, there is no clear rule delineating which improper
questions constitute reversible error. The majority of cases holding a
question or questions improper find that the questions did not con-
stitute reversible error, an indication that the defendant seldom gains any
protection from the statute. In short, the protections afforded a defend-
ant by the statute in its present form do not seem worth the problems
it causes. The two specific advantages mentioned above could be provided
by statute without otherwise restricting cross-examination.51
H. MARTIN JAYNE
49. C. McCol cx, EvmExcE § 26 (2d ed. 1972).
50. See text accompanying notes 18-23, 45-47 supra.
51. See PROP. FED. R. OF Evm., Rule 611, Advisory Comms. note, subdi-
vision (b) (1971), recommending unrestricted cross-examination.
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INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT -
SECTION 38 PROPERTY - BUILDINGS
Arne Thirupl
The investment tax credit, designed to stimulate modernization and
expansion of the nation's productive facilities,2 is a major business tax in-
centive. Currently, the credit is ten percent of the qualified investment in
new and used section 38 property. Limitations, carryover, and recapture
rules are found with the basic provisions in sections 38 and 46 through 50
of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code).3
Section 38 property is generally defined in section 48 (a) (1) of the
Code and may be summarized to include depreciable property with an
estimated useful life of three years or more which is:
1. Tangible personal property.
2. Other tangible property (excluding buildings and structural
components thereof) if-
A. used as an integral part of certain qualifying activities, or
B. a storage or research facility used in connection with the same
qualifying activities.
3. Elevators and escalators. 4
The balance of section 48 contains exceptions and qualifications to the
above general definition.5 Distinguishing between buildings, which do not
1. 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g. 59 T.C. 122 (1972).
2. CONF. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3732 (1962).
3. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46-50.
4. INT. R.y. CODE OF 1954, § 48(a)(1) provides:
in general.-Except as provided in this subsection, the term "section 38
property" means-
(A) tangible personal property or(B) other tangible property (not including a building and its structural
components) but only if such property-
(i) is used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or ex-
traction or of furnishing transportation, communications, elec-
trical energy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services, or
(ii) constitutes a research facility used in connection with any of
the activities referred to in clause (i), or
(iii) constitutes a facility used in connection with any of the activ-
ities referred to in clause (i) for the bulk storage of fungible
commodities (including commodities in a liquid or gaseous
state), or
(C) elevators and escalators, but only if-
(i) the construction, reconstruction, or erection of the elevator or
escalator is completed by the taxpayer after June 30, 1963, or
(ii) the elevator or escalator is acquired after June 30, 1963, and the
original use of such elevator or escalator commences with the
taxpayer and commences after such date.
Such term includes only property with respect to which depreciation (or
amortization in lieu of depreciation) is allowable and having a useful
life (determined as of the time such property is placed in service) of
3 years or more.
5. See, e.g., INT. Ray. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 48(a)(3) (exclusion of property used
to furnish permanent lodging), 48(a)(6) (certain livestock previously excluded now
eligible for investment credit).
[Vol. 41
120
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/6
RECENT CASES
qualify for the investment credit, and other structures, which may qualify,6
has proven to be one of the most troublesome problems encountered in
applying the investment credit.
In Arne Thirup7 the taxpayers claimed an investment credit for in-
vestments made in a greenhouse used in their business of growing and
selling cut flowers. The greenhouse was a completely enclosed structure,
200 feet wide by 400 feet long. It was constructed of a wooden frame with
fiberglass panels for a roof and walls. There was no floor; the flowers grew
directly from the enclosed soil. The greenhouse was designed to supply a
controlled environment and had built-in automatic temperature, humidity,
watering, liquid fertilizing, and carbon dioxide systems. The fiberglass wall
and roof panels were of a special type designed to diffuse the sunlight for
better growing conditions. Also, windows in the roof opened and closed
automatically to coordinate the external and internal temperature and
humidity. Within the greenhouse, the taxpayers' employees performed
such tasks as turning and fertilizing the soil, planting, pulling weeds,
spraying chemicals, pruning, and harvesting. On occasion, some of the
employees ate lunch and took work breaks inside the greenhouse, although
no formal facilities were provided for this. It was estimated that approxi-
mately one-half of the total work hours were spent inside the greenhouse.
The Commissioner, conceding that the greenhouse was "other tangible
property .. .used as an integral part of production" within section 48
(a) (1) (B) (i) of the Code, contended that the greenhouse was a building
and therefore ineligible for the investment credit.8 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and found
the greenhouse to be section 38 property eligible for the investment
credit.9
The "appearance test" (because it looks like a building, it must ipso
facto be a building) was rejected by the court of appeals in Thirup.1°
This test is derived from legislative history'! and finds additional support
in the Treasury Regulations, which provide: "The term 'building' gen-
erally means any structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls,
6. For a non-building structure to be eligible for the investment credit, it
must be used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or extraction,
or as an integral part of furnishing transportation, communication, electrical en-
ergy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services by a person engaged in the business
of furnishing the same. INT. REV. ConF- or 1954, § 48(a)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
A research or storage facility will qualify if it is used in connection with any of
the foregoing activities. INT. RIv. CODE or 1954, § 48(a) (1) (B) (ii), (iii) (emphasis
added). It is possible that a non-building structure could qualify as tangible per-
sonal property and not be subject to the question whether it is other tangible prop-
erty used in a prescribed activity. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
7. 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), revg 59 T.C. 122 (1972).
8. Id at 917.
9. Id. at 920.
10. Id. at 918.
11. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1962).
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and usually covered by a roof. . .. "12 It is clear, however, that courts have
generally concluded that certain structures, although resembling a build-
ing in appearance, are not to be considered such for purposes of defining
section 38 property.1 3 This is particularly true where the issue is whether
the structure is a building or a storage facility, as opposed to a building
versus a non-storage facility.14 Illustrative is Robert E. Catron,15 where
the Tax Court analyzed the apparent contradiction between the broad
definition of "building" in the Regulations and the eligibility of storage
facilities as provided in section 48. It noted that a storage facility would
not qualify if it were also a building and that it was difficult to imagine
a storage facility that would not fit within the Regulations' definition of
a building. The court refused to attribute to Congress such a "nugatory
provision" and rejected the appearance test. 16 Similarly, the Commissioner
has, when presented with the building versus storage facility issue, fre-
quently refused to apply the appearance test.' 7 The Thirup decision is
significant because it is one of the first decisions rejecting the appearance
test where the question is whether a structure is a building or a non-storage
facility.18
A different test more frequently applied by the courts is a "function"
or "use" test. Like the appearance test, the function test is derived from
legislative history' 9 and finds additional support in the Regulations.2 0
This test limits the broad scope of the appearance test and states that a
building is generally a structure with walls and a roof which also pro-
vides ". . . for example, . . . shelter or housing, or . . . working, office,
parking, display, or sales space."2' 1 The function test was first developed
in storage facility cases 22 and has only recently been applied in non-
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1972).
13. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263
(CL Cl. 1974); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258
(6th Cir. 1974); Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306
(1968). But see Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113 (1972). Sunnyside Nurseries was a
companion case to Thirup in the Tax Court and was also appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
14. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263
(Ct. CI. 1974) (warehouses for aging bourbon whiskey held storage facilities);
Brown &c Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir.
1974) (warehouses for aging tobacco held storage facilities).
15. 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 365, 1972-2 Cum. BuLL. 8; Rev. Rul. 359, 1971-2 CuM.
BuLL. 62; Rev. Rul. 122, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 10.
18. See also Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974). The Commissioner has
ignored the appearance test in at least one notable instance. See Rev. Rul 209,
1968-1 Cum. BuLL. 16 (appearance test ignored by the Commissioner with result-
ant classification of craneway structure as a building).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1962); S. Rn'. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1962).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1972).
21. Id.
22. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct.
Cl. 1974); Brown Sc Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258
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storage facility cases.23 Standards for applying the function test were
initially announced in Revenue Ruling 66-89 (5) and provide that a struc-
ture is not a "building" if: (1) the structure cannot be reasonably adapted
to other uses, and (2) the structure provides only storage space, but not
work space.24
The inquiry whether the structure is reasonably adaptable to alterna-
tive uses focuses on the economic and physical practicability of conversion.
The cost of converting the structure to an alternative use is a factor only
recently mentioned in the cases and, standing alone, may not be very per-
suasive. 25 A showing by the taxpayer that the structure was specially de-
signed to accomplish a particular qualifying activity alone may be enough
to satisfy this standard.28 Where, however, the structure has not been used
exclusively for that activity or is available for multiple uses, then, notwith-
standing a showing of special design, the structure may not qualify as
section 38 property.27 In Central Citrus Company28 "sweet rooms" were
used solely for storing fruit in a controlled atmosphere. Because of the
special design and equipment systems inolved, the Tax Court held that
these structures were not reasonably adaptable to alternative uses. In
Palmer Olson29 quonset-type structures were specially designed for grain
storage. One of the structures had been used by the taxpayer as a machine
shed and the others were used for grain storage only about ninety percent
of the year. The Tax Court concluded that these structures were available
and adaptable for alternative uses and consequently not eligible section 38
property.
The work aspect of the function test states that a structure may qualify
as a storage facility if the only human activity performed therein is
activity incidental to the storage function, and if the structure does not
provide general work space.3 0 In applying the work aspect portion of the
(6th Cir. 1974); Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365 (1972); Palmer Olson, 29 T.C.
Mem. 1367 (1970); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
23. See Arne Thirup, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g 59 T.C. 122 (1972);
Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974).
24. Rev. Rul. 89, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 7, modified in other respects, Rev.
Rul. 222, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 17.
25. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258(6th Cir. 1974); Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122(1972), rev'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974).
26. See, e.g., Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365 (1972); Adolph Coors Co., 27
T.C. Mem. 1351 (1968); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968). See also Melvin
Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974) (a non-storage facility case).
27. See Palmer Olson, 29 T.C. Mem. 1367 (1970); cf. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
28. 58 T.C. 365 (1972).
29. 29 T.C. Mem. 1367 (1970).
30. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. Cl.
1974); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968); see Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974); William K. Coors, 60 T.C.
368 (1973).
To qualify for the investment credit, a storage facility must be used for the
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function test, the Tax Court has been inclined to characterize as a "build-
ing" structures in which a "substantial number of [people are] frequently
and regularly occupied." 3 ' Thirup, however, joins the other appellate
court decisions on this issue and makes it clear that it is the nature of
the work activity, rather than the amount of work, that is determinative.3 2
The policy in tolerating work activity incidental to the storage function-
e.g., moving a product in and out of the storage facility, is consistent with
section 48, for to do otherwise would disqualify most storage facilities.33
Thirup extended the function test to non-storage facilities8 4 and may
have confused the otherwise consistent development of a building's defini-
tion. The function test, based on sound policy, was developed to dis-
tinguish between a building and a storage facility. Application of this test
in non-storage facility cases seems unwarranted in light of clear legislative
history contemplating a broad definition of "building." This is not to say
that the ultimate decision in Thirup was erroneous, only that the rationale
was faulty.
The Regulations provide two express exceptions to the definition of
a building, 5 either of which was potentially applicable in Thirup. The
term "building" does not include a structure which is essentially an item
of machinery or equipment.3 6 Brick kilns3 7 and refrigerator-freezer struc-
tures8s would be included under this exception.
bulk storage of fungible commodities. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 48(a)(l)(B)(iii).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(5)(ii) (1972).
31. Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113, 122 (1972). See also Melvin Satrum,
62 T.C. 413 (1974); Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972), rev'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir.
1974).
32. 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), revg 59 T.C. 122 (1972). The Thirup court
stated:
We find the distinction based on the amount of human activity un-
persuasive. The proper inquiry, which goes to the nature of the employee
activity inside the structure, is "whether the structures provide working
space for the employees that is more than merely incidental to the prin-
cipal function or use of the structure."
Id. at 919. (emphasis in original-citations omitted). See also Brown-Forman Dis-
tillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
88. See Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968) (citing Rev. Rul. 68-138 where
the Commissioner held moving potatoes in and out of storage did not disqualify
the storage facility).
34. See also Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 418 (1974) (applying the function test
to an egg producing facility).
85. "Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(i), (ii) (1972).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1 (e)(1)(i) (1972).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1972). See also Rev. Rul. 557, 1969-2 Cum.
BULL. 8 (wood drying kilns).
88. Rev. Rul. 489, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 64. If an item of property is within
this exception, it might properly be characterized as tangible personal property,
and as such it would qualify as section 38 property without regard to a qualifying
activity. Compare INT. REV. ConE oF 1954, § 48(a)(1)(A) with INT. Rtv. CODE or
1954, § 48(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii), (iii). See also note 6 supra. However, the Regulations
provide that tangible personal property does not include "inherently permanent"
structures. See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1972). The appropriate definitional subpart
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The second exception is for "special purpose structures." The Regula-
tions state that if the structure houses equipment used as an integral part
of a qualifying activity and if the use of the structure is so closely related
to the use of that equipment that the structure can be expected to be
replaced contemporaneously with the equipment, then the structure is
excepted from the definition of a building and is eligible for the invest-
ment credit.89 Factors enumerated in the Regulations indicating that a
structure is within this exception are: (1) that ' the structure is specially
designed to provide for the stress and other demands of the equipment
housed therein, and (2) that the structure could not be economically used
for other purposes. 40
There is little "case law elaborating either exception.4 1 One interest-
ing example of a "special purpose structure" is a 1966 Revenue Ruling
where the Commissioner ruled that a unitary hog raising facility did not
qualify for the investment credit.42 An elliptical steel structure housed
automated systems for the farrowing, feeding, and raising of hogs. The
equipment housed within the structure included automatic feeders, water-
ers, and heat system, special airflow units, slatted flooring for sewage dis-
posal, space heaters for farrowing, and movable pens and partitions. The
Commissioner ruled that special design alone was not controlling to ex-
cept the structure from classification as a building.
However, in 1971, while considering statutory language to limit stor-
age facilities to those storing fungible goods in bulk, the Senate Finance
Committee Report clarified the fact that the term building is not in-
tended to include "special purpose structures." The Report used as an
example of such a structure a unitary system for raising hogs and specifi-
cally concluded that such a structure would be eligible for the investment
credit.43 Considering the external shell of the structure as merely a way
of tying together the equipment systems, the Senate report stated: "There
is no other practical use for the structure and it can ... be expected to be
used only so long as the equipment it houses is used."
44
of section 48 for an item of property which is "inherently permanent," yet within
the equipment or machinery exception to a building, is unclear. But cf. Rev. Rul.
489, 1971-2 Cum. BuLL. 64; Rev. Rul. 557, 1969-2 Cum. BuL. 3.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(ii) (1972). The Regulations previously provided
that the structure must be replaced contemporaneously with the equipment. Treas.
Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(ii) (1964).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(ii) (1972).
41. See Walton Mills, Inc., 31 T.C. Mem. 75 (1972); Adolph Coors Co. 27
T.C. Mem. 1351 (1968). The Commissioner has generally applied a narrow inter-
pretation of these exceptions. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 281, 1973-2 Cum. BuLL. 8; Rev.
Rul. 398, 1972-2 Cum. BULL. 9. For examples of structures falling within the first
exception, see Rev. Rul. 489, 1971-2 Cmtr. Burt. 64; Rev. Rul. 557, 1969-2 Cums.
BuL. 3. For examples of structures within the second exception, see Rev. Rul. 223,
1971-1 Cum. BuLL. 117; Rev. Rul. 104, 1971-1 Cum. BuL.. 5; Rev. Rul. 412, 1969-2
GuM. BuLL. 2.
42. Rev. Rul. 329, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 16.
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Similarly, the greenhouse in Thirup could have been analogized to
the hog raising facility in the Senate report. The greenhouse contained
environmental control systems used as an integral part of a qualifying
activity and was so closely related to the use of that equipment that it
might be expected to be used only so long as that equipment was used.
No doubt -the greenhouse was specially designed to accommodate the
equipment systems and further factual inquiry would probably have led
to the conclusion that it had no .economically practical alternative use.
In summary, it is, essential to keep in mind that there are several
-separate and distinct approaches available to avoid the "building'! label:
(1) the two exceptions to the Regulation's definition of a building-
classification as machinery or equipment, and "special purpose struc-
tures;" and ,(2): the ,statutory exclusion for storage facilities.4  In certain
:respects, the standards for applying these different approaches are .similar.
:For example, the factual considerations under the Regulation's exception
for "special purpose structures" closely approximate those of the. alterna-
tive use aspect of the function test used in storage facility cases.40 Con-
fusion may easily, result from this similarity unless careful examination is
made of the context in which such phrases as "special design" and ."al-
ternative use" are employed. Additionally, in attempting to avoid the
"building" label, a critical distinction must be observed. The work aspect
of the function test is a releyant .consideration only in storage facility
cases and should .not be a factor in a non-storage facility case, as it was
in Thirup. The,,legislative intent will-be more accurately carried out if
this distinction is noted and respected.47
GAmRETr W. WALTON
45. A literal reading of section 48(a)(1)(B) indicates that only those storage
facilities which are not also buildings are eligible section 38 property. Howeyer, as
noted, the courts have contracted the otherwise broad definition of "building"
-where it conflicts with the statutory provision making, certain storage facilities
eligible for the investment credit. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
46. Compare text accompanying notes 39-40 supra with text accompanying
notes 25-29 supra.
47. A word of caution is appropriate. The scope of this note is confined to
particular aspects of the definition of the term "building" as that term is used
in defining section 38 property. The complex definitional scheme of section 38
property is thoroughly integrated, with individual definitional subparts interde-
pendent upon others. As a consequence, expansion of an individual definitional
subpart will result in contraction of others. Before relying on a particular aspect
of this scheme, careful examination of the whole is necessary.
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JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS-
"EFFECT OF CONTRACT NOT TO REVOKE
Owens v. Savage1
Samuel F. and Ida Alice Jones, husband and wife, executed their joint
and mutual last will and testament on March 23, 1959 and a codicil thereto
in 1964. .These instruments contained an agreement not to revoke the
testamentary dispositions. Ida Alice Jones died on June. 6, 1968. On Janu-
ary 11, 1969 Samuel executed an instrument declaring it to be his last
will and testament and therein expressly revoked all former wills. In this
instrument Samuel made several small specific bequests,, and devised and
bequeathed all of his remaining property according to a, dispositive scheme
different from that contained in the joint and mutual will. 'Samuel died
on May 15, 1971 and probate proceedings,, were initiated. Subsequent to,
these proceedings, the legatees and devisees. of the joint and mutual will
filed suit in ,the circuit court for declaratory judgment and equitable re-
lief, naming as defendants Samuel's personal representative, legatees,
and devisees. Plaintiffs based their claim upon the existence of a binding
contractual. obligation between Samuel and Ida.
The trial court found that there was an agreement between Samuel
and Ida tomake a joint and mutual will and that the agreed testamentary
distribution constituted an irrevocable contract. Based upon these findings,
the trial court dedared that the 1959 joint and mutual will could not be
revoked by the surviving testator and ordered it admitted to probate.
On appeal, the Kansas City District of the Missouri Court .of Appeals af-
firmed as'to the existence of a binding and enforceable contract inuring
to the benefit of the plaintiffs and granted relief in the nature of specific
performance, but ordered stricken that portion of the decree admitting the
1959 will, to probate.2
The contract involved in Owens is one of several types which may be-
come involved with testamentary dispositions. Contracts to make a will,
contracts not to make a will, contracts to revoke a will, and contracts not
to revoke a will, each with variations, appear frequently in reported cases.
Many questions relating to contractual obligations and their effect on
testamentary disposition have been definitively answered, but the effect
of a contract not to revoke testamentary dispositions contained in a joint
and mutual will3 has remained confused. In part this confusion may Ee'
attributable to the hesitancy with which courts recognized the validity of
1. 518 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974).
2. Id. at 199-201.
3. As used herein the term "joint will" means one where the same instru-
ment is made the will of two or more persons and is jointly signed by them. The
term "mutual wills" means the separate wills of two persons -which are reciprocal
in their provisions. See Curry v. Cotton, 356 111. 538, 543, 191 N.E. 307, 309 (1934);
American Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, -264, 162 N.
843, 845 (1928). See generally Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Willy, Mutual Promises
to Devise as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CoRNrm L.Q. 358 (1930); Partridge,
The Revocability of Mutual or Reciprocal Wills, 77 U. PA. L. Rnv. 357 (1929).
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a testamentary instrument purporting to be the will of two or more per-
sons.4 The. more persuasive reason for the confusion is that a testamentary
instrument executed pursuant to, or embodying, a contract not to revoke
gives rise to a conflict of legal concepts. The conceptual nature of wills
is that they are ambulatory until the death of the testator.5 An equally
strong hallmark of contract law is that enforceable rights'are created at
the making of a contract.6 It is in dealing with the "hybrid" relationship,
resulting from combining the elements of contracts and wills, that confusion
was created and remains.
Contractual'and testamentary principles are brought sharply into
c6nflict when a joint and mutual will embodying a contract not to revoke
is unilaterally revoked by the surviving testator.7 In dealing with this con-
flict some courts have given preference to the contractual principles by
holding a contract not to revoke is not only enforceable, but operates to
deprive the will of its ambulatory nature.8 The will is thus deemed ir-
revocable after the death of one of the testators and an attempted revoca-
tion by the sftrviving testator is without effect. Cases so holding often
Missouri courts, while not totally consistent in the use of terms, seem to have
settled upon the-use of .the term "joint and mutual" to denote a single document
containing testamentary dispositions of two testators, with the dispositions being
reciprocal in nature. This terminology may not be semanticall pure, but in light
of its use in Owens'and other cases it will be used in this note.
4. See, e.g.,. Darlington v. Pulteney, 1 Cowp. 260, 98 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.
1775) (Lord Mansfield stated "there cannot be a joint will"); Hobson v. Black-
burn, 1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (Ecci. 1822) (mutual or "conjoint" will is
an instrument "unknown to the testamentary law of this country"). For American
cases refusing to probate joint wills, see Shackleford v. Edwards, 278 S.W.2d 775
(Mo. 1955); Clayton v. Liverman, 2 N.C. 558 (1837); Walker v. Walker, 14 Ohio
St. 157 (1862). See also B. SPAmus, COr TRAcrs To MAar WiLLs 3 (1956) [herein-
after cited as SPARKS].
5. See, e.g., Owens v. Savage, 518 S.W.2d 192, 200 (Mo. App., D.K.C.
1974); Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo. 483, 488, 291 S.W. 132, 134 (1927); Edson v.
Parsons, 155 N.Y. 555, 568, 50 N.E. 265, 268 (1898).
6. See 1 S.'WILLISToN, CorrraAcrs 1 -(rev. ed. 1938).
7. The contract involved may arise in several ways. A minority of jurisdic-
tions adhere to the view that the mere execution of a joint will with reciprocal
provisions gives rise to a contract not to revoke. See, e.g., Frazier v. Patterson,
243 IIl. 80, 90 "N.E. 216 (1909), cf. Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N.Y. 315, 87
N.E.2d 275 (1949), Missouri joins the majority holding that mere execution of
such a will does not per se create such a contract. See, e.g., Plemmons v. Pember.
ton, 346 Mo. 45, "139 'S.W.2d 910 (1940), citing the "general rule" of Clements
v. Jones, 166 Gb- 738, 742, 144 S.E. 319, 322 (1928); Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482,
165 S.W. 1027 (1914). In jurisdictions following the majority view a contract not
to revoke may be oral, contained within the testamentary instrument, or set forth
in a separate document. See Comment, Contracts to Make Joint or Muttial Wills,
55 MARQ. L. REv. 103, 108-33 (1972).
. As to revocation of a contract not to revoke prior to the death of either of
the contracting parties, the weight of authority reaches the conclusion that the
contract is irrevocable except by mutual consent of both parties to the contract.
See SpAmns, supra note 4, at 111. See generally, Note, Contracts Not to Revokejoint or Mutual Wills, 15 WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 144 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Frazier v. Patterson 243 Ill. 80, 84-86, 90 N.E. 216, 218 (1909);
Stewart v. Shelton, •356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395 (1947). See also SPAnxS, supra
note 4, at 111-15.
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appear to treat the rights under the will and the preexisting contract
rights as being identical. This deprivation of the ambulatory qualities of
a will'has been widely criticized as violating basic testamentary law.9
The better reasoned view would seem to be that, notwithstanding a
contract not to revoke, the survivor may subsequently revoke the will
thereby rendering it ineligible for probate as his last will and testament.' 0
By adhering to this approach, a court is not put in the undesirable position
of probating an instrument it knows the testator did not intend as his
last will and testament. This approach also avoids what the Owens court
referred to as "[a] miscegenation of the law of contracts and law of
wills .. . when courts state wills are irrevocable.""l
The Missouri courts' position with respect to the effect of a contract
not to revoke testamentary dispositions contained in a joint and mutual
will has not been clear or consistent. Through loose and sometimes con-
tradictory language, two lines of cases emerge. Some cases, failing to de-
lineate between contractual and testamentary principles, have held a
later revoking will "void' 21 or the joint and mutual will "irrevocable."' 1
The second line of cases, which Owens joins, holds that, notwithstanding
a contract not to revoke, the joint and mutual will retains its ambulatory
nature and is denied probate as the last will and testament.' 4
Cases upholding the revocable nature of joint and mutual wills, even
in the presence of a contract not to revoke, do not necessarily deny relief
to the devisees and legatees of the revoked will. These cases grant relief
relying upon the third party beneficiary doctrine of contract law rather
than the probate of a revoked will, and indicate that the aggrieved con-
tract beneficiary may have a remedy at law or in equity.'6
While cases and commentators indicate the availability of either legal
or equitable relief, the vast majority of the cases involve equitable relief.
The preponderance of equitable proceedings is partially explainable be-
cause of the operation of the Statute of Frauds' 6 and the equitable doc-
9. See generally T. ATKINSON, ATKINSON ON WILLs 224 (2d ed. 1953); SPAMES,
supra note 4, at 111; Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise
as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 358, 367 (1930).
10. See, e.g., Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 P. 1065 (1924); Irwin v.
First Nat'1 Bank, 212 Or. 534, 321 P.2d 299 (1958); Owens v. Savage, 518 S.W.2d
192 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Church of Christ Home for Aged, Inc. v. Nashville
Trust Co., 184 Tenn. 629, 202 S.W.2d 178 (1947); Shawver v. Parks, 239 S.W.2d
188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96
(1822).
11. 518 S.W.2d at 200.
12. Ragsdale v. Achuff, 324 Mo. 1159, 1175, 27 S.W.2d 6, 13 (1930).
13. See, e.g., Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. 1967); Stewart v.
Shelton, 356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395, 399 (1947).
14. Owens v. Savage, 518 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Plemmons
v. Pemberton, 346 Mo. 45, 139 S.W.2d 910 (1940); Starks v. Lincoln, 316 Mo.
483, 291 S.W. 132 (1927); Green v. Whaley, 271 Mo. 636, 197 S.W. 355 (1917).
15. See, e.g., Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N.E. 307 (1934); In re Farley's
Estate, 237 Iowa 1069, 24 N.W.2d 453 (1946); Clark v. Cordry, 69 Mo. App. 6
(K.C. Ct. App., 1897).
16. § 432.010, RSMo 1969.
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trine of part performance. A large number of the reported decisions in-
volve either oral agreements or vague agreements contained within the
testamentary instrument.17 As a result, in an action at law the plaintiff
faces the risk of the Statute of Frauds acting to make the agreement un-
enforceable.' s This risk is largely negated at equity through the doctrine
of part performance.' 9 Additionally, due to the nature of the property in-
volved, the plaintiff often finds it difficult to ascertain damages and pre-
fers to receive title to the property as opposed to the monetary equivalent.20
One advantage an action at law may have over the equitable remedy is
a lesser degree of proof required with respect to the existence of a con-
tract.21
17. See, e.g., Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); Plemmons v. Pember-
ton, 886 Mo. 45, 189 S.W.2d 910 (1940). Section 2-107 of the Uniform Probate
Code lessens some problems in this area by providing three exclusive methods of
establishing a contract not to revoke a will, all of which require a signed writing.
The Uniform Probate Code section, now in force in a number of states, has been
recommended for enactment by the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar and
has been introduced in the 1976 Missouri General Assembly.
18. The Missouri Statute of Frauds, which is based on section 4 of the
English Statute of Frauds of 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 8, requires a signed writing to
support an action "upon any contract made for the sale of lands, tenements,
hereditaments, or an interest in or concerning them.... " § 482.010, RSMo 1969.
It has been held applicable to contracts relating to a devise of land or of land
and chattels. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hamilton, 846 Mo. 866, 141 S.W.2d 817 (1940);
Buxton v. Huff, 254 S.W. 79 (Mo. 1928); Ver Standig v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 228 Mo. App. 1242, 62 S.W.2d 1094 (St. L. Ct. App. 1983). The Statute of
Frauds has been held inapplicable to a contract relating to a bequest of chattels
only. See generally Schnebly, Contracts to Make Testamentary Dispositions as Af-
fected by the Statute of Frauds, 24 MIcH. L. REv. 749 (1926). Some states have ex-
press provisions relating to contracts to devise or bequeath or to refrain from doing
so. MAss. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 259 § 5A (1965); N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 5-701
(McKinney Supp. 1975); Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. § 2107.04 (1968).
19. See generally J. CALrA.aR, CONTRArs § 296 (1970). For a discussion
of the history and basis of the doctrine of part performance, see Moreland, Statute
of Frauds and Part Performance, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 51 (1929). As to what sort of
part performance takes an oral contract to devise or not to revoke a will out of
the Statute of Frauds, see Mills v. Bergbauer, 452 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. 1970) (son's
moving back to farm upon father's oral promise to devise held sufficient); Shaw
v. Hamilton, 846 Mo. 866, 141 S.W.2d 817 (1940) (husband's execution of will to
heirs of wife insufficient where there was an alleged oral contract between husband
and wife to make wills in favor of heirs of other); Ver Standig v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 844 Mo. 880, 129 S.W.2d 905 (1939) (alleged oral contract to
devise for services rendered, evidence of services rendered held sufficient per-
formance for enforcement of contract); Clark v. Cordry, 69 Mo. App. 6 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1897) (oral agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to board and lodge de-
fendants deceased in return for promise to bequeath $2000, held sufficient per-
formance to render the Statute of Frauds inapplicable).
20. See Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual Promises to Devise as a
Means of Conveyancing, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 858, 868 (1980).
21. Day v. Blackbird, 881 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1960), was a suit in equity seek-
ing specific performance of an alleged contract to make a will. The Missouri Su-
preme Court held that proof of the existence of such a contract must be beyond a
reasonable doubt. Within two weeks of the above decision the St. Louis Court of
Appeals decided Reighley v. Fabricius' Estate, 832 S.W.2d 76 (St. L. Mo. App.
1960), an action at law for breach of contract to bequeath a definite sum. The
court required the proof of the contract to be only by a preponderance of the
[Vol. 41
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Statutes regulating the time within which claims must be filed against
decedents' estates may also frustrate the plaintiff's action at law for dam-
ages. It would appear that the type of remedy pursued by the plaintiff
can be determinative of the applicability of a nonclaim statute.2 2 If the
beneficiary of a contract not to revoke is seeking damages at law, then
the nonclaim statute applies.23 However, if the remedy sought is specific
performance, then the plaintiff is not making a claim against the estate
so as to be within the scope of the nonclaim statute; he is claiming title
to the property, and in fact, the property he is claiming is itself subject to
claims against the estate.24
If the decedent's dispositive scheme, either that contained in a later
revoking will or provided by the intestate succession laws, is inconsistent
with the terms of the contract, specific performance of the contract may be
granted. g It is the contract that creates the right upon which the con-
tract beneficiary's action is based; the revoked joint and mutual will is
relevant only in establishing the terms of the contract.26 In an action for
specific performance the contract beneficiary should name as defendants
the surviving testator's personal representative, legatees and devisees, or
distributees and heirs-at-law. 27 A decree of specific performance does not
affect the administration of the estate as to the payment of claims and ex-
penses; 28 it merely acts at the time of distribution to transfer title to
the contract beneficiary.2 9
evidence. See Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 417,
425 (1960).
22. SPARms, supra note 4, at 184. The Missouri nonclaim statute provides
that a claim is lost if the claim or notice of action is not filed in the probate court
within six months after first publication. § 473.360, RSMo 1969.
23. Abrams v. Schlar, 27 Ill. App. 2d 237, 169 N.E.2d 583 (1960) (plain-
tiff beneficiaries of promise to leave them share of decedent's estate had remedy
at law in the nature of a claim against the estate and should have filed claim in
the probate court within the time set out in the nonclaim statute); contra,
O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950) (claim of a beneficiary
under a revoked will is not a claim against the estate).
24. The decree in Owens supports this view. 518 S.W.2d at 201. In Mills
v. Bergbauer, 452 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1970), the Missouri Supreme Court held that
the title decreed to be in the beneficiary of a contract to devise shall be subject
to claims properly allowed by the probate court and costs incurred in the adminis-
tration of the estate.
25. See, e.g., Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1967); Bennington v.
McClintick, 253 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1952); Plemmons v. Pemberton, 346 Mo. 45,
139 S.W.2d 910 (En Banc 1940). See generally SPARs, supra note 4, at 22-38.
26. The most vigorously litigated aspect of such contracts has been the proof
requirements to establish the existence, rather than the validity, of the contract.
The proof requirements and cases are considered in Wimp v. Collett, 414 S.W.2d
65, 76 (Mo. 1967). See also note 21 supra; Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills:
Mutual Promises to Devise as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CoRNEM L.Q. 358, 367
(1930).
27. See Silvester's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1619).
28. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. See also SPAmus, supra note 4,
at 152.
29. See Adams v. Moberg, 356 Mo. 1175, 205 S.W.2d 553 (1947) (detailing
the proper form of decree to transfer legal title to the beneficiaries).
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Relief predicated upon specific performance has not been the ex-
clusive equitable remedy relied upon by Missouri plaintiffs. There is au-
thority to support granting injunctive relief to prevent a surviving testator
from disposing of his property in violation of the contractual rights of the
contract beneficiaries. 30 Pleas invoking the declaratory judgment act have
also been recognized. In Stewart v. Shelton3 l the beneficiaries of a joint
and mutual will executed by husband and wife sought to set aside deeds
executed by the wife after the husband's death. The court held that a
"justiciable controversy" within the declaratory judgment statute was
presented. It would seem that under proper circumstances equity can also
entertain an action for an accounting32 and can award damages.33
The court in Owens held that the joint and mutual will and the codi-
cil thereto constituted a binding and enforceable contract inuring to the
benefit of the plaintiffs. Relief was afforded through a decree in the nature
of specific performance. The defendants were ordered to "convey, transfer,
and deliver" the plaintiffs' shares under the contract as set forth in the
joint and mutual will "subject only to the payment of debts, claims, taxes,
and costs of administration according to law."3 4 In the final analysis the
plaintiffs received what they would have received but for Samuel's revoca-
tion of the joint and mutual will and codicil.
Much of the confusion with respect to joint and mutual wills exe-
cuted pursuant to or embodying a contract not to revoke stems from a
failure to distinguish the testamentary aspects of the instrument from the
contractual aspects. Upholding the ambulatory nature of wills while de-
creeing the contract specifically enforceable retains intact fundamental
concepts in both fields of law while affording relief to the injured parties.
Although the wise practitioner may continue to avoid drafting joint
and mutual wills,3 5 the Owens holding has removed some of the confusion
and added a much-needed degree of certainty as to the effect of a con-
tract not to revoke testamentary dispositions.
JOHN M. MowRER
30. See Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S.W. 347 (1906), overruled on other
grounds, Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 492-93, 165 S.W. 1027, 1080-31 (1914).
See generally Comment, The Interim Nature of Property Passing Under Joint and
Mutual Wills, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 102, 102-12 (1968).
31. 356 Mo. 258, 201 S.W.2d 395 (1947).
32. -Cf. Von Wilmowsky v. Prindle, 225 App. Div. 597, 234 N.Y.S. 18 (1929).
33. In situations where specific performance would be impossible equity may
award monetary damages. This follows from the fact that once equity has takenjurisdiction, full relief will be granted. Elliott v. Richter, 496 S.W.2d 860 (Mo,
1973).
34. 518 S.W.2d at 201.
35. See generally PErrSON &: EcKHADT, Legal Forms, 7 Mo. PRACric SEuEs,
476 (1960); Fingar, Joint, Mutual and Reciprocal Wills, 94 TRusTs AND EsrAras
782, 786 (1955); Sparks, Contracts To Devise or Bequeath As An Estate Planning
Device, 20 Mo. L. Rxv. 1, 5 (1958).
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TAX AND INSURANCE ESCROW ACCOUNTS IN
MORTGAGES-THE ATTACK PRESSES ON
Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n'
Several lending institutions in and around Pittsburg, Pennsylvania,
financed the residential borrowing of various homeowners who had ex-
ecuted mortgages and accompanying personal bonds as security for the
loans. Along with the normal principal and interest payments, the mort-
gagees required one-twelfth of the amount of the annual property taxes
and casualty insurance premiums to be deposited monthly with the mort-
gagees in escrow accounts.2 The lending institutions paid these assessments
from the accumulated funds as they became due. The institutions com-
mingled the mortgage escrow funds with general funds and invested them
for their own profit, but did not pay the depositors for the use of the
funds.3 Twenty-nine individuals brought a class action against these
institutions to recover the profits derived from the investment of such
funds by the institutions.4 The trial court sustained the defendants' joint
demurrer and dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of
action. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
mortgagors' allegations of misuse of the escrow funds by the mortgagees
stated a cause of action for breach of an express trust, imposition of a
constructive trust, and breach of an implied contract,5 and remanded for a
trial on the merits.
The most common 6 method of challenging the legality of non-interest
1. 457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974). See generally Comment, Lender Ac-
countability and the Problem of Noninterest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts,
54 B.U.L. REv. 516 (1974).
2. The origin of these payments dates back to the 1930's when the financial
situation of thousands of people made this type of account the easiest and most
convenient method of paying the taxes and insurance on their mortgaged property.
At the same time these payments protected the lending institutions against tax
liens which would take priority over the mortgages. See, e.g., CONSUMER REP.,
March 1973, at 202; Hearings on H.R. 13337 Before a Subcomm. on Housing of
the House Committde of Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 322-23(1972); 4 Amsc.AN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.1061 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). See also
Comment, Payment of Interest on Mortgage Escrow Accounts: Judicial and Legis-
lative Developments, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 845 (1972).
3. The most recent estimate of annual lost interest income to consumers
amounts to over $235,000,000. Total escrow account collections themselves amount
to $9.4 billion annually. United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Study
of the Feasibility of Escrow Accounts on Residential Mortgages Becoming Interest
Bearing 7 (1973).
4. Consumer protection groups have become very involved in this area of
home financing. Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1972, at 12, col. 3.
5. '457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974).
6. Many other theories have been advanced, without success. See, e.g.,
Graybeal v. American Say. &c Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1973) (breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, usury, truth in lending, antitrust, fraud, breach of
trust); Vmdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D.
Okla. 1973) (breach of trust, unjust enrichment, truth in lending, antitrust);
Stavrides v. Mellon Natn1 Bank &c Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd
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bearing escrow accounts is the breach of trust theory.7 The, first appellate
consideration of this theory was in Sears v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n.8 The plaintiffs contended that their monthly prepayments were
deposits to be used for a specific purpose and were therefore sufficient
to establish a trust relationship. The court disagreed, perhaps confusing
the requirements of a deposit for a specific purpose with those of a special
deposit.9 The court held that the monthly payments gave rise only to a
debtor-creditor relationship, not a trust. It is to be noted that the Sears
decision was based on the court's interpretation of the specific mortgage in-
strument in issue. A major portion of the court's opinion centered on
the instrument's express language relating to the monthly prepayments.
The form used contained three possible wordings, of which one was to
be selected at the option of the lending institution. The language actually
chosen was in contrast to specific trust language contained in another of
the available options.10 Further construction of the agreement's language
led the court to regard the deposits as being pledged against the main
indebtedness; that is, the escrow funds were construed merely to represent
payments on a debt owed to the institution. The exact language of the
contract, as alleged in the complaint, proved to be a bar to the plaintiffs'
recovery.
Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank" went a step further
than Sears by "recognizing the special purpose nature of these prepayments
[tax-escrow funds] and the resulting trust relationship."' 2 Carpenter was
the first appellate decision to hold that the mortgagor's trust theory
stated a cause of action.' 3 Unlike Sears, the Carpenter decision was not
per curiam, 487 F.2d 953 (Sd Cir. 1973) (antitrust, truth in lending, usury, unjust
enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty).
7. The payments are considered as creating a trust relationship between
mortgagor and mortgagee under this theory. Ulbrict, Impound Accounts and After,
28 Bus. LAw. 203 (1972).
8. 1 Ill. App. 5d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300 (1971).
9. .Specific property deposited with a bank and earmarked for exact return
is a special deposit. The relationship created is one of bailor-bailee. A deposit for
a special purpose requires only that the designated purpose of the deposit be
strictly adhered to by the bank and a trust is thereby created. Annot., 31 A.L.R.
472 (1924); cf. 5 A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 530 (3d ed. 1967). The Sears
court believed that the payments must be segregated and earmarked before a
trust could arise. However, these are not requirements for a special purpose deposit.
See Comment, The Attack Upon the Tax and Insurance Escrow Accounts in
Mortgages, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 353-58 (1974).
10. The options in regard to the escrow payments were that they: (1) be held
in trust by it without earnings for the payment of such items; (2) be carried in a
borrower's tax and insurance account and withdrawn by the lender to pay such
item; or (3) be credited to the unpaid balance of said indebtedness as received.
11. Mass. .-, 291 N.E.2d 609 (1973).
12. Comment, supra note 9, at 359.
13. Only a New York Small Claims Court has gone farther. It allowed a
mortgagor to recover profits derived from the investment of the escrow funds on
a breach of fiduciary duty theory. Tierney v. Whitesone Sav. 8: Loan Assn, 353
N.Y.S.2d 104, 75 Misc. 2d 284 (Small Claims Ct. 1974).
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based on an interpretation of the specific language of the mortgage and
loan agreements in question. The language of these instruments was
not specifically set forth in the pleadings and therefore was not before
the court.' 4 The allegations pertinent to the decision set forth only that
the mortgagors made monthly payments into escrow in order to pay their
property taxes, that the bank commingled the funds with its own resources,
invested the funds for a profit, and refused to render these earnings to the
mortgagors. 15
To support its holding, the Carpenter court relied on two lines of trust
theory: the so-called "ABC" case and two special deposit cases. The former
analysis is based on the decision of In Re Interborough Consolidated Corp.G
In that case the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said
that when A gave money to B to be delivered to C, a trust arose in favor
of C.17 Under the facts of Carpenter, A is the mortgagor and B the lending
institution which pays the taxes to the city, C. If the bank refused to remit
the mortgagor's tax payments to the city, the "ABC" theory would allow
the city to sue the bank for a breach of trust.1 8 However, the primary
function of this theory is to protect creditors from middlemen, not to
allow mortgagors to recover the profits derived from a mortgagee's wrong-
ful use of escrow funds.19
The second theory involves the creation of a trust relationship through
the existence of special deposits. This relationship arises when money is
deposited with a bank to be held by it separate from its own assets. 20
But the bankruptcy cases relied on in Carpenter in support of this theory
are of doubtful precedential value. The imposition of a trust to preserve
a special depositor's rights against unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy
case does not, a priori, support the finding of a trust where mortgagors
are seeking an accounting of profits from mortgagees.2 '
Surprisingly, the Carpenter court did not indicate the specific form of
trust that may have been created. This is in contrast to the distinction
between express and implied trusts made by the Sears court. There it
was held that no express trust could arise, because of the nature of the
express language of the agreements. The Sears court proclaimed:
Although the term "implied trust" has been used to designate
an express trust arising from the construction of language in a
document, it seems to us that it is preferable to define the trust
which would arise in such situations as an express trust.22
14. - Mass. at -, 291 N.E.2d at 611.
15. Id. at -, 291 N.E.2d at 613-14.
16. 288 F. 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 752 (1923).
17. Id. at 347, citing McKee v. Lamon, 159 U.S. 317, 322 (1895).
18. Comment, supra note 1, at 522-23.
19. Id. at 521-22.
20. 5 A. Scorr, THE LAiw oF TRUSTS § 530 (3d ed. 1967).
21. Comment, supra note 1, at 522.
22. 1 IIl. App. 3d at 627, 275 N.E.2d at 303.
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Because the complaint before the Carpenter court did not assert the
express language of the agreement, the trust in issue should have been
considered an implied trust.
It has been suggested that a resulting trust most properly conforms
to the facts of Carpenter.2 3 This is a logical position, even though none
of the three traditional classes of resulting trusts is precisely applicable. 24
In contrast to an express trust, which is created by the settlor's external
expression of intention, a resulting trust exists if the circumstances
show an absence of intention on the part of a transferor to give the
beneficial interest in property to one who has received legal title.25
In the tax escrow account area, it can be argued that the mortgagor did
not intend to allow the lending institutions the beneficial use of his money.
Therefore, any profits derived from the use thereof should result back to
the mortgagor. The intent of the escrow payments is to protect the mort-
gagee's security interest, not to increase his income.
The Carpenter court noted that the intention of the parties deter-
mines the existence of a trust. 26 However, Carpenter did not consider the
merits of a constructive trust theory. Unlike an express trust or resulting
trust, a constructive trust is remedial in nature. 17 A creature of equity,
a constructive trust does not arise by virtue of agreement or intention.28
23. A resulting trust theory may provide a tactical advantage to the class
action lawsuit which typifies tax escrow account litigation. As the circumstances
surrounding the payments are instrumental in the determination of the mortga-
gor's intention and therefore the applicability of a resulting trust, the similarity of
circumstances arising from the dealings of one lending institution facilitates the
class treatment. A constructive trust theory has similar advantages. As an advo-
cate of the resulting trust theory, one has several possible contentions. He can
point to the limited purpose of the escrow payments and to other factors leading
to a strong inference that the mortgagor intended to keep the beneficial in-
erest in his tax payments. "The mortgagor could require the bank to rebut this
inference by showing, perhaps, that it was the bank's policy and practice to raise
this matter routinely with prospective mortgagors. If the bank cannot demonstrate
that its usual practice was to inform borrowers that they would not receive any
interest or earnings from the bank's investment of their tax excrow payments, it
will be difficult for the bank to argue effectively against the finding of a result-
ing trust." Without such disclosure it will be difficult to prove that the mortgagors
desired to give away any beneficial interest in their payments to the mortgagee.
Comment, supra note 1, at 528-29.
24. Traditionally, resulting trusts have been found where an express trust
fails, where an express trust is fully performed and there remains a surplus in the
trust estate, and where property is purchased with funds supplied by A, but legal
title is transfered to B. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS ,§ 411, 430, 440
(1959). The last kind of resulting trust is commonly called a "purchase money
resulting trust." See G. & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRusTs AND TRUSTEES § 454
(3d ed. 1964). It has been suggested that the only traditional resulting trust similar
to that which may exist in Carpenter is the purchase money resulting trust. See
Comment, supra note 1, at 525-29.
25. 5 A. Scorr, supra note 20, § 404.1.
26. - Mass. at - 291 N.E.2d at 614.
27. 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 139 (1955).
28. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS ch. 12, at 326 (1959) (introductory
note to topic 1).
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Buchanan marks the most significant advancement of the trust theory
by an appellate court. Only the Buchanan court treated the constructive
trust theory as stating a cause of action. Not really a legal trust at all,
a constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to prevent the unjust
enrichment of one party at the expense of another.29
In seeking the imposition of a constructive trust, the plaintiffs in
Buchanan contended that a confidential relationship arose between
themselves and the mortgagees as a result of the relative position of the
parties to the mortgage transaction. 30 As the primary basis for their cause
of action, the plaintiffs asserted that the mortgagees' retention of the
escrow fund profits had breached this confidential relationship. The
court stated that proof of the existence of a confidential relationship
is sufficient justification for imposing a constructive trust, unless the
party with the dominant position can prove "by dear and satisfactory
evidence" that the contract was not tainted by his superior bargaining
position.3S
A second theory offered by the plaintiffs in support of the imposition
of a constructive trust was based on the alleged existence of an agency
relationship between the mortgagors and mortgagees. If an agent makes
an unauthorized use of his principal's money for his own advantage, a
court may appropriately decree the equitable remedy of a constructive
trust.3 2 The court agreed with this reasoning, stating that the plaintiffs
could prevail on this theory if it could be proven on remand that the
mortgage agreement contemplated such an agency relationship.33
Unjust enrichment was the third theory proposed by the plaintiffs as
a basis for declaring the mortgagees constructive trustees of the earned
profits. In reply to this proposal, the court stated that the fundamental
question was whether "the conscience of equity" would conclude that the
mortgagees would be unjustly enriched should they be allowed to keep
the profits from the escrow funds.3 4 In general, equity will impose a con-
structive trust when property has been acquired in such circumstances that
the one who holds the legal right to the property ought not in equity and
good conscience retain the beneficial interest therein.35 It is well-settled
that this remedy will be imposed whenever justice or the need for fair
dealing warrant it.36
The dissent in Buchanan believed that the complaint did state a cause
of action on the constructive trust theory, but also said that the complaint
29. 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 139 (1955).
30. A fiduciary or confidential relationship may arise from the relative
standing of the parties to a transaction. Triesler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 817,
168 S.W.2d 1030, 1036 (1943).
31. 457 Pa. 135. , 320 A.2d 117, 127 (1974).
32. REsrATE MNT (SECOND) oF AGENCY §§ 13, 387, 388 (1958).
33. 457 Pa. at . 320 A.2d at 128.
34. Id.
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itself violated a Pennsylvania rule of civil procedure requiring a complaint
to state specifically whether any claim set forth therein is based upon a
writing.37 This objection underscores an advantage of a constructive trust
theory. The mortgage agreement itself can destroy the express trust theory
because the language of the agreement can be drafted to negate expressly
any intention to create a trust. A constructive trust is not based upon the
intent of the parties and no amount of careful draftsmanship can circum-
vent this theory.
Missouri courts have set forth standards for the imposition of a con-
structive trust applicable to mortgage escrow account litigation. It has
been held that a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists whenever
confidence is reposed by one party and the other exerts a resulting in-
fluence or superiority on the reposing party.38 The origin of this confi-
dence and its resulting influence are immaterial.39 However, there must be
evidence of some inequality, dependence, or weakness coexisting with the
granting of this confidence before a constructive trust will be imposed.40
It is of no consequence that the constructive trustee acted in good faith
or without actual intent to defraud.41
The Buchanan rationale illustrates the inherent flexibility of estab-
lished trust and constructive trust doctrines. Before relying on the Bu-
chanan case, however, a thorough examination of the mortgage agreements
in question is necessary, because mortgagors filing similar actions should
expect close judicial scrutiny of these agreements. Further decisions in
this area are likely to be on a case by case basis.
The most satisfactory remedy to the problem of tax and insurance
escrow accounts lies in recourse to the legislatures. A recent New York
statute requires the payment of interest at a rate to be established peri-
odically by a Banking Board, but in no event less than two percent per
annum. 42 Additionally, the legislation prohibits the imposition of service
charges on escrow accounts. The latter provision is a substantial victory for
the potential mortgagor entering the housing market, because the in-
creased costs of "administration" of the system may well have been passed
on to him in its absence. This "passing on" result is inherent in a Mass-
achusetts law, which requires a mortgagee to pay interest in a manner
determined by the mortgagee.48 The net effect of this latter provision may
be to require future borrowers to pay for the administrative costs incident
to the maintenance of an escrow account, a service that has traditionally
been provided free of charge. Nevertheless, resolution of the consumer's
37. 457 Pa. at - 320 A.2d at 128.
38. Trieseler v. Helmbacher, 350 Mo. 807, 168 S.W.2d 1030 (1943).
39. Id. at 817, 168 S.W.2d at 1036.
40. Cohn v. Jefferson Savings and Loan Ass'n, 349 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Mo.
1961); Gates Hotel Co. v. C.R.H. Davis Real Estate Co., 331 Mo. 94, 52 S.W.2d
1011 (1932).
41. Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1955).
42. N.Y. B.xNG LAw § 119 (McKinney 1974).
43. MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 183, § 61 (Supp. 1974).
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dissatisfaction with the present escrow account system can be achieved
through the elimination of such hidden charges coupled with legislative
requirements that mortgagors be credited in some manner with the
profits derived from the investment of their escrowed funds.
MICHAEL E. KAEMMERER
TAXATION-ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX NOT
APPLICABLE TO A PUBLICLY HELD
CORPORATION
Golconda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner'
Section 581 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes a tax on
earnings which a corporation unreasonably accumulates instead of dis-
tributing as dividends.2 The purpose of the tax is to discourage the use of
a corporation as a tax shelter for individual shareholders-e.g., where it
would be advantageous for the shareholder to have earnings disbursed
at a later date when tax conditions are more favorable to him. The purpose
of the tax is to deter tax avoidance by the shareholders of a corporation,
rather than any avoidance by the corporation itself. The more independent
management is from one or a few of the shareholders, the less likely it
is that the corporation will retain its earnings for the tax benefit of indi-
vidual shareholders. Thus, the likelihood of the accumulated earnings
tax being imposed is greatest where a single group of shareholders has
effective control over corporate dividend policy.3 On the other hand, a
corporation with a large number of shareholders and independent man-
agement would have little reason to fear imposition of the tax. 4
The Commissioner has generally assessed the tax only against closely
held corporations,3 although there is no specific statutory provision mak-
ing a distinction between closely held and publicly held corporations.6
1. 507 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974), Tev'g 58 T.C. 139 (1972).
2. "In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby
imposed for each taxable year on the accumulated taxable income... an accumu-
lated earnings tax. .. ." INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
3. For an interesting side effect, see Barker, The Accumulated Earnings Tax
as a Deterrent to Business Diversification of Close Corporations, 16 KAN. L. Rxv.
98, 103 (1967), where it is pointed out that small closely held corporations are
deterred from retaining funds in preparation for expansion into a different area
of business due to fear of the accumulated earnings tax and a statutory presumption
that these funds are being accumulated for the purposes of avoiding income tax.
4. See note 7 infra. See generally B. Brirrxn & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATiON OF COR'OR.A7IONS AN SHAREHOLDERS f 8.02 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Bnrxrm & EusT=cg].
5. Robson, Corporate Liquidity, Reserves, and the Accumulated Earnings
Tax, 51 N. CAR. L. Ruv. 81, 82, n.6 (1972).
6. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 532 (a) provides:
General Rule-The accumulated earnings tax imposed by Section
1976]
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Stockholder pressure in a publicly held corporation, including potential
shareholder derivative actions, is usually an even greater incentive for
management to declare dividends than the tax imposed by section 531.7
On at least one occasion, however, the government has attempted to im-
pose the tax on a corporation with relatively broad ownership.8 The
application of the tax to a corporation with a large number of share-
holders is an issue which has troubled the business world 9 and which had
not been confronted under the 1954 Code prior to Golconda.
Golconda Mining Corporation was a publicly held Idaho corporation.
During the years in issue, it had from 1,500 to 2,900 shareholders and the
management group owned or controlled no more than 12 to 17 percent of
its stock.' 0 Golconda was assessed with the accumulated earnings tax for the
years 1962 through 1966. The Tax Court found that for the years 1962
through 1965 Golconda did not accumulate its earnings beyond the
reasonable needs of its business. For the year 1966, however, Golconda
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its accumula-
tion was not for avoidance of income tax. The Tax Court held, therefore,
that Golconda was subject to the accumulated earnings tax."
The threshold question that the Tax Court faced in Golconda was
whether the accumulated earnings tax could be assessed against a pub-
licly held corporation.' 2 The Tax Court looked at the manner in which the
company was managed to negate public ownership.'3 Then, in reliance on
the Trico Products cases, 14 decided under the 1939 Code, the Tax Court held
that the tax was applicable.' 5 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the accumulated earnings tax does not apply to
publicly held corporations.' 6 Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service
531 shall apply to evety corporation . . . formed or availed of for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders...
by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being di-
vided of distributed (emphasis added).
7. Brlr&r & EusncE, supra note 4, If 8.02, at 8-6; Whitmore, The Accumu-
lated Earnings Tax: Where We Are-Major Developments 1965-1966, 16 TUL.
TAx INsT. 230, 232 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Whitmore].
8. There has been only one instance since adoption of the 1913 Revenue
Act, aside from Golconda. Trico Prod. Corp. v. McGowan, 169 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.),
cert. den., 835 U.S. 899 (1948); Trico Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 187 F.2d 424 (2d Cir,),
cert, den., 320 U.S. 799 (1943). See text accompanying notes 23-24 infra. See gen-
erally 7 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 39.54 (1967 rev'n).
9. See, e.g., Davison & Davis, Golconda Mining Corp. Forebodes 531 Attacks
on Publicly Held Corporations, 51 TAxEs 371, 378 (1973).
10. Golconda Mining Corp. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 139, 158 (1972).
11. Id. at 157.
12. Id.
13. See note 21 and accompanying text, infra.
14. Trico Prod. Corp. v. McGowan, 169 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 335 U.S.
899 (1948); Trico Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert den., 320 U.S.
799 (1943).
15. Golconda Mining Corp. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 189, 159 (1972).
16. 507 F.2d at 597.
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isued a non-acquiesence bulletin stating that it does not accept the court
of appeals' decision in Golconda.17
The decision of the court of appeals in Golconda makes the determina-
tion whether a corporation is publicly held a critical issue in cases involv-
ing the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax. Corporations with a
large number of shareholders, such as Golconda, undoubtedly need to
know if they will be considered publicly held and thereby avoid the ap-
plication of the accumulated earnings tax.18 Unfortunately, the court of
appeals' decision in Golconda does not specify what factors a court should
consider in making the determination whether a corporation is publicly
held for purposes of the accumulated earnings tax. The case is subject
to three different interpretations 19 with respect to how this determination is
to be made.
First, Golconda could be narrowly read on its facts as simply saying
that a corporation like Golconda is a publicly held corporation, and there-
fore the tax is not applicable. Under this view, the predominant guideline
in the field would be a series of cases which arose in the 1940's involving
the Trico Products Corporation.2 0 Until Golconda, these cases had been
the only instances of application of the tax to a publicly held corporation
(approximately 2,200 stockholders). Under this approach, corporations
with a large number of shareholders may be found to be not publicly held,
and thus subject to the accumulated earnings tax. In Golconda, the Tax
Court looked at the manner in which the company had been managed
to override the fact that the corporation was owned by many shareholders.2 1
Notwithstanding reversal of the Tax Court on appeal, it is arguable that,
under a narrow reading of the court of appeals' opinion in Golconda, courts
will still examine the manner in which a corporation is managed to decide
the threshold question whether the corporation is publicly held for pur-
poses of the accumulated earnings tax.22
17. Rev. Rul. 75-305, 1975 INT. Rxv. BuL. No. 30 at 12.
18. For example, to decide if they can safely retain funds in preparation
for expansion into a different area of business: See note 3, supra.
19. A fourth possible interpretation may exist. A specific statutory excep-
tion for publicly held corporations was offered by the House of Representatives
in the enactment of the 1954 Code. It would have excluded all corporations which
could produce records showing that no more than 10 percent of its stock was
held by one family. H. R. RyEP. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 532 (1954). This
provision was rejected by the Senate because of the difficulty of proof a corpora-
tion would have, considering the type of records which would have to be pro-
duced. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954). It can be argued that this
was an implicit adoption of the House standard, but a rejection of the stringent
proof requirement.
20. Trico Prod. Corp. v. McGowan, 169 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 335 U.S.
899 (1948); Trico Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 320 U.S.
799 (1943).
21. We are mindful, however, that the imposition of this tax upon a pub-
licly held company should only occur where the fact of public ownership
is neutralized by the manner in which the company has been managed.
58 T.C. at 158.
22. Cf. BiTrrr E EusricE, supra note 4, j. 8.02, at 8-5, 8-6, where it is stated
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The second possible approach is to limit Trico to its facts and treat
Golconda as setting forth the general rule that almost all widely held cor-
porations will be found to be publicly held and thereby avoid imposition
of the accumulated earningstax. This interpretation is supported by several
factors. First, Tricd dealt withan ufiusual set of facts. A group of 21 share-
holders 'held between 62 and 68 percent of the company's total shares, either
directly 'or indirectly through ownership of 85 percent' Of a holding com-
pany which in 'turn owned 55 percent of Trico's' stock. Three-quarters of
Trico's shareholders were substantially benefited by its accumulation of
earnings and over $3,000,000. in personal income taxes were avoided. 28
Second, although, the court of 'appeals in Golconda recognized Trico with-
out overruling it, it specifically pointed out that Trico should not be re-
lied upon because of its unusual facts.24 Third, nearly 30 years passed
between Trico and Golconda without any other cases allowing the accumu-
lated earnings tax to be assessed against a publicly held corporation. Under
this second interpretation, courts would not examine the manner in which
a corporation is managed to negate the fact that the corporation is owned
by many shareholders. Obviously, such an approach would be advantageous
to the corporation involved.
The final interpretation is based on the legislative history of section
531. In enacting the 1954 Code the Senate rejected a proposed House ex-
clusion for publicly held corporations, but it did recognize that "as a
practical matter, the provision' has been applied only in cases where 50
percent or more of the stock of a.corporation is held by a limited group."25
The court of appeals -pointed out that this recognition takes on special
meaning when coupled with. the rule that treasury interpretations long
continued without substantial change, applying to substantially reenacted
statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and to have
the effect of law.26 Under this rationale, the standard would appear to be
absolute; however, a counterargument rests on Senate recognition that the
tax was theoretically applicable to publicly held, as well as closely held,
corporations.27 The Tax Cdurit in Golconda had relied on this "theoret-
ically applicable" language to conclude "as a matter of law that the ac-
that publicly held corporations have little to fear if management is independent
and not under the domination of a few large shareholders, and if individual stock-
holdings are sufficiently diffused so that no single group can effectively control
corporate dividend polfcy. See also Whitmore, supra note 7, at 233.
23. "'In the Trico cases six men dominated the operation of the company
and ... avoided personal income taxes of $3,085,000." Tierney & Trokko, Tax
Court's Golconda Mining Decidon: What Are Its Implications in the 531 Area?, 32
J. TAx. 290, 291 (1972).
24. 507 F.2d at 596.
25. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954). The House also rec-
ognized this and further stated "the area of tax avoidance through a retention of
corporate earnings is confined to closely held companies." H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1954).
26 Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
27. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1954).
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cumulated earnings tax can apply 'to 'publicly held corportions." 28 The
holding of the court of appeals in' Golconda has two significant features;
First, there is an implicit rejection of any argument based on the "the-
oretically applicable" language found in the Senate report.2 9 Second, it
most likely draws the line between closely held and publicly held corpora-
tions at a limited group holding 50 percent or more of the stock.80
Regardless of what test is ultimately adhered to by the courts; the
impact of Golconda will be primarily one of relief to 'publicly held corpora-
tions after two and one-half years of confusion following the Tax Court's
decision. It also represents a retreat from the ever-increasing intrusion of
revenue agents and federal judges into the policy-making role of corporate
management.31 Golconda gives superficial relief to publicly held corpora-
tions by holding the tax not applicable in this case, but its overall effect is
to shift the emphasis to the criteria to be established in determining whether
a corporation is publicly held. No matter what standard is adopted, it
would seem that in the extreme case, such as that of .a publicly held
corporation deliberately availing itself to upper. bracket shareholders with
an announced policy of accumulating investment incomie,, the court will
find a -way to impose the tax of section 531.82
R. MIiHAEL BARON
WILLS - THE PRETERMITTED BIEIR IN MISSOURI
Vogel v. Mercantile Trust Company National Association'
The will of a testatrix who died in 1921 devised the residue of her
estate to a trustee to pay income to her only child for life, and then to
distribute ihe trust property to the namea bnly child of the life bene-
ficiary. Two more children were born to the life beneficiary after the
death of the testatrix. The life beneficiary, died in 1970. His two younger
children sued the trustee and their older sibling seeking intestate shares
in the, estate of the testatrix under the pretermitted heir statute in force
in 1921.2 The trial court sustained defendant's motion' for summary
28. 58 T.C. at 158.
29. Although the court recognized that this ,was the basis of the Tax Court
decision, it did not expressly reject this rationale. 507 l.2d at 595 96.
30. Id. at 597.
31. See Simons, The Gathering Storm of Section 531 of Our Tax Law, 44
TAmcs 528, 529 (1966).
32. BrrrKt & EusTE, supra note 4, f 8.08, at 8-80. See Whitmore, ,supra note
7, at 283.
1. 511 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1974).
2. ,Section 514, RSMo 1919, provided:
If any person make his last will, and- die, leaving a child or children,
or descendants of such child or children in case of their death, .not named
or provided for in such will, although born after -the *making. of such
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judgment on the ground that testatrix's only child, the father of the
plaintiffs, was named and provided for in the will. Thus, had testatrix
died intestate, plaintiffs would still have received nothing because their
father, who was then living, would have been the sole heir.3
The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment,4
stating that the statutory provisions for a child or children and for des-
cendants of such child or children in case of their death were made in
the alternative, and the word "their" necessarily referred back to "child
or children." 5 Thus, the provision for "descendants" did not become op-
erational unless a child or children did not survive the testator. The
plaintiffs tried to distinguish their case by the fact that their father
only received the income for life and thus could not leave anything to
his children, and by the fact that the fee estate did not vest in possession
until his death. The court found no merit in this argument, saying "[w]e
cannot see that this makes any difference." 6 The court cited Lawnich
v. Schultz7 for the proposition that any provision at all for the surviving
child is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. A contrary
holding would have meant that any descendant of a testator not provided
for or expressly excluded by a will, even one born years after the testator's
death, could demand the intestate share to which he would have been
entitled had his parent not survived the testator.
The idea behind pretermitted heir statutes, that of preventing un-
intentional disinheritance, has a long history. Under Roman law, a
person's children were entitled to a certain portion of their parents'
estate called a legitime. In order to defeat the rights of children in his
estate a testator was required to declare his intention expressly and name
or designate dearly the one to be disinherited.8 The law would not permit
the intention to disinherit to be inferred from silence. A child left out
could bring an action called querela inofficiosi testamenti, claiming
will, or the' death of the testator, every such testator, so far as shall regard
any such child: or children, or their descendants, not provided for, shall
be deemed to die intestate; and such child or children, or their descend-
. ants, shall be entitled to such proportion of the estate of the testator,
real and personal, as if he had died intestate.
The history of this statute and its subsequent amendment is discussed infra.
Plaintiffs also relied on section 304, RSMo 1919, which provided for inheritance
by posthumous descendants, contending that it brought them within the opera-
tion of section 514. The court dismissed this contention, saying that by definition
a posthumous descendant is one conceived during the lifetime of the testator
iliereas the plaintiffs here were born years after the testatrix's death.
3. 511 S.W.2d at 786.
4. Id. at 790.
5. Id. at 787.
6. Id.
7. 325 Mo. 294, 28 S.W.2d 658 (En Banc 1930). A five dollar bequest to a
daughter deceased at the execution of the will was held sufficient to exclude
her children from the, operation of the statute.
8. JUSTINIAN's INSrrrUtrs, Lib. 2, Tit. 13.
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unjust disinheritance, to have the will set aside.9 Under modem civil
law a system of forced heirs still restrains one's freedom of testation. 14
Certain heirs, generally the testator's parents and descendants, cannot
be deprived of their allotted share of the testator's estate, except for cer-
tain defined reasons which must be set out expressly in the will, along
with the name of the party to be disinherited.1
In early England a similar system of forced shares was enforced by
the ecclesiastical courts with regard to personal property.12 This practice
began to die out in the fourteenth century,13 but lasted until 1703 in
York and 1724 in London, having been expressly preserved by the Statute
of Distribution.' 4 Before the Statute of Wills in 154015 no testamentary
transfers of real property were allowed. After 1540 a tenant in fee simple
could devise two-thirds of his land held by military tenure, and all land
held by socage tenure. In 1660, when military tenure was converted into
socage tenure, a testator had complete freedom of testation as to his
real property.' 6 Thus from the time of the Restoration, English law
allowed a testator to cut off his heirs at law from succession to land by
will for any reason or no reason at all.
Soon afterwards, however, the English courts established the doc-
trine of revocation of a will by implication of law from change of cir-
cumstance.17 The earliest known case to enunciate this doctrine was
Overbury v. Overbury in 1682,'1 where it was held that the birth of a
child revoked a previously executed will bequeathing personal property.
In this case it was expressly stated that the doctrine was based on the
9. JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUrEs, Lib. 2, Tit. 18; 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*503. Cicero tells of a case where a father willed his estate to a stranger upon the
mistaken belief that his son was dead. Upon petition the son was reinstated
to his inheritance. CICrao, DE ORAT. Lib. 1, c. 38.
10. ILA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1493-95 (West 1952).
11. Id. at art. 1617-21. The application of the civil law rule of forced
heirs concerning disinheritance of descendants is illustrated by Walet v. Darby,
167 La. 1095, 120 So. 869 (1929).
12. H. SWINBURN ON TEsTA NmTs AND WILLS, pt. 3, § 16. See also W.D. MAC-
DONALD, FRAUD ON THE Wmow's SHARE (1960).
13. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *493; Fratcher, Toward Uniforn Suc-
cession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1037, 1051 (1966).
14. Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, § 4 (1670); W. BLACKsTONE,
supra note 13, at *519.
15. 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540). However, a tenant in fee simple could accomplish
the same result by means of a feoffment to the use of the feoffor or to such uses as
he might by will appoint or some similar use of the use device. See Fratcher,
Uses of Uses, 34 Mo. L. Rrv. 39, 52 (1969).
16. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *12; Fratcher, supra note 15.
17. See generally Graunke and Beuscher, The Doctrine of Implied Revoca-
tion of Wills by Reason of Change in Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L.
REv. 386, 387-94 (1930).
18. 2 Show. 242, 89 Eng. Rep. 915 (1682). "[]f a man make his will and
dispose of his personal estate amongst his relations and afterwards has children
and dies... this is a revocation of his will." Graunke and Beuscher, supra note 17,
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civil law querela inofficiosura testamentum.19 In later cases this doctrine was
clarified to require both the birth of issue and marriage subsequent to
the will in question,2 0 was extended to devises of land21 and made post-
humous children possible heirs.2 Two theories were given for revocation
in these cases: (1) to give effect to the assumed intent of the testator
to revoke his will on such a drastic change in circumstances, 23 and (2)
as a tacit condition annexed to the will itself, at the time it was made,
that the testator did not intend that it should take effect if there should
be a total change in the situation of his family.24
This is as far as the English doctrine progressed in the courts, 25
and the common law rule remained that birth of issue alone did not
revoke the will of a man made subsequent to his marriage.10 The reason
given for this rule was that after marriage a man is presumed to con-
template the birth of issue and to take this into account when making
his will.2t The Wills Act of 1837 did away with the doctrine of revocation
on marriage and birth of issue 28 and provided for revocation of a will by
implication of law only upon a subsequent marriage.29 This remained the
state of the law in England until passage of the Inheritance (Family
Provision) Act in 1938.30
19. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
20. Lugg v. Lugg, 2 Salk. 592, 91 Eng. Rep. 497 (1689).
21. Brown v. Thoman, 1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 413, 21 Eng. Rep. 1142 (1701).
22. Christopher v. Christopher, 4 Bur. 2182, 98 Eng. Rep. 138 (1771).
23. Lugg v. Lugg, 2 Salk. 592, 91 Eng. Rep. 497 (1689).
24. Doe ex dem. Lancashire v. Lancashire, 5 T.R. 49, 101 Eng. Rep. 28 (1792).
25. See Johnston v. Johnston, 1 Phill. Ecc. 447, 161 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1817).
Here the court admitted that there had been no previous case where birth of
children alone or marriage alone had been sufficient to revoke a will. Neverthe-
less, referring to civil law, it seemed to say that birth of issue alone might be
enough if accompanied by "other strong circumstances." See 4 J. KENT, CoN Ntxw-
TARIEs ON A xxucAN LA.v 524 (13th ed. 1884).
26. Easterlin v. Easterlin, 62 Fla. 468, 56 So. 688 (1911); W. PAGE, TNE LAW
oF Wnis § 514, at 943 (3d ed. 1941). The common law rule was enacted in Mis-
souri by Section 7, at 1079, RSMo 1845 (superseded and repealed in 1955 by
Section 474.240 RSMo 1969).
27. W. PAGE, note 26 supra.
28. 1 Vict., c. 26, § 19 (1837), provides: "No will shall be revoked by any
presumption of an intention on the ground of an alteration in circumstances."
29. Id. at § 18. See Note, 17 Mica. L. Rxv. 331, 332 (1919).
30. 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45, §1, provides in part:
Whereas, after the commencement of this Act, a person dies domiciled in
England leaving-
a) a wife or husband;
b) a daughter who has not been married, or who is, by reason of some
mental or physical disability, incapable of maintaining herself;
c) an infant son; or
d) a son who is, by reason of some mental or physical disability, incapable
of maintaining himself; and leaving a will, then, if the court ... is of
the opinion that the will does not make reasonable provision for the
maintenance ..., the court may order that such reasonable provision as
the court thinks fit shall ... be made out of the testators net estate for
the maintenance of that dependent. ....
The Intestates Estates Act, 15 &c 16 Geo. 6 &c 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64, § 7 (1952), extended the
[Vol. 41
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In this country the common law rule that the birth of issue alone
would not revoke a previous will was not well received because it fre-
quently resulted in disinheriting after-born children whom the testator
probably never meant to disinherit. Early in the history of the American
colonies statutes were enacted to mitigate the consequences of the com-
mon law rule,3 1 the earliest being enacted in Massachusetts in 1700.32
These statutes generally provided that if the testator did not mention
or provide for his children in his will, he was considered to die intestate
as to those not mentioned. The origin of these statutes is undear, because
there was no English precedent for them. It may be that they were de-
rived from the Roman law idea of inofficiosurn testamentum, but they
may have developed on their own from the same sense of parental ob-
ligation which inspired the Roman law.33 Unlike the civil law system of
forced heirs, the American pretermitted heir statutes are based upon a
presumption that the omission of the child is unintentional and that
the actual intention of the testator is not to disinherit his issue.3 4
The first Missouri pretermitted heir statute was enacted by the leg-
islature of the Territory of Louisiana on July 4, 1807. 35 It was reenacted
with no significant changes in language, by the legislature of the Terri-
tory of Missouri in 181536 and again by the General Assembly of the
provision to intestates' estates. See Crane, Family Provision On Death in English
Law, 35 N.Y.U.L. R.v. 984 (1960).
31, KENT, supra note 25, at 526-27.
32. 1 Acrs AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MAssAcisusms B.Y, Ch. 4, at
430 (1700), provides in part:
That any child or children not having a legacy given them in the will of
their father or mother, every such child shall have a proportion of the
estate of their parents given and set out unto them as the law directs
for the distribution of the estates of intestates.
33. See Dainow, Inheritance by Pretermitted Children, 32 ILL. L. REv. 1
(1937); Mathews, Pretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of Statutes, 29 COLUm. L. REv.
748 (1929); Touster, Testamentary Freedom and Social Control-After-born Chil-
dren, 6 Btr .o L. REv. 251 (1957). Dainow conjectures that the common law
revocation upon marriage and birth of issue was changed by substituting the
word "or" for "and' making it marriage or birth of issue. The next step was
separation of birth of issue from marriage. GA. CODE § 113-408 (1933) is given as
an example of the intermediate form. Dainow, supra, at 2.
34. McCourtney v. Mathes, 47 Mo. 533, 535 (1870); Guitar v. Gordon, 17
Mo. 408, 411 (1854); Block v. Block, 3 Mo. 594 (1834); Dainow, supra note 33,
at 3; Mathews, supra note 32, at 749; Note, The Establishment of the Rights of
Pretermitted Children Born Prior to the Execution of a Will, 16 IowA L. REv.
244 (1930). For a summary of American pretermitted heir statutes as of 1960, see
Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 892-98 (1960).
35. Act of July 4, 1807, 1 Trait. LAws, p. 132, § 22, provides in part:
Where any person shall make his or her last will and testament and
omits to mention the name of any child or children or afterwards shall
marry or have a child or children not provided for in any such will, and
die leaving a widow and child, or either widow or child, although such
child be born after the death of its father, every such person, so far as shall
regard the widow or such child or children, shall be deemed to die in-
testate....
36. Act of Jan. 21, 1815, 1 Trut. LAws, p. 405, § 28.
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State of Missouri in 1821.37 The origin of this statute is also unclear,
but the French civil law influence might have provided part of the in-
spiration. Perhaps this explains why this early statute applied whenever
a pretermitted heir was not "provided for," which implied the receipt of
some beneficial interest, whereas later statutesa8 have required that the
heir be "not mentioned." The pretermitted heir statute in force until
1955 was enacted in 1825 with substantially different wording but with
the same meaning as the 1821 statute.3 9 After Block v. Block40 in 1834,
in which it was questioned whether an express disinheritance was a
"providing for" with the meaning of the statute, the General Assembly
at its October term that same year amended the statute to read "not
named or provided for" to make it clear that the child need not receive
any positive benefit.41
The Missouri courts have given their statute a different interpreta-
tion from that of many other states, notably the "Massachusetts type"
statute.4 2 As early as 1857 the Missouri Supreme Court said in Bradley
v. Bradley43 that the Missouri statute, unlike the Massachusetts statute,
does not take into account mistake or intentional omission; thus, if a
child is not mentioned, the statute automatically operates.4 4 In this re-
spect the Missouri statute operates mechanically-i.e., if children are not
sufficiently mentioned in the will the statute applies no matter what
other evidence shows that the testator in fact intended to disinherit the
omitted child.4 5 The severity of this rule was somewhat eased in later
cases by the holding that the child need not be mentioned by name and
that any reference which indicates that the omitted party was in the
mind of the testator is sufficient to satisfy the statute.40 The net effect
37. Act of Dec. 1, 1821, 1 Tr.R. LAWS, p. 787, § 4.
38. See, e.g., MAss. GFN. LAws ANN. C. 191, § 20 (1958).
39. Block v. Block, 3 Mo. 594, 597 (1884).
40. Id. This was the first recorded case to interpret this statute.
41. Bradley v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311, 312 (1857).
42. The "Massachusetts type" statute is similar to Missouri's except that it
contains the qualifying phrase "unless they have been provided for by the
testator in his life dine or unless it appears that the omission was intentional and
not occasioned by accident or mistake." MAss. Gnu. LAws ANN. C. 191, § 20 (1958),
as amended, (Supp. 1969). See 26A C.J.S. Descent 6 Distribution, § 45 at 590
(1956).
43. 24 Mo. 811 (1857).
44. Williamson v. Roberts, 187 S.W. 19 (Mo. 1916); Bradley v. Bradley, 24
Mo. 311, 312 (1857).
45. Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); Thomas v. Black, 113
Mo. 66, 20 S.W. 657 (1892); Bradley v. Bradley, 24 Mo. 311 (1857).
46. Zillig v. Patzer, 865 Mo. 787, 287 S.W.2d 771 (1956) ("Between all of
you" held sufficient naming of children); Miller v. Aven, 827 Mo. 20, 34 S.W.2d
116 (En Banc 1980) (S5 to daughter who predeceased testatrix sufficient to
prevent pretermission of her children); Ernshaw v. Smith, 2 S.W.2d 803 (Mo.
1928) (contingent remainder to grandchildren who survive life tenant sufficient
providing for all grandchildren); Fitzsimmons v. Quinn, 282 S.W. 37 (Mo. 1926)
(appointment as executor sufficient for son); Woods v. Drake, 185 Mo. 893, 87
S.W. 109 (1896) (naming four grandchildren satisfies statute as to their mother);
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is that under a Massachusetts-type statute extrinsic evidence is admitted
to show an intention to disinherit,47 whereas in Missouri any evidence
offered to rebut the presumption of inadvertent omission must appear
within the four comers of the will.48 Because of this, the Missouri statute
has in many instances operated to defeat the true intention of the tes-
tator, in that the presumption that an omission of a child or descendant
is unintentional may often be unsound. Thus, despite the assertions of
the courts to the contrary,49 it is a kind of ritual formalism that governs
whether the testator's omitted heir can take, not the testator's true in-
tention.
In 1955, as part of a major revision of Missouri's probate code, the
previous pretermitted heir statute was repealed and replaced by section
474.240, RSMo 1969. 50 Although no reported decisions have yet inter-
preted this statute, it would appear to make three substantial changes
in prior Missouri law as to pretermitted children. First, it expressly
applies only to children born or adopted after the making of the testator's
last will, while the previous statute applied to children born both prior
Hockensmith v. Slusher, 26 Mo. 237 (1858) (bequest to son-in-law sufficient for
daughter); Beck v. Metz, 25 Mo. 70 (1857) ("children" sufficient for daughter).
In Hockensmith the court set out the general rule:
[W'henever the mention of one person, by a natural association of ideas,
suggests another, it may reasonably be inferred that the latter was in the
mind of the testator and was not forgotten or unintentionally omitted.
Hockensmith v. Slusher, supra, at 240.
47. White v. White, 322 Mass. 30, 76 N.E.2d 15 (1947); Buckley v. Gerard,
123 Mass. 8 (1877); Wilson v. Fosket, 6 Met. (Mass.) 400 (1843); W. PAGE, TnE
LAw OF Wxus § 530 at 992 (3d ed. 1941); King, Statutory Status of Pretermitted
Heirs, 13 BOSTON U. L. REv. 672 (1933); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 209 (1935).
48. Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707 (1944); Conrad v. Conrad,
280 S.W. 707 (Mo. 1926); Pounds v. Dale, 48 Mo. 270 (1871); Batley v. Batley,
239 Mo. App. 664, 193 S.W.2d 64 (K.C. Ct. App. 1946); W. PAGE, note 47 supra,§ 530 at 990; Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26, 211 (1935).
49. Guitar v. Gordon, 17 Mo. 408 (1853); Block v. Block, 3 Mo. 594 (1834).
In Block the court said: "The true intent of the testator is to govern all things
and where it is dear it must prevail." Id. at 596.
50. Section 474.240, RSMo 1969, corresponds to section 41 of The Model
Probate Code and provides:
1. When a testator fails in his will to mention or provide for any
of his children born or adopted after the making of his last will, such
child, whether born before or after the testator's death, shall receive a
share in the estate of the testator equal in value to that which he would
have received if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears from the
will that such omission was intentional, or unless when the will was exe-
cuted the testator had one or more children known to him to be living
and devised substantially all his estate to his surviving spouse.
2. If, at the time of the making of his will, the testator believes that
any of his children are dead, and fails to provide for such child in his
will, the child shall receive a share in the estate of the testator equal in
value to that which he would have received if the testator bad died in-
testate, unless it appears from the will or from other evidence that the
testator would not have devised anything to such child had he known
that the child was alive.
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to and after the making of the will.51 This change recognizes the fact
that it is highly unlikely that a parent would inadvertently omit a child
who was alive when the will was made. Section 474.240(2) makes an
exception where the testator believed, at the time of the execution of the
will, that a child born prior to the will was dead, unless it appears that
the omitted child would have taken nothing anyway. Second, the statute
is inapplicable to after-born children if the testator had one or more
children living at the time the will was executed and devised substan-
tially all of his estate to his spouse.52 Third, and most significant with
respect to the question raised in Vogel, no provision is made for omitted
grandchildren or more remote issue.53
The Uniform Probate Code was promulgated for adoption in August
1969 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in cooperation with the American Bar Association Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law.54 In late 1972 the Subcommittee for
Revision of Missouri Probate Laws was appointed by the Missouri
Bar Committee on Probate and Trusts and in subsequent meetings the
Subcommittee decided that instead of seeking enactment of the Uniform
Probate Code in Missouri, it would use it as a drafting model for a bill
amending specific portions of the Missouri Probate Code of 1955. 5r
The Draft of the 1976 amendments to the Missouri Probate Code of
1955, 1 October 1975, which has been approved by the Probate and
Trusts Committee and the Board of Governors of The Missouri Bar,
would make several changes affecting the status of the pretermitted heir
in Missouri. Section 474.010 would be amended to conform to section
2-102 of the Uniform Probate Code,56 which gives the surviving spouse
the first $50,000 of the estate plus half of the remainder where there
is no issue by another spouse. Thus in most estates there would be no
intestate share left about which omitted children could dispute. Amended
section 474.060 would conform to section 2-109 of the Uniform Probate
Code,57 making illegitimates children of their father as well as of their
51. § 514, RSMo 1919. See, e.g., Goff v. Goff, 352 Mo. 809, 179 S.W.2d 707(1944); Thomas v. Black, 113 Mo. 66, 20 S.W. 657 (1892); Block v. Block, 3
Mo. 594 (1834).
52. See Editorial Comment, 26 V.A.M.S. 558 (1956).
53. For other articles concerning the pretermitted heir in Missouri, see
Elbert, Advancements and the Right of Retainer in Missouri, 18 Mo. L. REv.
249, 258 (1953); Fratcher, Trusts and Succession in Missouri, 28 Mo. L. Rzv.
467 (1958); Lewis, Adoption-Descent and Distribution-Right of Adopted Child
to Take from Natural Parent Under Pretermitted Heir Statute, 19 Mo. L. REv. 86
(1954).
54. To date eleven states have enacted the Uniform Probate Code: Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota and South Dakota. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 54 (Master
Ed., 1975 Supp.).
55. Proposed 1975 Amendments to the Missouri Probate Code of 1955, 30
J. Mo. B. 500 (1974).
56. UNIFoMt PROBATE CODE, § 2-102, 8 U.L.A. 323 (Master Ed. 1972).
57. Id. at § 2-109.
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mother for purposes of intestate succession if paternity is established and
the father had treated the child as his during his life. This would allow
a new group of people to claim an intestate share as a pretermitted heir.
Finally, the Draft of 1 October 1975 would substitute section 2-302 of
the Uniform Probate Code58 for present section 474.240. This amendment
would deprive children who would otherwise come within the statute
of an intestate share if the testator devises substantially all of his estate
to their "other parent" rather than his "surviving spouse," as the 1955
Code reads. Also, a new exception is added to the operation of the statute
where the testator has provided for the child outside of the will.5 9
The net effect of the 1955 Code is to make the pretermitted heir
statute a vehicle for furthering a testator's probable intent rather than
a trap to thwart the intention of the unwary. An attempt is made to
balance the societal values of parental duty and familial obligation which
call for the protection of children from disinheritance60 with the common
law idea of freedom of testation. Section 474.240 is an indication that
the ideal of freedom of testation is becoming predominant,6 1 at least
where disinheritance of descendants of the testator is concerned. The
amendments proposed by The Missour Bar would seem to be a continu-
ation of this trend.
STEVEN C. KRUEGER
58. Id. at § 2-302.
59. On October 18, 1975 the Board of Governors unanimously approved the
Draft of 1 October 1975 and recommended it for enactment by the General As-
sembly.
60. See Fratcher, Protection of the Family Against Disinheritance in American
Law, 14 INTL & Comp. L. Q. 298 (1965); Note, Limitations on Testamentary
Power in Missouri: Protection of the Spouse and Children of the Testator, 1954
WAsH. U.L.Q. 354. In the latter article the author advocates changing the pre-
termitted heir statute so as to give a minor child of the testator absolute pro-
tection against disinheritance.
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